THE BLACK BAG
OWNER'S MANUAL

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PART ONE

"SPOOKCENTRE"

SPOOKCENTRE: ESPIONAGE HEADQUARTERS

The establishment of a regional headquarters may, at times, be necessary for the full and complete evaluation of information. In operations in a war theatre for example, it may often be necessary to begin collection of essential elements of information concerning noteworthy individuals in the area. Individuals who, when viewed against the backdrop of national events, may not be worthwhile for inclusion in a national file are often vital on the local front.

Files may also be about things, as well as people. If, for example, there is a major enemy office or communications center in the area, it is well to have the specific information concerning the site.

Topography may also be slated for special attention. Sites with special applications exist in every area. For example, the only firm field in an area which can serve as a park for tanks and heavy equipment, the only flat bit of ground capable of conversion into a landing field, the major supply for fresh water for an area or city--all have special value.

The advantages of these operational goals are obvious: Individuals may be of very great importance in an area. Lock operators, hydroelectric personnel, political zealots, persons who may have enough knowledge to hamper or interdict

intelligence operations, persons who have influence on either side, and many others may be catalogued for future reference. Locations or installations which have particular importance in regard to or about local activities may be looked at: The major command center for traffic lights is one, radio stations and antenna arrays are another, along with telephone exchanges, arsenals the enemy has under his control, secret police offices or filing centers, and many more. Topographic items are often useful, for a reading of a map will never tell about the real conditions. A place that looks ideal for aeroplane landings may be interdicted by a string of high tension wires; this can be reduced in importance. Another item is an otherwise perfect tank park; it may have springs or clogged drains which make it too soggy for men, let alone tanks. A watering point may not have any major importance unless the enemy has a yen to bring in more personnel; knowing where it is, how it is controlled and how it might be dealt with is useful.

Filing away information is only one part of the job, but still a very important part. It will be discussed in detail, and then other matters will be gone into. While it will not be possible to replicate the massive files of the National Security Agency or the Central Intelligence Agency on a regional basis, this can be assisted by breaking up the field sections so that each area has a smaller file, more intimately in tune with the area, and with a better network. Notes on individuals, installations and places are forwarded to the regional headquarters on a regular basis, filed away in less

detail, and these passed on to "state" or "seminational" headquarters. The latter group condenses the remarks, notes any major activities, and files the useful bits away. Abstracts of this material go on to National Headquarters, if necessary.

There are two thoughts about the national headquarters: one is that it is not vital, that the regional units can plan policy among themselves and the districts or departments will be semi-independent units, responsible for local acts and policy. The national center simply acts as an advisor, and retains the minimum files.

The other is the "federalist" system, with the rest of the operations subordinate to the national headquarters, which controls all actions and issues policy guides along with specific requests. The main files are retained by the national headquarters.

Both have good and bad points to be considered. The "confederation" or "constitutional" plan does a better job locally because it does not have to be hampered by the scattering and isolating effect of the national system, and can respond to local needs and matters with lightning speed. It may lack the ability to see the larger implications of things such as troop movements, a change in official commands, and it will "waste" some paper by duplication of efforts and filing.

The federalist system can see the overall implications that are vital when the enemy has the tide going against him, and is more objective, knowing the degrees of involvement and difficulty in all sections. It lacks speed to directly control activities, and is like the Soviet farm situation: by the time the committee decides that a harvest is ready, the crops may be too far gone. It lacks the spontaneous response needed to take advantage of changes and chances which present themselves right then. It is "cleaner" but lacks duplications which make up for losses.

The better system is a method modeling after a father-son relationship. The father is there to support, assist and guide the son, but believes rightly that the only way for the youngster to grow up is to keep hands off until he is asked to step in, meanwhile keeping an eye open to events so that the son cannot get in serious trouble and not have any help. It may be compared to the pure conception of the United States government; with a fatherly, interested, but light-handed national leadership watching with interest as all the states go about their business and grow, but not involving Uncle Sam until the states ask for it.

Broken down into something more useful, "Grandfather" represents the national headquarters, who watches over all and provides fatherly advice to all. "Father" is the regional regional headquarters, who manages to behave as a son to the

national headquarters and a father to the state headquarters. "Son" is the level of state headquarters, who takes suggestions from "Grandfather" and "Father" both, and behaves as a father to the local headquarters. "Grandson" is the local branch, the most in touch with the peoples and local events and the one responsible for the major operations of either active or passive natures. "Grandson" has nothing else below that level but the individual operatives, the people, and the enemy personnel in the area, and is responsible to "Son," "Father" and "Grandfather" all at once. Promotion for good work should be up this line of communication, if possible.

There is only one "Grandfather," but he may have many "fathers" under him so that the national area is covered. The "fathers" themselves may have many "sons," but be responsible to the paternal "Grandfather." The "sons" are in charge of local (state or district area) operations down to the local units and have the biggest say in such affairs while taking suggestions from above and following national policy. The "grandsons" have either the least influence or the most, depending on views. They are responsible for gathering all intelligence for the rest, take part in all the actions directly, and have the most freedom because they know the situation intimately. They are below the rest, and have several specific guidelines to follow: type of intelligence needed for the overall view, types of intelligence needed for regional and

state planning, and observation of individuals of importance to all above planning.

In times of severe enemy repression, the "grandson" units are acting almost completely on their own and must be familiar with delegated authority and taking charge. They actually have the most freedom of action and movement, for they have no long lines of communication to follow or attend to and are less visible than the rest. They also have the greatest risks, because they are where the enemy with the most interest in catching them can get them, if he is swift and they are slow.

There are a number of security precautions which all levels of command must follow, and these will be discussed here. It is imperative that no individual or group ever violate or fail to observe these:

PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL & PROFESSIONAL PRESERVATION

I. The Principle of Command: All must adhere to this policy. It states, simply, that no agent or operative may know the exact identity, residence or habits of any other. Except for the masters, who may know everyone in the group and how to get in touch with them as a matter of vital need, this must be adhered to.

II. The Principle of Cellular Construction: Agents operating in an area must work in cells, or groups. The cell is the lowest level of organization and the largest one at the same time, for it is the sole pattern for any work. A cell may

consist of any number of operatives who are capable of working together on an assignment: A sniping cell may have only the sniper, his security man, and spotter, ranging from two to three individuals. A cell formed for entry and evaluation of enemy offices may consist of a locks specialist, a safes specialist, a document evaluator, a master searcher, the flaps and seals agent(s), photography personnel for duplication of vital material, and from one to a dozen security personnel. A noncritical unit like security may be pooled in a series of cells of from five to twenty. A lone-wolf agent is himself responsible to only his superior, and forms his own cell.

A propaganda cell may consist of several others, or be composed on the whole of the writers, with the stencil-cutters, printers, editors and the rest separate. Each cell has one man who knows them all and can alert them all, but he--and the rest--are known to the others only by "noms de guerre" or "war names;" ones chosen for identification to each other. The primary rule is that it is the worst breach of security to attempt to learn the true identity of another agent.

III. <u>The Principle of Communication:</u> Each agent must be able to get in touch with someone in the event that he is being followed or suspects that he is known. This may be accomplished by indirect methods, such as making a chalkmark on a wall every third day or every week, while having a specific wall to mark on if he thinks that he is being observed. Other than that,

each agent in a chain of command may only know the next man below him with any degree of intimacy. This allows orders to go down the chain, but not infiltration up. Each subordinate must accept that his superior will never be able to identify himself to the agent, and realize that this is for the protection of the cause, the apparat, and the goal. Danger areas are at the bottom-most rungs of the ladder of command, and must be covered, although all individuals must cover themselves. The need for making the marks on the walls allows the superiors--or a special cell of observers--to know if a date was missed or an alert made. If the observer cell manages to infiltrate personnel into areas around sites or where they will be able to see the active agents at various times, security will be greatly improved. The observers are attached to the "security cell" and have the role of reporting only. If there is any cause for alarm, the observers will wander out on legitimate business and leave a sign of this with someone--a shopkeeper, in a book in a library, or another mark on a wall--so that the security cell will be able to get to the cell leader and have him alert his men to scatter. This utilizes the people who would like to help, or who have proper leanings, but are unable to engage in active work within the apparat. They are the safest of all, for they are totally passive, and have nothing to incriminate them.

IV. The Principle of Constant Inspection: Inspection of security and personnel matters must be constant. Individuals change--witness all the embezzlement cases--and trust must be constantly proven. Places and areas change, and must be observed so that it is possible to get the full benefit of day-to-day actions. The easiest people to subvert are those who have passed inspection several times while really showing a slowly deteriorating zeal for the cause or result. People and organizations which are not inspected continually leave gaps or begin to get careless, bringing on a situation which an alert intelligence/counterintelligence unit may exploit. Inspection keeps people on their toes, and prevents a serious compromise from developing. Prisons have vast numbers of guards, and still the prisoners make escapes. This is the best example of a very active situation in which inspection is secure, and the precautions are still being nullified by alert people. Reversed, intelligence units or operations are prisons of data which the enemy tries to break into. Either the unit disappears or the walls and visible signs are toughened. Changes in people, places, things, systems and measures must be constantly observed.

V. The Principle of Constant Change: Security measures must be changed, and cells must be allowed to split apart, so that the enemy is presented with the least accessible target. Anything that stays in one place long enough will be liquidated, neutralized or avoided; the point of this security precaution

is to change as often as practical in order to alter the configuration of the apparat. Security is attending or walking alongside the cellular construction, and the cells must be allowed to expand as often as the agents are capably trained and ready to split off. Say there are five men in a cell in an industrial plant. Each may be in a different department: shipping, associating with teamsters and haulers, with the drafting staff, and involved in the typing and production staffs.

After each is thoroughly briefed and able to go forth, each is requested to pick out the four best prospects in the special areas in which they work, and begin a series of new cells. Every person who is open enough and alert enough will detect several others who are alike in feeling or who have a score to settle with the enemy, and will be able to use friendship to manipulate conversations around until the agents can evaluate the others. The four best prospects are selected by each agent.

The industrial section may be expanding along the production lines, perfect for conversion into sabotage or slowdown roles. The drafting cell may expand into a sabotage cell--with errors creeping in--or it may work on the associations between drafting professionals and turn into an espionage cell. The typing cells will have the opportunity to make extra copies or orders, letters and the like to go to intelligence--knowing the 5,000 cases of felt winter boots are being ordered for the

First Tank Army will assist greatly. Shipping is an ideal sabotage role, but may be converted into intelligence, harassment and others for different roles. Teamsters and haulers are perfect for starting a new courier route, gathering intelligence about outside conditions, and giving road-travel reports. The enemy may know about--or suspect--the original cell of five, but before plant security can do anything serious, it will have infiltrated four other indigenous departments and subverted a fifth area. Each of these members will split off into other cells and make more unified sabotage, espionage and other units. With the diverse nature, and no cells actually in contact, the role of enemy security will change from preventing the foundation to controlling the effects. No individual draws attention to himself by movement, but the cell expands and separates too many times for effective capture. With the customary lines of communication, penetration or elimination would be terribly difficult.

VI. The Principle of Defense by Invisibility: All activity is at the lowest level of operation: the agents actually at work. Those who are in control are less visible because they are less active. By calling for each cell to split off as soon as possible, the enemy is presented with X passive spymasters instead of X active spies, while at the same time there are XX new active spies to hunt down and isolate. Before this can

be accomplished the XX group becomes less active by suddenly becoming "invisible" spymasters, while XXX new spies start to work. The point of no return comes when there are too many agents to work through the single chief spy without the volume of data being obvious. This is altered by changing the direction of the flow to drops, outside relay points and places where it can be picked up piecemeal.

Compare the transmission of data to the need to get a bucket of water out a window: If it is frozen--all the data is together--anyone handy can see it leave and the sight is visible for a great distance. If it is melted and tossed out by the glassful, the visibility is less but it is still apparent. If it is pumped through a sprayer, the fine mist resulting will not be visible very far away--like having the data brought out in small lots or individual documents. However, if it is boiled up and the steam blown out with a fan, it is invisible, like data gathered, stored in the mind, and passed out that way, being written in briefs later. If the spies are not visible--never pilfering notes or making second copies except when there is no other way--they are safe from any but the most intensive investigation. This can be countered by continual inspection and evaluation.

VII. <u>The Principle of Striving Upward:</u> While it may be very easy to recruit, subvert and convert the rank and file wholesale,

the best intelligence value may be made by striving for upward mobility. The assistant to the director of the company is far more likely to have good, timely information than the man who works the pneumatic press. On the other hand, the director's girlfriend or boyfriend, the driver, his charwoman, and the staff that cleans his office are far more likely to have access to reliable scraps of information than the eighteenth undersecretary's typist. Proximity to the makers of policy, the movers of ideals and ideas, and the directors of action must be sought. While the man himself and his personal staff may be under constant and vigilant inspection, their associates and lovers may not be; there is where to work. Strive for the individuals who have the most control over the vital data sought after.

Work on the rank and file may be limited to starting block cells, sabotage units, sites for drops and couriers, as well as recruitment of overt fighting units, attack sections and the like; so never avoid using any avenue for forwarding the fight against totalitarianism, but keep it in perspective and within the most reliable and fruitful means of access.

VIII. <u>The Principle of Deception:</u> This must apply to all agents in any field; they must all be able to apply deception. This is simple. The agents must be in the process of stealing the innermost secrets or doing a spot of industrial sabotage

but at the same time they must be able to behave as though they are loyal supporters of the enemy movement, and really devout members of the Party of the Proletariat. As has been said before and will be said again, there is no such thing as false or genuine documents, attitudes or associations; there are only useful and useless ones. Anything that will serve to keep the ideals of a free society alive is allowable, and anything that will deliver the maximum harm to the enemy while preserving the operative for another day's fight is allowable. If this means to profess to belong to the Party of the Proletariat and pay daytime lip service to the credos while applying nighttime finger service to a trigger, it is allowable. If this is not practical, the individuals must be thoroughly briefed to maintain their usual, normal attitudes and characteristics.

They must be good at pretending, lying to the enemy (but not the the friendly side), and general deception. If they cannot keep the fact that they are involved in espionage or sabotage strictly to themselves, they will not last long; for this reason, the primary trait to look for is the one of not spilling one's guts in gossip. Planting information and seeing if this comes back out will assist in telling if the agent to be is reliable. If the gossip is all anti-enemy or neutral, with little anti-friendly gossip, the person may be good for approach.

IX. The Principle of Obedience: This is simply that the agents and apparats must be willing to obey the orders from their superiors. Information which is classified in any manner must never be discussed. Information about operations past, present and future must never be discussed except for cases in which the individual is involved. The entire apparat must observe the need-to-know principle, and refrain from asking about, seeking, or otherwise involving himself in matters about which he is not required to know for his job.

This progresses upward: The active field agents are given instructions, have the matter explained to them within the restrictions of security and need to know, and go to work. Their superiors need to know all the actions being conducted below them, but are involved in only the planning which is vital for their own operations. NOTE: If there is a concurrent operation in the area, they must be told of it--but not given enough details to allow it to be compromised from a leak--so that anything happening will be identified and understood. Agents working in the same area may or may not be so informed, but they should not be given specific information that would allow the mission to be compromised. No agents involved in any capacity whatsoever may depart from the norm and do or say anything which could bring down the least bit of enemy interest.

A Nazi Abwehr agent once wrote a crisp letter to an American Army officer, severely taking him to task for the officer's anti-Nazi views, and actually gave his true name and address. This sort of thing must never happen, and agents

should try to content themselves with their feelings of serving a vital, liberty-oriented cause that is doing good. Transmuting these feelings must be accomplished, if the agent and all his friends and associates are to have victory. The violation of the principle of obedience will hurt the agent, as well as any of the apparat even remotely connected to him.

X. The Principle of Classification: All information which is of value to the enemy must be classified according to specific requirements and not deviated from. Names, addresses and occupations of personnel must be given the "TOP SECRET" classification, and dealt with in code. Immediate or long-term plans or operations must be accorded the designation of "SECRET" and not transcribed except in a secure code. Objectives must not be classified lower than "SECRET" although the most general--getting the rascals out--is not classified. Intermediate functions of the intelligence network, such as specific areas in which operations exist, but where there is not enough data to allow pinpointing, may be designated as "CONFIDENTIAL." Other data accorded this clearance would be intelligence files on persons not connected with or to the network, enemy personnel, and enemy-leaning individuals.

Recruitment plans, procedures and the like must be designated as either the latter, or as "CLASSIFIED" or "RESTRICTED," which means that they are not subject to public broadcast or general discussion. Literature meant for public consumption,

or which is designed to be given to the enemy to lead him astray, may be termed as "UNCLASSIFIED," although it may be given a higher mark to allow the enemy to attach more importance to it. Bear in mind the restrictions of codes and ciphers, and make certain that he does not discount it because he is able to read it with little or no trouble. "NONCLASSIFIED" concerns all the information which is not related to the above; meaning public literature or material not related to or associated with the intelligence operation.

Ten principles: command, cellular construction, communication, constant inspection, constant change, defense by invisibility, striving upward, deception, obedience, and classification constitute the elemental methods for operating a viable intelligence network.

To these, add the principle of timeliness: information, no matter how vital at the moment of interception, is valueless unless it gets to the people who can best use it while it can still be utilized. The felt winter boots mentioned earlier are used for severe arctic winters, and the need for them by the tank army located in a temperate zone would immediately indicate a pending arctic winter campaign. This is perfect information if it is first received in June and the message goes out in July, but it is valueless if it never arrives until the following March, after the winter campaign. A unit may operate completely unknown to the enemy, but unless it manages to supply timely,

accurate information that can be applied at once the unit may as well get drums and a tuba and work in public like the Salvation Army, for all the good it does.

The factors of security and speed are usually trade-off items: the more security is attached, the less speed results. The greater the speed, the less security results. Compare this to a vehicle with an external exhaust system. With a huge muffler that is as long as a coffin, it may be nearly silent, but the back-pressures caused by this much restriction will slow it down greatly and may even stop it. When tooling up for speed, the exhaust system is given smaller muffling devices and may even be a straight pipe with no restrictions. However, as the lack of restrictions to the flow progress, the amount of noise increases to the point where it may be the fastest thing around, but also the loudest. Security is thus discarded for speed.

The end alternatives are to increase the operational power so that a large "muffler" (security screen) can be attached and it will still work, trade off and have some loss of security for better speed, but not so much that the apparat or vehicle is arrested before it goes too far; or design the apparat or vehicle for all-out speed and alert everyone that something is up, but try to outrace the ones who would want to arrest the noisemaker.

The first alternative is good--it is the Lincoln, Mercedes and Rolls Royce version of the operation, but requires a large amount of expense to achieve and keep running.

Next is the middle-of-the-road alternative which represents the Ford, Chevrolet and Volkswagon approach. It requires only a modest outlay and careful handling to maintain.

The third is the hot rod approach, and corresponds to childish racing, the IRA and other loud, juvenile approaches. It seldom lasts very long or does much good, as it costs too much to assemble, and damages civilian goodwill by roaring around like a lunatic, while being captured in the end.

Information may be classified according to the speed it is to be given as well as to its importance. Data concerning the precise details of a submarine pen which is going to be built constitutes slow-progression material; the sub pens are still going to be there, and it will take enough time to construct them that the site will be nearly done by the time the information arrives. Slow progression is safer, and usually more secure.

Any data concerning the conversion of a plant to make aero engines can stand as medium-progression information; the information will be able to move at a moderate pace and not arrive until it is nearly needed. Converting a different type of engine to aero use tends to take some time, but not nearly as much as the construction of a submarine pen or the like. If it progresses with any speed it may be compromised, but the difficulty is offset by the vital need for the data.

Specific intelligence concerning a pending troop movement is a high-speed-transmission fact; headquarters must be notified of the move very soon so that it can be ready to alert other agents along the line of travel to watch, sabotage or attack while the unit is still grouped and not clearly able to defend itself. Transmission may be by radio, which is a high-risk operation, but this is balanced by the need to get the data to headquarters very quickly.

If news is vital, speed as in transmission speed is the most important factor. Security and classification may be discarded, at times, for the need to get the information out and in the hands of the people who are able to do something about it.

Aside from these considerations, effective unit security must rely on effective systems, effective actions, and effective supervision.

Effective Systems: All personnel in the apparat must know all the elemental portions of the security system by which they and their friends can stay out of the loop in the end of the rope. If it is not possible to keep up their enthusiasm, perhaps it will be possible to remind them of the fates of those captured, and make self-preservation take over. The human drive for self-preservation will be the best force if patriotism or the goal begin to lag.

Effective Actions: Having the best system in the world means nothing if the individuals involved will not take action. Everyone must know how to implement these actions, and be made to observe security systems. The designated Security unit may be given the power to reprimand, fine or demote persons who fail to observe proper security. Firm but fair enforcement of security precautions puts the entire operation into perspective and makes it run more smoothly. Security is a permanent assignment, running twenty-four hours a day.

Effective Supervision: This means that the security section must keep on the job along with everyone else. Security must be run with an eye to the possibility that anyone and everyone is a potential risk or leak. Paranoids may not have many friends, but they are seldom surprised. Backing up the supervision must be a chief who is sensitive to the feelings of the agents or employees, and who is able to detect any changed actions or attitudes that may betray a change in sides or wavering. Exercise of a paternal hand on the shoulder may save far more potential risks from becoming reality than any mailed fist shaken in one's face.

THE THREE FACES OF INTELLIGENCE WORK

ESPIONAGE: This is the overt side of things, meaning the placing or recruiting of agents within the enemy's sphere of

influence for various purposes. It may be for observing correspondence, learning plans, stealing war materiel, misdirecting the enemy's plans, or sabotage of the physical or psychological sorts. This may be found detailed in other sections of "The Black Bag Owner's Manual" and is the main thrust of the field agents, with due direction and assistance by headquarters.

OBSERVATION: This concerns surveillance of persons, mails, communications and missions. It may be engaged in by a specially trained branch or unit, although it is usually the case that each agent will be able to do some of this himself, if not perfectly. Details are found in other sections of "The Black Bag Owner's Manual" concerning these steps.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: This is the sole role, in many cases, of the intelligence headquarters. This means to take reports from the field agents, condense them with other reports of a similar nature, and produce a progress report. It also means to maintain an up-to-date map of the deployment of the enemy forces in one's area, and report each and every change in location. Further, it means to catalogue the individuals who may be able to help or hinder the apparat later on. Data regarding production capability, speed, reliability, and quality of goods, along with degree of

war material production, is also useful. Crop data will be beneficial to guerrillas and upper headquarters units, as it will be possible to plan and project actions based on the amount of available foodstuffs. Public, civilian morale is also beneficial. Reaction to propaganda is vital. Long-term likes and dislikes of people within the area of operations is necessary to avoid turning them away.

Research and Analysis operations include every area of life within the section being studied: public opinions and whisperings; official and unofficial press releases; non-printed news media remarks; trade and professional journals pursuant to the matter; official documents taking a policy and planning line; captured documents' remarks; the remarks overheard from the enemy; information provided by agents; information derived from estimates based on other matters and anything else which is applicable.

Concentration on people within the area of operations may not be as heavy in the cases of individuals who have already established their alliance to the enemy or against him--although in the latter case, one must wonder why he is still free if he is really opposed to the enemy.

The goals and objectives should be to get guidelines to the attitudes, potential routes of action, and commitments of those who have not been quite as blunt and honest about alliances. Determining which people are more probably going

to support one side or the other when the going gets tough will assist in selecting which to be placed on the potential-enemy list, and which to be placed on the potential-friend lists. Those whom the evaluations suggest will be neutral are not as much of a threat to either side, but still should be observed.

Determinations should include estimates on the following traits: Cowardice --ready to spy for the enemy out of fear of harm. Greed--the desire for the thirty pieces of silver or being on the then-winning side. Depravity--the desire to be in with the enemy because this allows a chance to act out desires and hopes. Profiteering--the desire to be able to make a small fortune by being the only store or individual to operate as the enemy-approved one. Degeneracy--a moral or physical condition, requiring gratification of unusual desires. Delusions--bumblers or frauds who join the enemy because they can fulfill their dreams of power and influence that cannot otherwise be achieved. Lawlessness--individuals who seek to join the secret police so that they can have an excuse for their depraved actions. Thrill-Seekers--those who join with the enemy so that they can get excitment by being in charge and able to have their way with the population. Political zealots--those who support the enemy cause and comprise the actual or accidental fifth column. Idealistic dreamers--those who cannot see past the

enemy propaganda and are seduced into support of this cause directly or indirectly. Political infants--the ones who support any nonviolent, noncontroversial, nonconflictual cause which will put them on the enemy's side by their urgings of the people to do nothing or support the enemy cause. Pseudointellectuals--those who have very little depth but a great deal of brooklike babble, who support the enemy movement or a noninterventionist stand as being "the natural way of the universe" or "the only logical alternative" and like humbug. Opportunists--those who are personally neutral, but who will bend any way the wind blows and climb on any successful bandwagon. Appeasementites--the Prime Minister Chamberlain types who feel that the totalitarians can be dealt with by apeasing their desires, and who do not see that the more one feeds a cancer the more it grows. Haters--those who are consumed with hate for some real or alleged wrong and who go to the enemy so as to punish or get revenge on those whom they hate. Apologists--for obvious reasons.

Groups especially deserving observation include persons in: Unions, especially the upper levels or as foremen. Political Parties, at the level which will result in their views being listened to. Educational institutions, where they can corrupt the minds of the youth sooner than the enemy would by overt action, and where status gives them authority to espouse views and be believed or listened to.

Writers and Authors, who may put the enemy doctrines into palatable forms or construct reasonable arguments for their actions. Broadcast commentators, those on the local scene who either propagandize, apologize for, or otherwise favor the enemy stand. Local Opinion-formers, consisting of those who will support the actions which will be counterproductive for friendly goals of self determination. Youth Group Leaders, those who can influence the children into supporting the enemy cause. There may be local variations on this theme from nation to nation and area to area, but these will suffice for the present. Include any Organization Leader who would be a threat, obviously.

DESIGN & PROCEDURE FOR CATALOGUE-FORMATION OF PERSONAL PROFILES

The system may be run as one or two separate files, depending upon the nature of the apparat. The basic system is to create a file of five by eight inch cards using any convenient system--conventional card-file, improvised shelving or drawers, or shoeboxes. The box is indexed according to the alphabet. A separate master list is also prepared for use, such as a ring-binder, for checking to see if the individual has been catalogued and filed before.

If the area is very heavily populated, it may be possible to set up files on professions and progress accordingly. On the other hand, supporters may be filed separately from the opponents, although this is asking for this group to be

eliminated to a man if the local headquarters are discovered by the enemy. None of these files are encoded, for it would be too hard to refer to them quickly if that was the case.

After the establishment of the file, all reports are observed and all news media are carefully watched, and every public entry concerning the individuals are filed away by additions to the cards. This is not the full text of the article, unless other matters are being attended to along with this, but only the brief discussions.

After the first entry, the individual's name is placed in the master file. After the second, a colored mark or bit of tape may be affixed to the card. The third, and another, different, color is applied. Another entry, and the name is removed to a second book being kept for the outspoken. After that, a file may be started on that individual, particularly.

Before we get ahead of the matter, consider that a press clipping has been forwarded to the area headquarters "grandson" by a field agent or clipper. In this, Mack D. Anorak, Professor at Edward Bowie College, had spoken at a luncheon highly in favor of socialized medicine, and ended the discussion by saying, "That is only the beginning, though." Had this not happened in a free state, the remarks would be

rather like the bankvault alarm bell going off. So, Anorak is entered into the file with appropriate remarks, and mentioned in the master book, too.

The master book reference might be comparable to this:

Anorak, Mack D., Professor E. Bowie Coll. Socialism Speech 8/12/77

Indexed on the card, though, it might be rather more detailed, like this:

Anorak, Mack D., Professor — Elyseum, Texas 8/12/77

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL: Prof. English, Edwd. Bowie Coll., Elyseum, TX. Eight yrs. expr. in work; bn. 18 July 1932, Montvale, N.J.

RECORDED REMARKS: 8/13/77 made speech for soc. med. spoke that soc. med. was only the beginning. Reported to have contact w/Weather Underground.
FURTHER REMARKS:

The master book would not be attended to any more unless there are pages to spare and each page contains one heading. The purpose of the Anorak reference is to indicate the first entry, who and what he is, and when he spoke first.

We will assume the agent, who was working the campus of Edward Bowie College had heard about Professor Anorak, or after the speech asked some questions, and came up with the supposed tie with the Weather Underground. As it was not proven, it was catalogued as "Reported;" had the agent been able to prove this to within a legal question of a doubt adequate to a police officer, it would have been inserted as "Connected to Weather Undgd.," and the connection would have been adequate for further work in an active capacity. As it stands now, though, the professor will simply be placed on a "watch list" supplied to the report-clippers and field agents in that area. There is plenty of room on the card for further information from field agents pursuant to Professor Anorak, both in his personal and public statements life. Once the card is filled, it may be paperclipped to another card. The "watch list" is simply the "watch for comments by list," which brings him to the attention of the groups.

This state of affairs means very little. Talk is cheap and not indicative of anything but an attitude that bears observation. The point at which matters get interesting is

when Professor Anorak starts doing something; or perhaps, starts becoming a propagandist first and a professor second.

Should that happen, there is need for some detailed work on the professor, and this may take either of two avenues: placement of an agent in the general proximity of Anorak, or recruitment of one in place, at the campus. The latter avenue is better. Attached is a revision of an official recruited-agent document provided by the US government. This may stand as the instructions to the agent-in-place.

CONFIDENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATIVES

1. Mail weekly report to this address every Monday or Tuesday.

2. In first or second report send a picture and brief history of the subject, stating where born, schools, work prior to present employment, military or government service.

3. You are looking for: espionage, sabotage, and propaganda against our United States.

4. You are not a tale bearer--I am not interested in who was drunk or gambling or playing around UNLESS the subjects are in security employments where such actions offer blackmail potentials for subversive agents. Any evidence of such excesses will be rechanneled through federal offices.

5. Be a good fellow but DON'T TALK TOO MUCH!

6. Never make oral reports except in the greatest emergency.

7. Write weekly reports as you would normally write letters, using small letters for proper names. If possible, utilize two envelopes with both being taped to preclude tampering, with opaque insert to guard against illumination reading.

8. Never use government issue envelopes or make address out to the true name of this apparat. Use cover addresses at all times.

9. Destroy all written instructions immediately after memorization. Do not destroy this paper, for further issue is forbidden. Conceal in safe place.

10. Beware of the man who is too smart for his job or too skilled for his rank or grade of employment. Beware also of men who do not desire promotion even though it may be due them.

11. Beware of the man who claims to be a secret agent and immediately file a special report with this office.

12. Do not try to become a detective but go about your business in as normal a way as possible, keeping eyes and ears open and MOUTH SHUT.

13. Exactly what was said? By Whom? When? Where? To Whom? Who else was present at the time? Are these statements frequently made in the same location or establishment? Does the area seem to be a "hangout" for persons of similar convictions?

14. Does the subject write relatively more or fewer letters than usual? to any particular person(s)? How does he send and receive mail? Do such communications have return addresses? Are letters or addressed envelopes simply thrown away, or are they specially disposed of?

15. Who are the subject's associates? Have reports been filed on them as well? Are they being observed by other security personnel? Never cross cases, but link up reports with specific surveillance topics and subjects. Clearly identify all subjects' associates in reports.

16. Does the subject spend money freely? Where? With whom? On what goods, services or products? When?

17. Does he spend more money than his income warrants? Does he always seem ready to loan money? How strict is he with debtors or does he let others borrow more and more without repayment? In some cases, "loans" have been camouflaged payments for information. On the other hand, does the subject seem to be engaging in usury?

18. Is he extremely sympathetic to others' complaints? Does he ever appear to turn the conversation to certain topics in order to provoke complaints or talk? Which topics does he pay more attention to? What does he have to say when other persons complain about various subjects?

19. Does he own an expensive camera? Darkroom equipment for photodevelopment and enlargement/reduction? Does he own field glasses, telescopes, telephoto lenses, infra-red, ultra-violet or image-intensifier devices? If so, what does he do with such equipment? Where? When? With whom? What does he have to say about such doings?

20. Does he take frequent or regular trips? Where? How? With whom? For what length of time? Are the trips regular? What other information is there about such trips?

21. Does he make or receive many telephone calls? What kind? From whom and where? Does he ever go out immediately after taking a call? Do you know if he gets many "wrong numbers"? How about calls from pay telephones; does he make or receive many?

22. Does the subject exhibit undue interest in any particular military, industrial or governmental matter(s) which would not normally concern a civilian or one who is not concerned with that aspect of business?

23. What does he read? Does he possess books or printed matter of a foreign, communistic, pacifistic or similar nature and origin? Does he seem to hide books and certain literature? Does the subject ever refer to items which appeared in such books, magazines or printed matter as though it was the final argument?

24. What does he observe in television and movies? Which programs, movies, types of programs or movies does he prefer? Does he ever speak about them in any manner? Is he fond of pornographic literature or films?

25. Is he quiet or "loud mouthed?" What are the subject's political, religious, ethnic and regional preferences and prejudices? Is the subject very politically- or ethnically-minded? Mention prominant persons in the local or national arena whom the subjects likes and dislikes. It is usually easier to learn dislikes or prejudices. Does the subject ever seem to be quoting from some account or doctrine? Is he a leader or a follower? Or a "Cheer-leader"type?

26. What does he say about his past? Where has the subject lived, gone to school and worked? If possible, gradually get full educational and employment record. Has the subject ever seemed to contradict himself about facts? More importantly, if the subject has very little to say about his past, try to learn why. If there is no information available to anyone, at any time, attempt to secure samples of the subject's fingerprints for submission to the FBI through this Office. Report fully, using words as close to those used by the subject as possible; word choices and phrasing are important for construction of a personality profile index.

27. Remember that you have no power of arrest and that you are a source of information as well as a preliminary investigator only upon which proper authority can act. At no time appear to be a "detective," "secret agent" or an overly curious or nosy person. Such actions will cause the subject to avoid your company or watch what he says about you, being wary. The longer and more gently you extract information from the subject, the more probable it is to be the truth. Attempt to prompt conversation--a man who talks about himself will say more than when he is questioned. Never follow the subject about, unless you manage to become a close friend or are invited on jaunts. You will be more useful to your country if your true mission is never revealed, much less suspected. This office will strive to build a case on other testimony so that you will not be called as a witness to the subject's crimes. Your use to your country will not end at the capture of the enemy agent; if another is

sent in to replace him he will not suspect you as much as if another employee was "planted" at the same time. Your usefulness to your country increases the longer you are employed in this capacity. Your employer or the organization to which you were transferred will not be informed of your assignment or employment because anyone is a potential security risk or you would not have been called upon to serve.

28. ABOVE ALL, REMEMBER that you are a SPECIALLY SELECTED MAN protecting the best government and country on earth and success depends on SECRECY.

END INSTRUCTIONS

The document has been updated and revised to take into account the technological differences in matters and advances of science since the Second World War. The assignments mentioned are better for someone working at the same defense plant and living in the same boarding house as the subject, but it will also work for other operations.

In the case of professor Mack Derby Anorak, placing an agent near his favorite student would assist matters and not be as overt or direct as trying to work a new one into his inner circle all at once. This agent would become friendly with the student first, and use this as a source of information while working on securing an introduction to the "inner circle;" being suggested by the professor's favorite will certainly work.

The student chosen must be vouched for by someone in the apparat, and sincerely in favor of the correct cause. Recruitment must be very serious and formal to assist in cultivating the importance of the operation. None of the agents involved may later see the cultivated agent, in case he turns on the apparat. Communications must be sent to a "drop" address or to a dead-drop. Another alternative would be to insist that the cultivated agent provide the apparat with the combination to his college post-office box, and leave the messages in there for later pickup by the second agent on the campus. Double-teaming, or having the

existing agent observe the cultivated operative as well as Professor Anorak, is feasible and must be conducted. Until the agent has proven himself, and even afterward, this is useful so that information can be verified and cross-checked and the new operative can be watched to make certain that he is not doubling with an interest to pass on false or misleading information or "smoke."

Surveillance of the subject is in order, and this will be detailed in the appropriate section. The point is to see what he actually does when alone as opposed to what he says he does. It may be compromising, or it may be incriminating. In either case, it must be inserted in the file.

All this is undertaken if the professor gets overt or begins to go into propaganda in a big way, or if he insists on making such remarks for months on end.

Concurrent to these operations, learning something useful about the family and associates of Professor Anorak would be helpful. The point at this time is to learn if the professor is inclined to rash acts, to learn why he has such ideas, and if he is dangerous. This is part of the campaign to identify, isolate and categorize his actions.

As much as we hate to, let us assume that Professor Anorak is a very dangerous fellow. Not only is he propagandizing in such a manner, but he takes every chance to say something harmful. He may have some degree of overt

contact with something dangerous. Unless he comes right out with a great deal of stuff, or associates with students whom we have found have revolutionary interests, he is not going to be bothered. No apparat has enough time and man-power to observe all the fools and knaves around.

Let us implicate him with a farm or summer cottage that--the word is--the revolutionary groups on the run may use for a resting place. First, there is the need for an agent who is skilled in woodcraft, camouflage and stalking; this man will be detailed to the area of the cottage or farm to see if this is just talk or really something genuine. It may not be occupied then; see about repeat trips, bearing in mind that (if it is true) there may be patrols out around the site. Should it be occupied, a good camera and telephoto lens may be convenient; check the pictures of the occupants against those in official files.

See about the professor's preference in students; bearing in mind the KGB saying: "Intelligence operations are like tree planting: there is an initial cultivation and then one may wait years for full growth."

Should the Professor befriend those generally assumed to be able to go far in their professions--useful ones only, as social workers are good only as other developers--then he may have something in mind. Try to find another one to cultivate or then, insert the one or two already on campus.

See what is said. See how the students react to the professor (do they stoutly defend him, like him a great deal, and so on) and how he seems to be towards them. Describe the students he befriends--he may be bisexual or semi-homosexual and prefer certain types. See if he picks the ones who are likely to be inclined to be leadlike, easily cast and formed by anyone who has the fire of character to do so.

When planting or cultivating agents around such an individual, be as careful as possible. The individual may be won over by Professor Anorak and confess to espionage, which will lead to either a reversal of the system--dis-information coming back out--or an attempt to capture the spies. Avoid breaking any federal laws such as using the mails, interstate traffic, bugging, and so on, because this will involve the FBI. Avoid placing the drops where they can be observed from any direction or have a spotter placed there, be observed indirectly by camera or bug, and the like. Keep the cultivated agents in the dark as to their employers. Be very wary; the Professor may call in the police to prove he has nothing to hide or to get some official witnesses to the supposed government harassment. It is the experience of many that Communists stand on their constitutional rights when they do not have a leg to stand on otherwise. So said J. Edgar Hoover.

When selecting the agent-to-be, avoid any obviously right wing people and all who have taken a stand against Anorak's situation. If there are no others, arrange for there to be a formal, loud split between the agent and his right wing connections and a dead run to the other camp. Or have it arranged that there is, or appears to be, a gradual swing to the left with the agent getting closer and closer to the views of Professor Anorak all the time. Double-teaming or even double-cultivation will assist in providing the maximum possible useful information.

Avoid exteriors when considering the agent-to-be.

The author has a rather nice network that cost no money or effort to cultivate or place. There are several older men and women, ranging from pillars of the community down to bar flies.

There are also three operative-type individuals who are supplying useful information about area events around a campus. None cost anything in the respect of cultivating, paying, or operating them. This is simply hobby work, with the information pandering to a desire to know the inner workings of things. Also in the association are X number of bartenders, Y number of police officers, and Z number of welfare workers. None has been asked to do anything illegal, improper or immoral.

Before this gets unduly interesting, this is the conversion of a circle of friends into an apparat-like association. Anyone who has an open mind and a willingness to talk to people will get reliable data: Friends have been cultivated in Spain, Holland, Italy, England, West Germany, Ireland, and all three Swiss language districts, Greece, and elsewhere. Interesting and potentially useful information is available rather easily!

When checking out Professor Anorak, these are the things to endeavor to learn: organizational connections, past and present; vices of any sort; family life; known friends, covert and overt; personal observations on life, government, order, politics; personal habits; mental stability; temperament, general alertness; foreign travels, official and unofficial; plus the items from the World War II listing.

Organizational Connections: If the individual has belonged to or does presently associate with the "Campaign to Stop Government Spying" (a pan-organizational assembly of groups including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ, Friends of the Earth, the publication Counterspy and many more; sixty in all), that should serve as a mild alert. The CSGS is currently supported by no less than three dozen individuals or groups which espouse demolition of the present American government, within a limited area of knowledge. Having good relations with the ACLU is nothing, for the ACLU does have a moderately good

ideas at the center, but supporting the ACLU's "Project on Political Surveillance" assists in activating the alert.

One-quarter of the 400-odd Soviet and ComBloc students attending upper division colleges in America have been for over ten years identified as genuine enemy spies. So asserts the Justice Department.

Vices: May have been used as a handle to get him to work for the other side, or may be utilized to curb him without soiling one's hands by the friendly apparat. Vices are always interesting in themselves, in that they make the individual a bit of a security risk. Making up "Screwdrivers" with denatured alcohol (195° grain alcohol) and orange juice concentrate will be rather helpful to vocal lubrications. Drugs aside from marijuana are also interesting to know about, and if they constitute a habit they may be cut off at the supplier end to discredit the chap. Men or women not married to the individual also serve as a vice, and may be utilized as a tool for steering him away from his outbursts. Serious gambling will also stand as a handy device, and it may be possible to locate, recruit and emplace a professional gamesman (gambler by the nice name) to clean out his account.

Utilization of vices will be covered more completely under the heading of COMPROMISES in the Black Bag Owner's Manual, but it will serve to add this series of remarks:

Depending upon the polarity and degree of conservatism of the employer, it is possible in some cases to utilize these as a vehicle to discredit and reduce the hindersome individual by getting him or her fired. Other employers will take a very tolerant view of the matter. When in doubt, see about mailing packets of data to the board of directors and the board of supervisors or regents who tend to be more hide-bound than the others. A breath of certain scandal will help to remove the individual if the scandal would tend to harm the business or professional reputation of the firm.

Family Life: Members of the subject's family may constitute additional agents or representatives of his thoughts, and may be catalogued. On the other hand, a serious family split may be considered as a curbing vehicle. If the wife/husband is a social climber and cannot tolerate any implication of scandal, this part of the union will help to curb the indiv-idual. If the other party is having discreet little affairs all around, or might be if given the chance, this will help in curbing outbursts if photographic and audio records are made of a few trysts. Again, this is a vehicle more pro-perly seen to in COMPROMISES.

Pay special attention to the children, and see if it might be possible to recruit one for the household--serious anger at the family will work--or notes on foreign travel. The chance of being bagged in Turkey with a pre-arranged cache of drugs in the bag will be useful, if the children are antisocial little brutes.

Known Friends: Rather useful in itself, for the friends may serve as interesting little flowers to sniff at. Is there a Mexican servant at the house? If so, she/he might be one of the dozens of spies recruited in Mexico by the thirty-odd Soviet "Diplomats" there. Only about five or six are what they seem, and probably less are, since Mexico sends only five to Moscow for diplomatic work. Look for some of these agents, which may number from a mere handful to a few hundred or perhaps a few thousand. The individuals may be Cubans, as well as Mexicans, although the legend will be of Mexican origin. Few Anglos can tell the difference.

Starting a witch-hunt against immigrants and Hispanics is not the intent here; indeed, most are innocent. The ones encountered in jobs which bring them into contact with restricted documents, sensitive offices and within the area of sensitive bases and who sought those posts or areas must be considered probably guilty until proven innocent, though.

Covert or overt friends are beneficial in locating the ones who may be good candidates for further attention. As a rule of thumb, the ones who have friends with like ideals are probably the ones who are engaged in such propaganda because of misguided zeal. While those who have no associates of like nature are probably the ones who are deliberate in their actions.

The ranks or grades of friends are also beneficial for forming a picture. If the individual seems to be associating

with men who would have more information, it is likely that he or she would be engaged in information pumping, or social climbing. Anyone who concentrates on people of substance in business with more determination than on getting social status is unusual, for social status is often the main drive and the people contacted are the vehicles; a reversal from the norm. Careful observation will determine this, for it is often a drive from within the mind, not an overt thing the individual knows about, and the quest for the status will show through. If it is the quest for the people, this will show through.

See also if the friends would include anyone from the diplomatic world. While Americans are often turned away from the image of the squat, Ursa Major like Soviets, they will be enchanted by the debonair, cosmopolite Czech, Hungarian, Yugoslav, Polish, and (sometimes) East German spies in striped trousers. There are others who will be taken in by the tough, romantic-imaged Cubans, either as diplomats, visitors or "tourists."

The majority opinion among American intelligence units is that the average East European businessman is either an active spy or has been detailed off to observe and report everything useful he sees, and all the individuals he notes are likely candidates for future recruitment. Individuals in the business, scientific, and educational fields have been implicated in espionage and a reliable contact remarks that no businessman or professional leaves alone without promising to spy some. If they will not spook about, there is a "bodyguard"

assigned to do this, or they stay home. No one of any importance leaves without this, in other words. Staff with cultural, historic, musical and other touring groups are also detailed off to do a spot of espionage and recruit spotting.

Another friendship factor to consider is the "New Left" type. The more energetic have been recruited for the "10 (or Tenth) Venceremos Brigade," an outfit that exports people to Canada and then flies them to Cuba with the professed purpose of cutting cane and other agricultural tasks. However, very reliable sources have discovered that each member is individually photographed and interviewed about background, education, employment prospects and so on. The more devout or worthwhile are then taken aside and trained in intelligence and sabotage, rather than wasted on sugar in the sun. Where the Cubans tread, Moscow follows right behind and the Cuban intelligence apparat is a front for the KGB.

Relationships with reporters from East European papers must also be ranked among the likely spies: "Barsukov, Yuri; Correspondent, Izvestia" and "Sisnev, Vissarion; Correspondent, Trud" are two of the ones who should be catalogued as agents for the KGB in the Washington, DC area. It has been said that a correspondent for an East European paper whose home office is behind the Iron Curtain cannot be sent abroad unless he agrees to spy. The same thing also applies, reportedly, for personnel from Aeroflot Airline.

Does the individual have a warm spot in his heart for something like "The Seaman's Shore Leave Benevolent Society?" The only Soviet and East European sailors who get off their ships in port are those who can be counted on to spy, and there were 14,00 to 16,00 and probably more annually let loose in the past few years. They rather like to tour about, see things, get things, and then return to the ships. Of course, the Soviet trawlers which have such powerful radio sets and five to twenty nonfishing members of the crews are well-known as covert operatives.

With all these, it is obvious that people are not going to walk about with tags on their backs "Soviet Newspaper Report" and the like; it will be necessary to find out precisely who they really are. Soviet "bodyguards" tend to ramble about in cheap suits, and others look rather foreign, but do not expect the getup dating from some of the old conceptual films, with the lad dressed like a spy for the Austro-Hungarian Empire in wide-brimmed hat, a cloak and riding boots with pointy toes. That sort of guise went out with the advent of chain stores and inexpensive outfitters.

Photowork will assist greatly, for the friends can be snapped by a surveillant and the films stored until each is matched with a name and occupation, and alignment.

Personal Observations. All the personal details about the subject that he dropped in conversation or let slip while

containing a few of the 120° "Screwdrivers" will assist in detailing how the fellow truly feels about politics and political movements, government here and there, and the meaning of life in general. Is he perfectly happy? Does he want more money? Is he resentful of the nation? Does he hold a firm grudge? (If he holds a grudge against people he will do so against government; watch for this.) Catalogue all of his personal observations and see if they present an odd or differing picture. Place more credence in remarks made while drunk or drugged than while he was alert, if there is any difference. Shake him down in this respect, and see how he runs--how his mind works and how he regards matters.

Personal Habits: Is he careless or careful? Does he lock the doors and make a thing about keeping the shades down? Does he forget things and strew his personal belongings about? Does he tend to be slovenly about his dress, toilet (washing, shaving, and such) and effects? All these are vital in regard to how he may leave the door open or closed to a clandestine search, how he may leave documents out where they may be photographed, or how he may be dealt with if it comes to that. A majority of "nos" to these will assist matters; a majority of "yesses" will hinder them. If he has a strong security habit, does it center around any particular room of the house? Which one? Is that room easy or difficult to get to from outside? If access is possible to that room,

check the window(s): Are they tightly nailed, screwed or paint-glued down? Are there scratches on the frame(s) and sill(s) to indicate that he may put a partial or full barrier there? Are the windows equipped with reinforced, frosted or armoured glass? Check the dooor(s): Are there extra locks there? What type of door is it, hollow-shell or solid, panelled, metal, folding, double-hung, or what? What are the brands of locks used on the door(s) and window(s)? How many locks are used? How recent do they seem to be? How secure is the lock surface mounting? How smoothly do the locks work?

Other habits may be apparent from this or other sections, although it is necessary for the investigating agents to sound the individual out about all these matters.

Mental Stability: Does the individual fly off into a rage or drop into depression easily? Does he tend to have any sort of "complex" that would indicate that he is suffering from personal views of his own extreme importance? Does the subject seem to have any curious ideas on anything? Does he have any manias or fears? Describe all these as they are presented.

Temperament: Is the subject patient or impulsive? Does he have a desire for getting all the details down (like the author) or does he tend to give the "general idea" and let the rest go? Does he seem to be painstaking or does he take

pains to do no more than he has to? Is he easily provoked or very slow to anger? Is he a leader, follower, or cheer-leader type? Clues for temperament can be drawn from other sections, and be, in turn, supplied from the other questions to this one.

General Alertness: The reason for asking this is so that it can be determined how well to cover him with surveillants. If he is not very alert or wanders about in his own little world, it may be possible to trail him with a dog and a white cane. If he tends to notice the environment and the people around, and he cannot be easily surprised, he is very alert (why?) and extra care plus multi-teaming him will have to be exercised. If he likes to commend himself as to his environmental awareness (can see most of what is around or behind him), it may be necessary to utilize some complex steps to work out a tail. He may just be alert, but he may also have studied "defensive living," and this may call for deeper looking. The author knows one doctorate holder who can tell when someone is behind her every time, and she does some rather remarkable dodging about.

Foreign Travels: This may be easy or difficult to handle, and it may be both, all at once. Anyone wishing to avoid any US Immigration Service stamps on his or her passport will invariably come in through the Bahamas or perhaps Canada or Mexico; coming in as though the party was out for a plain

local tour. Therefore, getting one's hands on the passport will not work. Other nations often put their own stamps on slips of paper inserted--laid--in the passports, so the removal of such slips will not indicate any alteration. Or any visits, either. The only nations who will stamp passports are those which have nothing to hide, which do not have a foggy system of policy in which only about one in a hundred passports is stamped, and so on. Anyone coming in via a tour has a seventy-five to twenty-five chance of not getting the passports stamped elsewhere. Therefore, there is very little chance of getting any definitive clues from the actual passport. It is also inclined to sit about in a safedeposit box until needed, too, which removes it from access.

However, aside from asking questions and rambling on about the places visited by the agent--who must have at least a passing knowledge of these areas--there is another idea: in the case of trips and travels out of the country, with an overtly innocent reason added on, it may be possible to dig up a contact who will remark about the subject's date of arrival and at which point of entry. Assume this is so, and the apparat finds out the man will arrive in New York City on or about 27 July. It is very expensive to get a man to the departing airport in a foreign country so that he can observe the departure of the individual. It is less expensive to simulate recent arrival from overseas. Two agents are needed for best security. One calls up the

reservations terminals of all airlines until it is determined that the subject will be coming in. He would hardly be willing to excite attention by flying under another name, for his passport may be checked. If he does this, this is the place where it becomes necessary to observe the incoming gates from outside of passport control. If he is spotted by one agent, he gets to a pager or paging telephone and asks that "Mr. Douglas" or whomever be called to report to the telephone. Use a different name. When the other agent hears the name, he goes to the paging telephone and is told when the subject came in, where it seems that he is going, and so on.

Now, preparatory to getting the individual on the same flight back to the operational area, the two of them have been busy getting reservations on every flight that will go to the home area directly or indirectly. One does tourist class, and the other does first class. This will put the agent on the same flight as the other chap, and in the same compartment. This should cover all flights from the morning of the anticipated arrival to the evening, and into the next morning. For bigger cities it could be a problem, but if this were the case, the fellow would have flown home direct.

When the other agent is told where the subject is going he heads off in that direction, and manages to get in his line or the one to either side, with the same destination in mind. Behind the subject, though, so that his flight may be heard.

If this is not possible, he communicates to the other agent to reserve and buy a ticket on the flight to be taken by the subject later. Effecting an introduction in the waiting lounge would be the agent's concern. If it is a holdover until a morning departure, it might be arranged that both share a room, with this perhaps helping in the operation.

The other chap makes certain that the agent and the subject are nicely settled, and moves off to report on the contact. He observes and covers the pair from a remote distance.

Baggage would be a problem for the two, unless this can be cached around the airport and fetched. But remember to get the correct tags for it. The more likely approach is a very old one: One's baggage has been lost or stolen or the tour has been discovered to be bankrupt, and the agent is left abroad, penniless and with no one to turn to. He/she went to the embassy and got a loan to get home, but had to surrender the passport until the loan is repaid. This cover is so old it has white whiskers, but it still works, for tourists are always getting in trouble and the government is always helping them out. This also assists in removing all traces of baggage and ID, so the agent cannot be checked out very completely. The "ID card I left in my trousers pocket" will serve very well, and could be anything at all. A little money and the price of a ticket back could be all that the individual has on hand...or the ticket could be paid for in advance by the other

agent, to be picked up by "so and so," once the flight back to the regional airport is determined. Picking up the ticket in advance is likely, although if the reservations are made in advance it is a simple matter to claim to be the respective X, Y, or Z and get the reservation then and there.

The subject and the agent get along famously, with the agent helping, and views of the world may be exchanged in the waiting area. This will tend to be something that will result in more information than any other pumping, because the individual will be suffering from jet lag and fatigue and not be suspecting that a spy will be posing as another incoming tourist who happened to run into trouble.

In truth, this was tried on the author pursuant to a domestic industrial espionage matter, with the other camp trying to pump the well dry to see how well the business which consulted the author had made out. However, such matters have been run from either end, and the other agent got a great deal of chaff to play with. Caveat emptor and all that. The business which hired the firm of Mutt and Jeff deserved to be found out.

These will stand as guidelines for information-gathering, and prompt some thought in the matter. When a subject is being considered for such an indepth observation, a formal file is constructed concerning all the details of the individual's past, views, and other matters. These files will be stored in a cabinet, or filing box.

These files are also indexed in alphabetical order, with the individuals involved given a particular folder which contains the papers which have been written about them. It is also profitable to form a "File Envelope" in an accordion file concerning all those people in a specific group or area, to assist in handling the matters, but each subject will be detailed in one particular file. Only members of a family will be detailed in the same jacket, and then all the relevant names will be put on the tabs or front. This will assist in getting the most good out of the data. Where another individual who crosses paths with the subject has his or her own file, it is vital to mention this at the point of "crossing" and in a note on the outside of the jacket--"Additional notes in F #228, F #128, and F #250." This way, if there is any need for further researches, it can be accomplished right away.

This may sound like a great deal of work, but it is not. The main effort will be to complete the files and get most of the earlier data catalogued. After this is completed, the documents must be refiled and typed out as a comprehensive brief, eliminating earlier errors and filling in corrections, citing the assorted errors. This is superior to the earlier efforts of the FBI, with guesses and lies being assembled into files and not removed when these items of information are proven false. This is all right for dealing with simple civil criminals, but when engaging in collecting files about

enemy or fellow traveler personnel, it is imperative for these records to contain nothing but the proven truth, than the suspected, than the alleged, and than the lies and guesses; in that order. A lie or guess may easily alter the entire profile being composed. Following is a sample of how an intelligence dossier should be:

Cashin, Fedora Penelopie, Miss (Caucasian) Burkeburnett, TX
Revised Report****** File Number 150

Personal: Born 26 August 1943; Ht. 5'5"; wt. 100 lbs.; eyes blue-green; hair lt. brown, straight, worn short (wears wigs); face--prominent cheekbones, sml. straight nose, slightly pointed cleft chin, narrow lips (no polish or lipstick usually), slightly hollow cheeks; usually not tanned, slightly olive skin tone; No visible scars or blemishes; walk is flat-footed. Born Washington, DC

Family: Father--John Ashton Cashin, Commander, USNR, Deceased 11 Dec 1943. Mother--Rebeka Alice (Johnson) Cashin; Born 4 May 1922, Chicago, Ill. Mother embittered loss husband, instilled trait, attitude to children. Siblings--John Richard, born 1 September 1941; drafted Korea, deserted whereabouts U/A. Susan Patricia, Born 27 February 1938, married Sam Allen 1956, resides Dallas TX. No Information.

Friends: Lawrence C. Villers (F #72), Elainea Ross (F #44), Andrew Furgeson (F #101), Peggy C. Bugress (NF), Randolph Zimmer (NF), Chathie Palmer (F #133), Suzanne Teller (F #32), Mary C. Robinson (F #149), Roberta (Bobbie) Senner (F #38), Unknown Caucasian Female FX221, Unknown Caucasian Female FX 198.

Business: Owner/operator "Cashin Carry Book Shoppe" 1322 South Hinkley Ave., B. Burnett--Shop is 84' x 50' cinder-blck structure, glass front, Yale locks. General Notes--Shop distributes following papers: Daily World, Challenge, the Revolutionary Communist Newspaper, The Militant, The Guardian; also full line of "International Publishers" books, incl. topics by Kwame Nkruma, et. al. Business site also serves as meeting place, various occasions/groups--see other files.

Residence: Four-room "L-shaped" house, 141 E Street, BB; Ilco locks, house tract-type, kitchen/laundry/back door on spur of L; Enter into living room f/front door, side room to front of house occupant's room, cyclone fence all about (5' high in front, up to side of house, 10' around back).

Assets: Owns 1975 Ford Mustang, red w/white convert, top. Lic. # FPC 000; Car has rusted areas right side, bent rear bumper, dual racing exhausts for V-8 engine. Has total net worth $70,000.00 with ready cash stored in Mosler safe type 4 in business. Money obtained death mother, with father's estate share coming to her after F's elder brother passed on w/o heirs. Believed owning three firearms--rifle, shotgun, pistol. Home & business owned by subject.

Personal Life: Drives Mexico 4 times yearly, w/friends, w/unusual caution. Suspected not verified homosexual relationship w/F 44, F #133, F #32. Goes camping Arizona 3-5 times during summers, near Ft. Huachuca (USAIC & S site) where subject stimulates

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affairs w/personnel Ft. Hua. Subject also cultivates photography hobby--telephoto and pornographic. Expert shot pistol, sharpshooter rifle, Marksman shotgun. Visits Soviet Embassy Mexico City, friendly Undersecretary F/Cultural Affairs--KGB Contact Man (alleged). Conducts mail-order book business, sends books Address, Mexico City w/o being requested to. Evident income exceeds volume of business. Shows undue interest in matters not pursuant civilian occupation. Evident preference Soviet ecopolitical system, known denouncer US affairs.

Apparent Role: Subject apparently fellow traveler, vol. operative, possibly main focal point New Left intelligence operations. Now known having skill micro-photography. Potential spotter candidates for recruitment/compromise/subversion owing to preference f/marrieds, personnel w/reason to comply. Potentially bisexual, acting as Swallow some operations. Known preference atypical sex acts. Known skill subverting personnel. Known skill clandestine operations. Role apparently high in informal network.

Suggestions Further Actions: Increased observation, E&E home and business, further analysis effectiveness, programming analysis f/possible neutralization of effective role. Last stage if none other work effective, liquidation commencement of hostilities. Preparation of unbiased evidence for military/civilian tribunal.

FURTHER DATA FILED WITHIN CHART: CONDENSED ANALYSIS HERE.

That is a rough draft of how the leading page of the intelligence file should read. Other notes, condensed surveillant reports, and comparable data will follow the preliminary evaluation sheet(s) to further aid the staff in getting a brief but accurate analysis of the individuals in question. Data must be added to the evaluation sheets as it comes in, questionable or supposed information updated and verified or disproved, and the best effort made to keep the files in the most reasonably accurate state possible. Note that no details about the surveillant personnel, the agents in place or like remarks as to the true origin of the information are inserted. This differs from a peacetime dossier, mainly because the fact that the files are solid, concrete items and not easily hidden or eliminated in a moment's notice precludes the chance that the data could be safely placed there and yet be secure from compromise or capture. If the files are being kept in a secure spot in peacetime, the remarks as to who and what supplied the information must be inserted. In troubled times or in the event of a clandestine operation, these details must be left off so that the personnel will not be compromised or eliminated if the files should be captured by enemy personnel.

The other use for such files would be to analyze and evaluate personnel who have jobs which may be useful to the apparat at some time in the future: lock and dam operators may be observed and reported on so that it is possible to determine if they are friendly and can assist in any sabotage or demolition,

or offer full intelligence of things which pass within their gaze. Cement plant personnel in the foreman, quality control and administrative units may be evaluated to see if they could be briefed in sabotage of the cement (deleting one kilning operation) so that the material is not as durable as possible, and can be more easily defeated by bombs, demolitions, or shells. Railroad personnel, who may be able to do sabotage or intelligence jobs without being punished. Water or sewage plant employees in the upper ranks, who may be able to sabotage the water or waste-removal efforts in or around a base...the enemy will likely take over friendly installations in preference to building new ones. These are just a few of the vital individuals within an area. Meat-packing plants may be sabotaged--if totally for enemy consumption--by the use of improper canning or processing techniques, or the relaxing of sanitary standards. A resistance group managed to sabotage a fish-cannery by using croton oil in place of the other oils for preparing tinned sardines, which made more than the submarines' engines run at flank speed! This could not have been possible if it had not been for a knowledge of people who could provide the croton oil, get it into the plant, and put it to work where it would best assist the Allied efforts by assisting the Germans' elimination processes.

The entire point of such operations is to make things just as difficult and dangerous for the enemy as possible, at all times, so that he expends efforts in the direction of security for himself more than in oppressing the population. Every

man put on guard where he may watch that something peculiar does not happen, or every enemy engaged in the actual operation of devices so that he can be assured that nothing is sabotaged, means that many of the enemy who are not available to effectively oppose the apparat and oppress the people.

For a small, local, intelligence operation, the efforts should be towards making certain that the enemy does not find enough free time to really seek the apparat's agents. This is dealt with by sabotage, interdiction, and making things as difficult as possible. To tie down the most enemy personnel for as long as possible is the key to success and survival.

For this, the apparat needs to know the friends, foes and neutrals in every area that would be useful. This need not be a vast number of people, in every case, since a semi-rural area or a farming area could be reduced to those who have farms and stores--possibly as few as a hundred individuals, and perhaps fewer. Some ninety percent of a population will be neutral until the enemy shows his full totalitarian hand. After that, perhaps seventy-five percent will be scared into neutrality or support, and twenty-five percent will be resentful enough to oppose him. Adroit use of propaganda will assist in reversing these figures, and knowing the target audience as well as possible will further chances for success. This may differ from one extreme to the other, depending upon the natures of the peoples involved, so a good intelligence evaluation of the three groups will assist in giving the best possible results--

and this means compiling files. If security is a problem, this means mental files; if it is possible to engage in such things, the files may be more formal and on paper.

PLACES also require filing away under different headings: it has often been said that a reliable fortified village can hold up an enemy advance for hours or perhaps days. The speaker has failed in the respect that intelligence was not considered. It is better to give up a hundred villages which could be bypassed or pounded to debris and defend the precise one which is astride road and rail communication lines, where a truly severe pounding is out of the question because the roads and rails may be too severely damaged to be used later. It is better to not defend an area where the enemy will be likely to set up his own headquarters, so that the site can be plundered for intelligence afterwards. This system will genuinely confound the enemy, for he will not know that the village or city which he has captured without a struggle will be the heart of a vast intelligence operation, or where he was meant to think there would be a major apparat. Keeping him in suspense will be ideal for the psychological-warfare operations to come. If he does not know whether his presence was deliberately sought, or that the area could not defend itself properly, he cannot feel safe.

Other places to evaluate are--as before--the swampy ground that is apparently suitable for the tank-park or the field headquarters. The potential landing strip for friendly or enemy aircraft which happens to have a set of high tension wires

in the flight path may be discounted unless the enemy is willing to change the wiring.

Sabotage potentials such as electric power booster stations, pumping stations along a fluids pipeline, a gas terminal, sewage or water sub-station, rail switches, a continual-rail joint along a straightaway where the trains will zip along, a curve in a high-speed area, a handy hill for ambushing, a hundred others may be catalogued for future reference. These may range from a railroad signal-box up to a railroad repair shop, and require anywhere from a 9mm Parabellum round to a 9-kilogram charge of HE. They may be catalogued for instant attack, as well as for some matter that would require a hundred-man team working for two days, such as permanently crippling the Panama Canal.

These are more properly the sphere of the sabotage units, or the overt guerrilla operations, although control is better when a good liaison with a domestic, indigenous, intelligence operation is possible. These files, which will not be altered greatly unless a massive revamping of the concerned system is undertaken, may be recopied several times and the resulting files hidden away where cadre level personnel can recover them for field use.

Keeping records--mental or physical--of these sites, items of interest, and personnel are vital to a growing, surviving intelligence operation. Not only these must be considered, but doing the maximum possible harm to the enemy during this time is vital, too.

OPERATIONAL NAMES

Actual agents are assigned operational names and numbers so that they can communicate to headquarters and be spoken of without compromising their covers. Not by accident, these names also give the agents a sense of professionalism and help boost their morale. A cultivated or recruited agent will feel more like he is working for a "real" or "professional" operation if he is given a code-name and number.

All in all, it is usually better to keep the names similar to others in a single operation, so that mentioning the name will bring to mind what his/her project is within a particular operation. This may sound difficult, but is not really. Assume that a section of the apparat is to be called the TAILOR circuit: Under Tailor, one may find Suit, Vest, Slacks, Spats, Cuffs, Pockets, Belt, Coat, and others. Mentioning Pockets will bring to mind Tailor, in all probability. As another example, consider a sub-agent network being run by TOYSHOP. Under that would be found Erector Set; Dollhouse; Truck; Car; Scooter; Unicycle and his associates Bicycle and Tricycle; Tin Wagon, Skateboard and others. Aside from the altered name, this is representing a genuine apparat. The ones missed are Irish Mail; Pushcar; assorted dolls; Cap Pistol, Squirt Gun, and others.

No more examples will be given because of the tendency to copy styles, although it is not critical here. So what if the enemy finds out that BARNYARD, the rural network, consists of Billygoat, Nanny, assorted breeds of cow, Duck, Goose, Dog, and others? There are potentially a hundred and fifty names

which could be applied, and the prospects of having an actual 150 individuals or groups operating is enough to chill the blood.

The Headquarters unit must be in charge of assigning names to the agents, or at least the primary ones such as ROSE and TOYSHOP, so that there is not a field duplication of names. Too, this is useful in terms of establishing authority and assisting to instill the proper attitude in the agents.

Agents must learn to think differently, rather like artillery men who view a landscape and see it in terms of aiming points, dead ground, fields of fire, and the like. Agents must learn to see things as useful or useless to intelligence, with degrees of usefulness. Artillerymen will not be fully able to see the beauty of landscape in terms of form and flow, and pleasing colors, but rather in terms applicable to artillery. Agents must have much the same attitude. Assigning their names and numbers will assist greatly.

A more vital consideration is that the additional assignment of names and numbers will assist in keeping the agents' true names secret in the event that the enemy captures the files. With the names of the agents, he can motor about and collect them like gathering pumpkins. The names of the agents must be guarded with devotion and strict determination, lest the enemy liquidate them.

Files on other persons must never contain anything but the code names and perhaps, only perhaps, the appropriate numbers, if those. No special indications which would serve as points of

reference. Example: inserting something which only Joe Fergeson would know when speaking of Angela Snobb so that the enemy may interview Ms. Snobb and find out the particular individual who would know that. It is better to keep the files general and list the data as it applies, with no references. The compilers and the Commander of the unit would need the files as refreshers only, and be able to supply the informants' IDs or know that Sunflower supplied the bits if need be. In small operations or "grandson" units, the bulk of the data would be small enough for someone to recall the specifics, or at least know when the data had been verified or the informant was truthful.

Obviously, it is impossible and very unwise to file away the names and cover- or code-names and numbers of personnel. One fool suggested this is another "para-official" file of dos-and-don'ts and this is working into the enemy's hands. It was a good idea in the case of the OSS and SOE or SIS operations, for England was not too far away and the agents would not have to operate completely alone; London could be sent notes on each agent, his personal files, and be expected to keep the lot away from enemy eyes. This would allow another operative to be inserted and he could pick up with the rest after being briefed--in the safety of London--on his chain of operatives. It is not safe when a local apparat is being operated within the enemy's window-box, as it were, with no secure headquarters. Likewise, the creation of service records for guerrilla fighters is a poor

idea and was contributed for some unknown purpose. This is impossible in the terms of any operation which demands secrecy and which places the physical files in a material space. Files within the enemy's sphere of influence, within his area of operation, cannot be kept which will identify the agents by any physical traits that would be useful by the foe.

Always assume that the enemy will be able to capture the files at some time or other, and that the convenience of storage which allows one to get to them easily for referral places them where the enemy may also refer to them. Never allow any negligent action to endanger the apparat, and the creation of agent-files is the most negligent of actions. Recording the authentic names or addresses of the agents will endanger the files. Never assume that the enemy will miss noticing the files during searches of any area. The only secure place for files is at the bottom of a foundation-footer hole under a massive building, where they will be covered up with tons of concrete and tons of building, and no one will be able to find them afterward. If the files are anywhere that makes them convenient to refer to, and the enemy knows of them or even suspects them, he will find them.

Files on enemy or suspect persons may be kept and stored in an area, providing photographic or material (retyped or carbon) copies are stored away in a very secure location such as being buried under a basement or other floor after being developed and fixed or sealed to prevent damage. The information will not be new

to the enemy, for he will expect that the intelligence units will be interested in his people, and he will likely have much vaster files of his own on them. The fact that personnel have been urged to pay lip-service to the enemy credos by day, and pay homage with high explosives on his installations by night, will allow covering a small number of files on converted or compromised persons within the enemy-file group. Never, for example, note in the files that the individual is turned (now working for the friendly side) or has been recruited. Keep in touch with the possibility that the enemy will eventually capture the files, and keep noting the anti-friendly outbursts faithfully, and in the same style.

Files on persons who have become friendly, or whose alliances have been determined to be friendly, must be eliminated so that no trace of this determination will be present. This means elimination from the master book, as well. If the party is very important, or the coverage is very thorough, a false file may be needed, in order to make them secure in the event that the records fall into enemy hands. The facts must conform to the truth up to and excluding the fact that the individual has been recruited, and the evidence presented in such a way that is plausible or reasonable to assume to be the truth.

If the area is tightly knit, the most vague of files will serve to prompt action and ideas, and allow the readers to certainly recall just what had been said or done.

Where data to be provided by an operative must be inserted, try to at least alter the style, and format, so that it is not

practical to track the information back to the supplier.

Avoiding the number assigned on any records will assist with security, for then the enemy will not be able to tie UNICYCLE to #2847, and localize the area "worked" by UNICYCLE if they manage to capture any coded messages that bear 2847. Assorted notes have been made as to the use of the number in choosing the cypher or code key, and if the enemy knows this, he may be able to crack the key and read the messages, learning firsthand where the agent UNICYCLE/#2847 operates from the intelligence he provides. This can spell the end of the agent.

There is also a domestic, peacetime, policy reason for avoiding the use of names and assigned numbers as well as precise data in files. With the irresponsible use of the Freedom of Information Act, records and files can be procured by the individual under investigation, or an extremist group, or by a chatty association or organization, with the data being used to track back the informant(s) involved. The operative or informant will then be likely to qualify for a sudden life insurance payoff. Either the individual will be severely beaten, discredited and fired, or will be liquidated by the individual or group on which he has been providing information.

Apparently the FIA provisions were introduced by responsible, idealistic people, but it is being misused by the irresponsible or extremist people to clean out their stables and tighten up operations. Not many years ago, such an action would have been wholeheartedly declared "subversive," and rightly so. Now it is

being applauded as "Libertarian" and Humanitarian." To avoid compromising the information, the files should be forthwith altered so that the information contained cannot be traced back to the suppliers, and no record kept of the true names of these people. One may be called into court to answer questions, but then, the cover name may be supplied.

It is the author's opinion that a flood of officers who refuse to say where they got their information--establishing dead-drops so as to protect the contacts, and making certain to never learn more than possible about the informants--would cause the rash of such suits to dry up like a case of poison ivy that has been medicated.

If the authorities can truthfully say that they never see the man who makes insertions in drops, and have never processed originals for fingerprints, they can probably escape the wrath of a judge who wants them to testify and tell all in open court. No court official can require what is unavailable. Assigning the code names to informants and never retaining the original, verbatim files of their reports, will confound the surprised suit-bringers. It would also make the informants secure.

Paraphrasing information supplied, weeding out words or phrases which would indicate the information, as well as putting the information in official language, would make most of them secure. If the files are to be used for informational purposes only, it is possible to insert items in terse terms and "allege"

many things that are proven, reversing matters, so that the informant cannot be pinpointed by his or her access to information. Make the alterations random, so that "alleged" cannot be read for "proven" or the reverse.

The first order of effective law enforcement is to protect the innocent; protecting the informants is included, and no rabid or ill-advised cadre of individuals may destroy the effectiveness of law enforcement by remote-controlled eliminations or liquidations of informants.

Too, charging the groups with being accessories to the killing or abuse of the informants would probably dampen their ardor a bit. Take it to court; it can only be thrown out. Make an issue of it; they do. Make the charge public; they do.

One idea would be to assign names at random, so that it is not easy to apply direct or reversed reading! Gloria Mundy may be read directly and equated to a frail lady or at any rate, a woman. G.M. may also be read indirectly to indicate a very brawny man. The point is to apply the names at random, so that some cases are direct and others are indirect, as coincidence, so that the enemy will not be able to gather anything if names are learned incidental to other efforts, and not equated to any subject.

Assigning numbers is also vital, so that the agents may communicate with headquarters without giving anything other than a group which indicates the operative's callsign. While it may be possible to run a thousand agents ranging from 000 to 999,

in series, it is usually better to compose a random four-number group for each, so that it is easier to add or subtract and arrive at a group which can be sent in four-group or five-group codes or cyphers. Too, with four groups, there is a greater number of potential agents--from 0000 to 9999, or 10,000 possibles. The communists have some eight to twelve thousand agents in West Germany (the German Federal Republic) and something in the area of a thousand in America--depending upon whether one is counting the Fedora Cashin types or not--although it is not likely that any single area will require 10,000 agents. Ten thousand could easily run a nation's efforts in a big country. For a "grandson" unit, this will be fine, since this gives a nice quantity of variables to play with. The assignment of the numbers will not allow the enemy to determine if there is any particular quantity of agents about. A two-number group would indicate a maximum of a hundred operatives; three-number would maximate at a thousand, but four numbers would give a potential of ten thousand. Never give the enemy any more information than possible about the strength of the apparat!

When assigning numbers, they may be selected from a telephone book, in the same manner as the "Gamma Pads" or one time codes pads: At random, working from a telephone book from a distant area, sticking strictly to one exchange and one series (no numbers are duplicated within the same exchange: 123-#### will have no duplicates, for example, although combining 123-#### and 456-#### will produce some duplicates). Using a telephone book

from an area remote from the operational zone, it is possible to start at the "As" and run to the "Zs" and number every agent thrice over. The book may be concealed after selecting a group of six or eight numbers for use in advance. Alternatively, working up the 10,000 possibles on slips of paper and dropping these into a tin will supply all the names, although if the enemy captures the book, he will also be able to handle this, though the book is perhaps less desperate-seeming than a tin of numbers of individual slips of paper. The advantage of the strange-area book is that the enemy will not be able to determine, from any traitor or planted agent, precisely how many agents there are at that time by having him check out whose telephone number is being used and then counting back from that entry to the front of the book.

Numbers, as seen in "Cyphers and Codes," may also be used to assit in selecting the order of any cypher or code alphabet selection. Say his number is 4567; he arranges his cypher or code series by picking the fourth then the fifth, then the sixth letters out of the alphabet, putting them down as the first four letters, then selecting the next group. If the fourth letter is selected, written down, and eliminated from the group, then the fifth (actual sixth) letter is selected, then the sixth (actually eighth) letter, and so on, this will make the order less apparent. The codeword or keyword is put along the top line and the order of the letters altered so that the unused

letters which appear in the top line are plugged in where the former keyword letters were in the square, and a jumbled alphabet is selected for each agent's use. With a Gamma or One-Time, this makes matters less difficult afield and more secure. Determining the order of a Playfair cypher is often done by selecting the frequency and other matters, and trying to reconstruct the chart or graph from the bottom to the top. With this system, the agent will not have to learn a scrambled alphabet, and no different alphabets will have to be provided. For some avenue like radio communication, the date may be added to the groups for fabricating the "code-of-the-day."

A number assigned to the individual will also give him or her a sense of belonging to something bigger than him/herself, and of being a vital portion of a massive apparat. Depending upon the attitude of the new agent, a low number may be claimed to be reserved for vitally important people or, then, issued in random fashion. The Walter Mitty streak will be thrilled by the idea of being important, and the realists will be more inclined to approve of random issue. The same thing could be said for large numbers: the higher the number the greater the importance, or the larger the number of agents, or the realistic account of random issue.

This will have to be carefully evaluated by the agent or spymaster providing the number and name. If the recruit seems to be thrilled by the selection--and many work best when they are rescued by Intelligence from deadly dull jobs--then a little humbug as to actual worth is acceptable. Remember:

call for an heroic effort, and one gets an heroic result. Call for a puny effort, and all one gets is a puny result. The preference is obvious. As long as an agent is not thrown away for the sake of temporary gain, the most energetic agent result is the best. One may get a fine agent in a prison, who steals a spare set of keys and disappears. This is a temporary gain, for then security will be alerted and the locks changed. It is better to secretly get copies of the keys, and a full report on guard runs, and then work the operation without implicating the agent.

DIFFERENCES IN INTELLIGENCE SOUGHT

The types of intelligence which the apparat should seek are "specialized" and "tactical." "Specialized" refers to the results of operations such as would be covered under other operations--compromises, entry and evaluation, flaps and seals, and so on. "Tactical" intelligence may be determined from the logistic and tactical aspects. Rather than confound the issue, here is a list of likely objectives for intelligence evaluation; the logistical and tactical items will be apparent to the observers.

Elements of Information to be Gathered

1. RADIO--AM, FM, Commercial and Amateur
   Television--Free-broadcast, Cable
   Micro-Wave-- Radar & Telephone transmittal towers
   Military--Indigenous channels/frequencies utilized, plus equipment
   Civil--Police, Fire, Air, Ambulance, Civil Defense
   A. Transmitter/receiver locations
   B. Tower locations

C. Studio location(s)
D. Equipment & storage facilities
E. Repair shops
F. Sales locations (shops, distributors, etc.)

2. Telephone Installations
   A. Offices--Business
   B. Offices--Technical
   C. Offices-Operator-control points
   D. Equipment Centers
   E. Major underground cable pathways
   F. Underground cable routes to other tactical targets/ objectives
   G. Substations and/or generator or booster stations
   H. Microwave relay sites
   I. Overhead arterial lines, general and specific

3. Electric Power Facilities
   A. Generator stations
   B. Major elevated distribution lines
      1. Sabotage points (tower on hillside, isolated tower, etc.)
      2. Lines to plants used by the enemy
   C. Switching Centers
      1. Local net
      2. Local portion of national net
      3. Special areas of industrial value
   D. Substation Complexes
      1. Unmanned
      2. Manned
      3. Elevated
      4. Groundlevel
   E. Repair Equipment Centers
      1. Speed of response
      2. Equipment utilized
         a. Condition
         b. Quantity & quality
      3. Major personnel at all sites mentioned

4. Indigenous Military--national forces
   Reserve training centers
   National Reserves
   National Guard
   State Guard
   Civilian self-defense militia

(If all of above enemy personnel)
Party militants
Plant/industry militias
Party youth militias

(If all of above enemy personnel)
- A. Estimate personnel strength
- B. Estimate morale
- C. Estimate mobility
  - a. Air-mobile
  - b. Land-mobile: foot
  - c. Land-mobile: vehicular
- D. Analyze probable mission
- E. Analyze equipment issued
- F. Locate & identify communications equipment & facilities

NOTE: These are of importance if enemy-controlled personnel; friendly indigenous military can take care of itself. Otherwise, analyze friendly bases which may be taken over by enemy personnel as bases w/o personnel.

5. Transportation: Highways
   - A. All major routes in area
   - B. Intersections
   - C. Connecting points
   - D. Alternate routes to installations
   - E. Military roads/routes (totalitarian nations)
   - F. Ambush/roadblock/sniping/interdiction points

6. Transportation: Rail
   - A. Type of unit(s) utilized--electric, steam, fuel
   - B. Supply areas for fuel/power
   - C. Stations for passenger travel
   - D. Parking yards
   - E. Repair yards
   - F. Repair shops--complex work
   - G. Roundhouses
   - H. Communications towers
   - I. Signal towers
   - J. Signal wiring relays
   - K. Switch lines
   - L. Switches
   - M. Frog sites (continual rail)
   - N. Bridges
   - O. Tunnels
   - P. Underpasses
   - Q. Overpasses

   (Charting on map would be more effective)

7. Transportation: air
   Commercial
   Military
   Private
   Other

A. Length of runways
B. Type of instrumentation (all-weather or daylight/night)
C. Type of communications facilities
D. Serving what aircraft types
E. Surveillance sites
F. Guard force(s) available
G. Sites of hangars
H. Type of perimeter--cover for attack

8. Water-related installations
Reservoirs
Wells
Dams
Generating facilities
Purification/desalting sites
Harbors
A. Size/volume
B. Attendant security
C. Surveillance sites
D. Potential areas for sabotage/attack
E. Potential for infiltrating/recruiting personnel

9. Police installations
City or municipal
County or district
State or department
National police

(If for civil criminal apprehension)
secret state police
party police
military police

(If for political/military criminal apprehension)
A. Local headquarters
B. Schematics of site
C. Total number of personnel
D. Number per shifts
E. Disbursement of police/agents
F. Armament & condition of same
G. Uniform, if worn on duty
H. Transportation available
I. Communications equipment available
J. Intelligence, of commanding, junior officers
K. Air patrol capability
L. Detaining areas, guard numbers
M. Longer-term jail areas
N. Very long term prison facilities
O. Scaling of indigenous personnel to enemy cadre

10. Sources of supply--
Military hardward
Convertable civilian equipment
Ancillary equipment
  A. Foodstuffs
  B. Medicines and bandages
  C. Doctors--trusted, neutral & enemy-inclined
  D. Safe hospitals--mental asylums, TB sanatoriums, etc.
  E. Fuel depots, civilian supply points
  F. Clothing sources
  G. Weapons/material for weapons
  H. Vehicles--land, air or water
  I. Communications equipment
    a. Field telephones
      1. Railroad
      2. Barges
      3. Telephone company
    b. Radio sets
      1. Civilian transmitters
      2. Military/government transmitters
      3. Special receivers
    c. Other communications equipment
  J. Blasting/high explosive supplies
    a. Construction sites
    b. Dealers
    c. Owners
    d. Governmental supplies
  K. Heavy equipment
    a. Trucks, bulldozers, etc.
    b. Wrecking trucks
    c. Cranes
    d. Others
  L. Propaganda supplies
    a. Paper stocks
    b. Printing machine sources
    c. Ink/paint outlets
    d. Sign shops
  M. Metalworking supplies
    a. Lathes, drills, milling machines, grinders, etc.
      1. Private hands
      2. Small shop/garage/factory sources
      3. Larger installations

If the area is under enemy control when the effort is started, all emphasis will be on how to gain immediate knowledge which will allow implementation of hostilities as soon as possible. Determining the answers to these and other, special, local questions will be a bit more difficult and dangerous after the enemy has set up housekeeping.

If the area is still under friendly control when the effort is undertaken, the emphasis is on gaining general intelligence (the enemy may change or alter things when he takes over) and locating areas which may be attacked by fifth columnists so that defense may be implemented, if a war footing is ever necessary. The former calls for specific intelligence right away, whereas gaining this would be a useless and dangerous effort--the enemy will undoubtedly change security about so that he can keep out attackers who are familiar with the former systems. Leaving the first line of area or site defense to the designated, overt, authorities will assist in preserving the full strength of the intelligence apparat in the event that behind the scenes operations are called for.

The listing is meant only as an indication of how to go about the matters. If an area lacks one item but has a large concentration of other facilities, it is practical to assume that the tables would be changed to reflect this situation. Arranging a listing for each and every possible aternative would in itself result in a book. This is simply a guide.

INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING AREAS NOW ISOLATED AND UNDER ENEMY CONTROL

An apparat may be called upon to gather specific information concerning areas now isolated behind enemy lines, so that agents may be sent in to organize apparats and lead guerrilla as well as resistance activities. In this case, it is vital to know how to go about gathering such data.

Essentially, the needed information is broken down into several groups: terrain, populational, industrial, political, agricultural, topographic, and others.

For each classification, a section of the intelligence apparat "goes above ground" as specific, authorized gatherers of information. Refugees are interviewed pursuant to all these matters within the areas where they formerly lived. Indigenous personnel, civilians, are interviewed as to the areas observed during their travels. Sportsmen are interviewed as to cover and other useful items, hikers provide terrain notations, possibly maps, and other information, and tourists are sought to provide information on the communities, individuals within the area(s) who may assist the apparat's formation, and opposing individuals, along with other matters. People with friends or family in the area are interviewed as to who would be more likely to oppose or support the enemy while he is there, as well as along general population lines.

In some areas, a letter from a relative asking for his people to support the bearer of the note will be very effective.

"Aunt Minnies" are collected; photographs of the regions, maps or hand-drawn charts, publications put out by the enemy, copies of the then-current identity document issued by the enemy (goes to counterfeiting for replication), and information concerning the enemy personnel then in residence in the area--origins of soldiers, weapons, morale, attitudes (oppressive or as would-be liberators, thieves or plunderers, lax or right controls, and others), and other notes.

Artists and sportsmen are requested to give sketches or details on enemy small arms utilized (refer to "The Black Bag Owner's Manual" section for example sketches), fortifications or installations built, vehicles or military materiel being used, sketches of important officers, and other information that will assist in giving a complete picture of the various important enemy personnel in the area, including those who would not be above (or below) taking a bit of a bribe.

Artists, hikers and sportmen, as well as poachers, are interviewed as to topographic concerns, to update any maps secured. Information should include condition of cover in the area, undergrowth, presence or lack of thick ground cover, whether or not area has been cut over for

timber or burned in forest fire, cleared fields, streams with usable depth for parachute dropping, and marshy ground where drops could be made--wet but not excessively so and not a hazard to walk there.

Farmers, urbanites, visiting relatives and tourists are interviewed as to the state of the people in the area--inclined to be neutral, support the enemy, quietly oppose him, or actively oppose him. The specific people who would be reliable first contacts for operatives--who oppose the enemy but are smart enough not to get out and do so at first while the foe is nervy--must also be determined from refugees, tourists, and others who are interviewed.

When doing these interviews, neglect to mention that the object is to secure the information for the reasons mentioned. Instead, ask all manner of questions from each subject. People may have had cause to learn specific things not immediately apparent by attitudes or background. A very nice little lady may have a deep and abiding love for gossip, which was implemented during chats with residents or relatives, but men may also have been involved in such operations. As it is probably the case that there will be few individuals who know anything major, make up for this by interviewing everyone in the area, exhaustively. Not to exhaust individuals, or make them resentful of the questions, but in full detail and so that they answer questions at least twice.

Interviewers' Attitudes: This is based on the background(s) of the individuals being questioned. If the people respect authority and gladly answer questions, the attitude may be formal and stiff. If the people tend to love individual freedom and resent dictatorial chaps, the interview teams must be more informal. They must maintain the attitude of authority, so that their role will be apparent, but they may be friendly and indicate that the individual they are questioning has something useful to tell. Too much of the latter will tend to create an attitude in the subject of the interview in which he babbles at great length; this is why the series of questioning periods are separate from each other, so that the small differences which indicate a lie or exaggeration will be apparent. The interviewers must never behave as though they suspect that the individual is handing over a tall tale, but report what was said with a note that it seems rather unusual. The best attitude to be assumed is that the individual is doing the apparat a service, and the apparat is grateful, but not fawningly so.

Two, three, or more interviews may be conducted, with all information requested two or three times. The allegation is that people tend to forget small things, and by getting the interview so many times the subject will be more apt to provide all the information necessary. Really, it is so that any lies will be noted.

The apparat need not and should not pay for the information, in most cases, but rather, pay for the individual's travel expenses (if the agents need him to come to them), plus supply food, drinks and lodging if the situation warrants it. Rewards may be offered by the apparat for photos, maps, sketches and the like of the area, to assist in bringing these forth, with the items being duplicated carefully and returned to the owner if he or she requests this.

Obtaining the information and photographs may be accomplished by placing editorials or adverts. In the event that the friendly papers will provide full support, these may be utilized to spread the alarm among the civilian population so that the intelligence section can go off and interview as many people as possible.

If refugees are being brought in and they have to pass some type of border control or the like (and they certainly should be searched for weapons and munitions which would be tools for saboteurs), it is possible for the searchers to lay aside all film, photographs, maps, and so on and issue tickets or chits which will allow the refugees to be reimbursed in some manner or other. Then, the individuals may be given a preliminary interview to determine where they came from, their roles in the area, the degree of contract they had with the population, their degree of hatred for the enemy, and whether or not they may be interviewed again, in more detail.

A special interview barracks must be established in the refugee camp, if applicable, with a separate waiting room. Separating walls around each interviewer's desk and stenographer must be constructed to keep out the distracting sounds and give an air of privacy. The interview notes must be made in the subject's exact words, and reviewed later to make certain that the same tales were told. This means the stenographic personnel must be able to speak the language, or a tape recorder per unit may be used, with the tapes being translated later. The interviewer must speak the same language as the subjects, obviously.

A small network of sbserving agents must be installed in the camps, to look for any individuals who behave oddly--may be enemy spies--and to index individuals who have good qualities for being recruited, trained, and sent back to the area as spies.

This must progress with dispatch, so that the enemy does not miss the individuals before they are returned to the area, and he is not able to settle the area down before the agents go back. Matters may be so hectic that new people can be inserted up to months later, and report in as refugees who were scared out by shelling and wandered a bit before the glorious soldiers of The People's Peaceful Progressive Proletarian Paradise brought order and peace to the area. Upon hearing this good news, obviously, the individual returned home at once. This is generally what the enemy should be told, so that the individual can get an

identity card and settle down to a job of espionage.

If the refugees are being issued clothing, and garments are needed by agents to be planted in the area, they must be asked to supply the garments to the Intelligence unit. Garments must include everything down to the skin, shoes and socks, ski boots or the like if applicable, packs or suitcases, and incidental items such as money (reimburse in value), watches or rings indigenous to the area (reimburse in value) and other items. Any badges or pins provided by the Party of the Proletariat must be gathered (refugees often obtain these so that the enemy soldiers will not be abusive) and duplicated so that agents may be provided with these articles. The British issued cufflinks in the form of swastikas, Quisling badges, assorted medals presented to indigenous Nazi parties, and other pins. Such pins and badges are useful in case the agent happens to be forced to associate with Party members, who will generally accept him if the badge is worn and the individual has the rituals down pat.

Until an apparat can establish tailors from the area(s) to duplicate the garments, the main supply of such apparel will have to be from the refugees. In cases of chain-stores and such, it may not be necessary to replicate the garments, although everything worn should be used and obviously so, to allay suspicions as well as reinforce the cover story.

Letters of introduction are gathered from refugees, who will advise their families and friends that they have

managed to make it to free territory, are enlisting in the fight against the totalitarians, and are asking X, Y or Z to give full support to the individual bearing the letter. If the enemy might find the letter, it should be rather more vague, and still get the point across.

Refugees must be interviewed another time, getting the pet names used by the individuals, mentioning specific things--of no general military or intelligence value--which can be told to the family or friends so that the letter will be proven to be true, and not tortured or extorted out of the individual. General descriptions of the refugees, his condition and outlook, and his health must be secured for the agent to be planted in his area, so that the operative can prove he knows or saw the refugee. If possible, some "trick" the refugee has when eating, smoking or talking may be included in the agent's briefing, so that he can mention this. Few people will evidence such a trait if being confined by the secret police. The agent may meet with the refugee, or he may simply observe him from a distance, so that he knows the individual on sight.

Such information is valued, for it effects an introduction to the families of the refugee and dissipates doubts, and manages to firmly prove the agent's credentials. Even if such an introduction is not vital at that time, it can be reserved for use later, or added to the fund of

knowledge necessary to survive in the area.

The refugee must be interviewed as to the specifics of his home area, so that the agent emplaced there will have places to hide, secure locations for other work, and the like.

If an apparat must be "dropped blind" into "denied territory"--must be parachuted in with no friendly agents or fighters to receive him--the agents will have to be dropped into the area in multiples, with each one very heavily trained so that each can start to establish a full operation. The agents involved must be thoroughly briefed in weaponry, self-defense, locks and entry, photography, and the rest. One agent will provide the core for a series of specialized cells, and must be able to brief each cell in the proper methods of operations. Using different agents, there will be less chance of compromise if one cell or the other is breached, and less risk of total failure if there are alternate cells or agents who can fill in if one or another is captured or injured.

If agents are at a premium, it may be possible to utilize "Cell Founder" agents whose role is to go about forming cells and chains, to be picked up by another agent who is sent in to run the operation.

Arranging identification is rather easy. It may be that a particular item is cut in irregular zigs and zags so

that the two halves can be pressed together to act as verification, or a particular currency bill may be torn cleanly down the middle. Identification is effected when the other half is presented, with the serial number matching the part that was torn off and left. Very little currency around the world is provided with one single serial number, or with the serial numbers atop one another. If that is the case, the agent may take part of the bill, and write the serial number on it, signing it, and this will act as number-verification and authentication to the dormant indigenous cell leader. Laundry, shoe repair, room or other tickets may be utilized as verification; including bus or streetcar tickets, cinema tickets and the like. If tickets are issued in books, with the numbers on each ticket exactly the same, one may be presented to each operative or leader of a cell, and the verification made when the master or ticket-book jacket is presented. This will be more convenient, for it will preclude any forgery by the enemy, or one of the operatives attempting to activate the network for himself.

Once the indigenous apparat is properly constructed, it will be a less complicated matter to provide or import any supplies or specialists needed and to bring in a specialized instructor or two. The latter step will then revolve about creating any specialized device or machine necessary for an operation. The point is to establish a network to some degree or other, with an ultimate headquarters, in the

area. The headquarters may be simply the original instructing agent, but that will suffice.

One of the values of having a headquarters is the chain of command, and the likelihood that the operation will have more professionalism and less wasteful and dangerous duplications.

Too, one spy, alone and on his or her own, will have to be exceptionally brave to function properly deep in enemy territory; but an agent with an apparat, even if alone at that time, will draw comfort from knowing that there is a structure and authority over his actions. Another advantage is the diversified and decentralized nature: A lone agent will have to handle all the photography, entry and evaluation, transmitting, etc., and the volume of work and the degree of activity will put him under severe risk. The most obvious part of the operation is the radio work; if the agent is doing this himself he will be caught sooner or later. If there is a cut-out and another avenue to follow, the raido operator may be found although the insulating and protecting nature of the apparat will shield him more. Even if he is caught, the agents he serves will not be in as great a danger. With reliable security, the loss or capture will be noted earlier and augmented so that the risk to the apparat is lessened.

Relationships with Criminal Elements

A local intelligence unit may establish liaison with criminal elements or with a criminal syndicate in some cases. The "Mafia" assisted American Counter Espionage Corps personnel by keeping an eye out for dockside sabotage during WW 2, as well as in assisting in preparing the lower portions of Italy for Allied invasion. The "Union Corce" assisted in preparing the way for Allied landings on Corsica and the South of Franch.

If an area is overrun by the enemy, it is possible for the Syndicate to offer its services, or be invited to join the struggle, for they have an effective apparat already. They can smuggle goods, and can smuggle codes and cypher messages just as well. They will have a vested interest in eliminating the totalitarians, for the enemy will wish to eliminate all their activities. The Mafia are also patriotic, usually very respectful of the Catholic Church, and valued for their sheer numbers. Example: The nation of France maintains approximately 100,000 men who may engage in investigation or comparable observation, in some capacity or other, counting military, national and other police, the paramilitary security forces, etc. On the other hand, there is a conservatively estimated number of 600,000 to 1,000,000 individuals who would answer to the Union at some time or other, and could be recruited for investigation or detective work.

Tapping this outlet would oblige the government controlling the apparat to make some concessions to the syndicates, in most cases, although this may not be the case. Even if so, it is easier to deal with a syndicate operating in "victimless crimes" after peace has been restored than to lose everything because of a pigheaded attitude. In Poland, for example, the Free Polish forces operating within the nation released all the criminals with the provision that they would concern themselves completely with crimes against the German occupiers. Up to the end of the war, the criminals behaved with admirable patriotism, and hardly touched the Polish citizens who were not allied with the Germans.

The forces arrayed against the totalitarians by the crime syndicates would be immense: gambling, prostitution, and drugs would be useful in effecting compromises. Prostitution, black marketeering, and others would be useful avenues for developing intelligence and picking up information. The safe and loft, burglary, and allied groups who must operate with the Syndicate's permission could be redirected by the apparat or the Syndicate into plundering enemy offices for information and documents. The "fencing" operations would be ideal for procurement of weapons, munitions, materiel and other articles useful in operations. Too, there would be a labor pool of assassins, enforcers, beatings specialists and the like who could deal with the

traitors, less important enemy officials and for sniping and interdiction in the cities. The criminal network could also assist in arranging for safehouses and hiding places for people fleeing the enemy's anger.

In most cities with some degree of underworld, the likely individuals willing or available for operations against the totalitarians would range from a few hundred to several thousand; better than an apparat could arrange for a few months to a few years. The quality of such activities will be lower than if handled by a formally trained intelligence unit, but volume of information will assist in making up for this problem, to a degree.

What will have to be remembered is that the reliance on such outlets will not (must not) be absolute, and an operative must be installed to verify and prove the information supplied. The syndicates must ultimately be in the hands of an intelligence agent, and not allowed to wag to apparat or run the show. Their methods, goals and procedures are not the same and they will lack contacts in many places where contacts must be emplaced, and this must be pointed out. The members or subordinates of the syndicates may be given a general amnesty if they operate in the nation's interest and perform good work, without working against the civil populations. Points will be added for enemy directed actions and taken off for friendly directed action.

The reliance placed on the syndicates must not be very great--no more than sixty percent, we will say--and they must be watched. Training useful in intelligence circles will assist in their postwar activities. The use of intelligence skills in civil crimes must be counted as the maximum degree of punishment for that particular crime, after the war.

Before the conflict, files must be established concerning the leaders of the criminal syndicates, or civil police files may be observed, and in the event of war or insurrection the more likely among the "Bosses" or Capos must be contacted for assistance in fighting the common and greater enemy. This will be rather like the gamekeeper and poacher, or fox and dog, lying down together and becoming great friends, but it will serve to beat back the enemy more thoroughly and with less time and suffering involved.

The Apparat must also be on the watch for special criminal personnel who may be of service to the fight. Obviously, it will be distasteful for one to field a friendly agent and request that the individual work in a compromise situation or as a homosexual; but there are prostitutes of either sex and homosexuals as well who have the proper patriotic feelings. Being an individual who practices either does not mean that all feelings and sense of duty are gone. They must not be trusted any farther than necessary or introduced to any friendly personnel who

might be turned in by the recruited individual, but their use in the roles described in very great. The other side utilizes specially trained "Sexologists" or individuals who are carefully briefed in all the ways and means of achieving sexual gratification for either the opposite or the same sex. While it is a "soft Capitalist trait" to avoid training one's own agents in such work, to quote the enemy, there is less expense and difficulty involved in recruiting a prostitute or two who already know the tricks (pun not intended) of the trade, and whose services may be used for good ends. This will not violate morality or give a sense of having degraded anyone, for the prostitutes will already be soiled as far as their souls are concerned, and the chance at working for the friendly side will be just another job to them. The point is, and has always been, and will always be, to defeat the enemy any place he may be found, in any guise he assumes, with whatever means are necessary. This does not mean to stooping to the levels of the totalitarian to defeat him, for that is simply exchanging one evil for another, but it does mean to use whatever avenues are open and watever objects are available.

Other individuals useful on a job-to-job basis are the more experienced burglars, safe specialists, and the like. Files should be made on these individuals, or at least the police files looked into, and a listing made of the better-skilled among them for future reference. When they are arrested, their files should be retired, and when they come

back out, they should be reactivated. Therefore, when or if there is a need for their services (depending on the requirements for such work and the apparat's skilled manpower pool), these individuals may be contacted and recruited.

An advantage of using a burglar or safe and lock criminal is, if or when one is captured, he will be simply a criminal who is still in business and will not reveal the workings of the apparat. Too, their style of work and the need to plunder the place afterwards will be more realistic. They may be paid off by being allowed to steal all the valued appliances in the place, after they have opened the safe, tossed the documents about (or so it seems, actually the documents will be evaluated and then tossed about) and rifled the drawers. Work done by an authentic burglar looks like the work of a burglar; work by an intelligence team to simulate a burglar tends to look like an intelligence job with a burglarlike covering. The Secret Police will tend to concentrate on catching a burglar, and not sending a balloon up about an intelligence entry and evaluation job. Different intents often leave different signs.

Utilization of professional criminals will have to be done very carefully. These individuals must not know their employers, nor how to effect contact directly. They must work through a sign or symbol which will be observed and reported. The arrangements for making the appointments must

be carefully analyzed so that there is not a chance for the enemy to entrap the agent(s). Remember: Individuals with criminal records will probably be known to the enemy, and he may, in turn, observe or recruit these individuals for use in a civil observance network or as spies against the people. Individuals with a sincere patriotic streak will usually carry on with their resistance work, but there are apparently more criminal types who would work for the enemy than remain neutral or work toward friendly goals. The solution is, of course, to file information concerning the criminal acts and use this as a controlling "line"--the enemy will be given the papers if the criminal does not behave--or they may be frightened into compliance with an order to destroy the individual if he ever becomes a traitor. The enemy can only threaten them with the same thing, and the criminal has the civilian population to hide in and the apparat to assist him. Made an enemy of the apparat, there is no place the criminal can hide, for the enemy will not take him or her in and protect the party.

BLUEPRINT FOR UTILIZATION OF UNITED NATIONS GROUPS FOR ESPIONAGE:

Providing a United Nations still exists, the apparat may utilize the considerable services of the UN for operations against the enemy. Necessary will be the compromise, recruitment or emplacement of an individual who is friendly

to the apparat, within the higher offices of the local UN unit.

At times, it may be possible or practical to emplace an agent directly within the staff at the United National headquarters in New York City, and have that party appoint or delegate the selected agent to such a role as would be useful. Please Note: This will not work with the American chief representative at this moment--Andrew Young--for he is not of the caliber to safely approach or recruit. There would be an immediate press conference, or a meeting with other delegates, and the word would go to the four corners. Careful evaluation of the potential recruits will be necessary, or the procedures for compromise will have to be used as a final recourse. Do not approach personnel who are untrustworthy.

Working at the top is useful for obtaining all manner of United Nations credentials for the field teams. The use of top UN situations may be divided, like Gaul, into three parts: penetration of the government or military structure of the hosting country; the American in the case of the UN office, or the country in which there is a UN mission. Observing and fighting the intelligence forces of the other nations, or working with them, as the case may be; the largest in the New York City branch is the Soviet Union backed up by Polish, Czech, and others, which

must be read as one major "intelligence empire," with all being lackeys to the KGB. Finally, to observe, attempt to manipulate, and use, the United Nations as a body. 33.33 percent of the Soviet UN personnel are, by count, tied to the KGB, and the other 66.66 percent must report to their KGB handlers.

Category one: As an example, the Soviets have managed to run most of their operations in America from behind the UN cover, including cells which work on uncovering defense secrets and even actual parts of the weapons-systems utilized. In another nation, personnel from the UN may have general passage, especially if they claim to be dedicated Marxist-Leninists and work for a communist empire nation, while operating within a nation courting these "wonderous benefits." Third World nations generally operate in such a manner.

Category two: Fighting the other side or a rival is very important, especially if both are out to woo the same nation at the same time, or are mutually interested in creating a base of operations. The USA and the Soviets are generally agreed to be at war wherever both have an interest; and with democracy and communism locked in a deadly struggle, this means throughout the world. The Soviets and Chinese are likewise engaged in a bitter war of colonialism over Africa, with both sides wishing to establish political colonies there. Even among the various communist empire nations there is conflict, for each wants to curry favor with

his master by bringing in the information first. In any war zone, one can expect there to be a double allocation of operatives from every side and most major foreign observers.

Category three: This is obvious when one considers the way the UN has been manipulated like soft clay over the past years. The oft-quoted UN Security Council resolution that demands the Israelis return the lands captured in the 1967 attack was inserted, run through, and heartily approved by the Soviets. It is often the case that a severe rivalry surfaces between the Soviets and the Chinese Peoples' Republic (ChiCom), and this is best illustrated by the reactions to the African situation. When there is a loud resolution to sanction a free world nation for some particular matter, one can safely wager that it was thought up and pressed through by the Soviets or Chinese. Israel's censure as Zionist is one example. The critical outburst against Honduras is another. The odd silence following Cuban imperialism in Africa is another. The gravelike hush over the bloddbath in the Peoples' Peaceful Progressive Proletarian Paradise that is Cambodia is another. The fight to remove the single veto rule, now that the Soviets have adequate power and can be opposed by their former ruse, is yet another example. The ouster of Free China is still another.

At times, the chief delegate may be utilized as an agent and prime mover behind operations, as witnessed by the bald status of the PLO's man. He violated the "peace"

accords by running propaganda and recruitment as well as performing as an agent. He is in essense a Command rank officer, and his word is not to be questioned without reprisal. The PLO also maintains an extensive array of UN employees, most of whom are full time paid UN personnel, who assist the PLO with UN funds, material, and information. Most of these employees serve the PLO first, and the UN if they have the time to spare. Some do not serve the UN at all.

Examples: The United Nations funds for relef work, children's aid and other matters are carefully and thoroughly plundered for the PLO. The UNESCO and UNICEF funds are firmly reported as being sidetracked for use in buying weapons, materiel and information. UNWRA funds have been proven to have been directly used to buy munitions and support for the PLO. The humanitarian funds or foundations which have utilized the UN as a major vehicle for direct transmission of aid to the refugees are directed to PLO coffers at a rate of from ten cents on the US dollar to ten dimes on the US dollar; from ten percent to one hundred percent of the funds are PLO-plundered. Christian Church funds seemed to be worst hit during the Lebanese conflict, and ther other funds (Jewish Relief, etc) put in the hands of UN personnel for refugee aid are sacked up for PLO causes. In many areas, the UN represents the only group which is the one on the scene with enough manpower to assist, and has been unwisely used on many occasions, with the money being poured into terrorist coffers.

Other Palestinian adventures with the UN--with the latter extending a direct or inadvertent hand--include work in gathering intelligence. The UN peacekeeping forces must motor about safely, so they require charts of road-blocks, bunkers, landmine fields and armed concentrations, as well as clear roads. The Israelis and Phalangists provided this information. The maps which are so marked tend to gravitate to headquarters where the PLO has a major interest, with the maps stubbornly clinging to Palestinian fingers until they get to groups who can utilize this information. Fatah and the rest utilize the carefully prepared and accurately drawn maps to avoid the defended areas in their marches to military objectives such as schools, the UN supported breadlines, and the private homes of opponents.

Other UN operations which have been well verified and proven to be serving the PLO and Fatah include the refugee camps. One majors in training for airline skyjackings. Another has the specialty of an assassins' school. Still another is established to specialize in demolition, min-laying, bomb-making and like thrills. These represent the major training specialties of the house; all camps provide weaponry training and some demolition instructions as a matter of course. Some camps will be found in the hands of splinter groups and factions which cannot use the campus of other units, and some camps are run by special groups which will require the work on skyjacking or demolition.

The children's relief funds meant to cover the education of the Palestinian refugee children do go into education. Starting as young as five, tots learn about the theories of guerrilla warfare. By the ages of eight and nine, the children learn to fire assault rifles and comparable weaponry. This would be considered as rather "progressive" education, as additions to reading, writing, mathematical sums (learning the amount of TNT or plastic needed for a timber or support), history (of the struggle) and social sciences (first aid, the theory of Marxism, and so on). The author confidently assumes that this sort of education is not precisely what the United Nations had in mind when the implemented support for child and youth education.

Other UN operations run by and for the PLO include a full propaganda apparat being housed in a United Nations Building. Another "Brotherhood" alliance between the PLO and the UN is the use of the UN headquarters as the PLO Information and Recruitment Center. The UN acting as a front for the recruiting center for a military operation is in gross violation of the tenets of peace and neutrality.

UN offices which employ indigenous Lebanese personnel are often run by PLO supporters who will not hire the Christians or Phalangists, but only hard-care PLO Muslems. In other nations, the indigenous personnel are hired for their "proper political ideals" and the security clearance for the employment comes from the PLO, Communist, Marxist-

Socialist and like crew. Moderates or conservatives are placed either as figureheads, or are not passed by security and cannot work in sensitive roles, if allowed in at all.

UN "humanitarian hospitals" are often run solely for the benefit of the aggressors; in Lebanon, this mean the exclusion of the Christian Phalangists and most of the wounded population, and the avid inclusion of the terrorists. Elsewhere, UN hospitals are arranged so that Marxist-socialists, extremist communists, and the totalitarian bourgeois cadre members are allowed preference. The rank and file of the military, party, and militant cadres get preference over the civilian population, in other words, and with the opposing forces denied treatment in most cases. While the preference for treating military wounded might, possibly, be acceptable, it is in gross violation of the UN's doctrines when the hospitals presume to deny friendly forces, neutrals, or the defending forces. It is rank hypocrisy when the UN hospitals accept only aggressor personnel, or accept them ahead of noncombatants or civilians.

<u>This Forms the Blueprint</u>: If the PLO may get away with perversion, subversion and prostitution of the finest principles of the United Nations without a rebuke or sanction, then the friendly forces anywhere may do the same. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and if the UN sells herself to the PLO, the friendly forces

may put in a bid for her professional services. Obviously, one cannot be prejudiced in such matters.

To win over the UN units in the area of operations, or to neutralize a biased situation being enjoyed by the enemy, the friendly forces must construct files on the major UN personnel. Following the requirements for other file candidates will serve nicely. After the files have shaped up and an assessment may be made of the faults, flaws, strengths, and weaknesses, the individuals may be dealt with as suggested by their record--subverted, compromised or recruited. The file serves the apparat well as a "tool" for developing the cultivation. Once the subject is properly cultivated, he may be asked for favors. These may be escalated until he is firmly involved and cannot back down. Alternatively, proof of the favors may be collected and kept on hand for use as a lever should he stick at anything. The key feature here is to behave ruthlessly and with promptness; the thing being fought for is freedom; one cannot hesitate, lest it be lost. Cultivating, perverting or subverting the United Nations stands as rather a fearsome task at first glance, but since the UN sold herself to the PLO with such gay abandon she has no reputation to preserve, really. Prostitution of the finest principles of humanity and civilization denies the United Nations the right to protest or pick and choose her paying customers. This must be understood.

Specific Objectives: include the areas which may serve as propaganda producers, medical aid providers, food and clothing suppliers, financial sources, intelligence outlets, refugee camp administrations, disarmament crews, communication centers, administrative cadres, and foreign press assistants. Photographic units, public works sections, machine shop or repair installations, water and electric power supply vehicles or dispatchers, ambulance crews, and others may be seen to in order to secure full cooperation and support. Why settle for a little comfort if one can have more? These operations should be conducted against UN civilian employees (foreign or indigenous), or noncombat or nonmilitary sections. Operating or attempting to subvert military personnel will tend to be reported to the military counter-intelligence unit if worked too heavily to allow the party to camouflage his support. Administration groups have less control, so may be exploited rather more heavily. Avoid operations against free world military units if at all possible, as a matter of courtesy. Avoid British, French, West German and America UN personnel, in particular, if military or strictly neutral. Neutrality should be respected and observed as a character trait in UN personnel. Should the individual be playing "kneesies" with the enemy, however, all restraints may be abdandoned, for he is already soiled and cannot merit the least amount of respect.

In a nutshell, cultivating the attitude usually tendered toward women would suffice: In virginal (neutral), treat in the manner of a lady or the daughter of one's best friend; if easy (corrupted already or looking for a buyer) then treatment in the manner befitting one's need will suffice. If there is time, one may enjoy the chase and capture but if not, the blunt proposal of full intercourse will suffice.

Because the United Nations has frequently sold itself to the PLO and other extremist groups, and is used freely by the enemy, one may treat the UN in the same manner as the local tramp. Specific individuals may merit more respect, but only if they have earned the right to be respected. This is comparable to belonging to any other group. There were some Nazi SS men who were fine examples of the modern Teutonic Knights and perfect gentlemen and there were others who deserved treatment befitting that tendered to rabid dogs. Simply belonging to something which is infamous for its partisan, hypocritical actions does not make the specific individuals liable to tarring with the same brush.

General Notes: There is no such things as a "NATO Intelligence Service" although the KGB has used this mythical group as a vehicle. Expect to find secret police personnel in unlikely military units if there happen to be communist empire military personnel about. Suspect everyone from any diplomatic or assistance mission sent in by a totalitarian nation. The KGB has used "The United Nations Division of

Counter Espionage" as a front, along with the "United Nations Center for Law Enforcement." Avoid these like the plagues they are.

Good luck, good work, good success, good spirits, and good hunting.

THE BLACK BAG
OWNER'S MANUAL
PART TWO:
THE HIT PARADE

Figure One

THE HIT PARADE

This pertains to the personalized killing that, in peacetime, is called murder. The James Bondish image of a special branch of an apparat that has exclusive rights to this sort of treatment applies in some states; the Soviets and allies have sections of the KGB, GPU and other apparats which deal in death and the Chinese Communists have a section that provides for elimination of "Unreliable" people. The American CIA maintains no such unit, since the order would have to be approved and passed down too far to allow the actions to be timely; and besides, they do not work that way. With a few exceptions, the American CIA has felt that a known enemy agent is an asset, since he can be manipulated and played like a violin. The NSA has nothing to do with assassinations, and the various military intelligence agencies lack the power to order executions. In foreign nations, this role may fall to the secret police, the action squads, the special branches, and so forth, but it is hardly a common thing. The reason for this is that the nations involved know that it is asking for a vendetta to go about eliminating opposite numbers, and agents spend too much of their nations' money and time to be casually used. The only nations which do maintain an assassination section are the ComBloc and the ChiCom ones.

In resistance or guerrilla operations, though, it is far more common, for the Uniform Code Of Military Justice and the Geneva Accords are not in effect to such a degree. Virtually everyone

suspected or actually caught in the act will be claimed to be a spy, and "shot trying to excape." A uniformed guerrilla may or may not be treated as a prisoner of war, although resistance and espionage personnel will be "out of uniform" and so dealt with as spies. Civilized affairs like trials will probably be discarded in favour of summary execution. Barring the "spies" designation, there is always "treason", and the same penalty may be attached, with the same resources--a fast, fair trial and an execution when found guilty. Not <u>if</u> found guilty, but <u>when</u> found guilty. If Geneva or UN observers are not around, there will probably be torture, rape of women operatives, and comparable barbarisms.

The role of intelligence section operatives assigned to this job--designated as "executioners," "Wrath Of God," "judgemental squads," or as "termination specialists"--will be to act in behalf of the underground courts as the instruments of sentence delivery. Exceptionally harsh enemy officers may be designated as war criminals or judged in other manners, and if it was the decision of the court that death-sentencing should be carried out, the job falls on the personnel in this squad.

Enemy infiltrators or fellow travellers who attempt to penetrate the apparat or otherwise find out specific information about the unit may be legally designated as spies, and tried as such by the underground or guerrilla military court. According to the Geneva Accords, the role of spy carries with it the sentence of death.

Trials in absentia, or without the accused party present, must be conducted with utmost propriety and a defense attorney

or representative must be designated to give the accused party every chance of having a lesser charge brought against him. Legality must be maintained at all times, to guard against improper use of the judgmental squad for petty or personal executions.

Members of a designated enemy unit that is uniformed and armed in accordance to a comparable-strength military unit, and who do not appear or work in uniform, may be designated as spies and so dealt with. This will not extend to military personnel on leave or off duty, but it will cover enemy personnel who are working in the field without the benefit of a uniform or clear insignia of rank and unit.

This also applies to any unit which does not presently wear a uniform but which did or does when in enemy territory, and is attached in some manner to the military or political arm of their government, and which undertakes military/political-military actions against the indigenous population.

Not included in the "spy" designation are plain-clothes members of law enforcement units which impose civil laws upon the population, and which are not a subdivision of a military-type unit. Indigenous police units which have changed loyalty, working for the enemy, are liable to the charge of treason. Military police units which govern and enforce laws over the civilian population may be presumed to be acting in this capacity, though.

Geneva-recognized laws which could carry the death penalty are those listed under SECTION II, Persons Not Entitled To Be Treated As Prisoners Of War: those persons who conceal their status as members of the enemy armed forces (wearing civilian

or captured friendly clothing, etc.); spies, who are attempting to obtain information or commit acts detrimental to the security of the friendly side; individuals who give aid and comfort to the enemy, and therby undermine or attempt to undermine the friendly forces, and non-armed-forces personnel who are engaged in, plotting toward, or who have done acts of violence detrimental to the friendly forces. All of the above may be dealt with in a permanent manner, after due process and trial by civil or military tribunals, as applicable. War criminals, those who have violated the Geneva Accords as well as the Uniform Code Of Military Justice, are also excluded from standard POW policies, and may be tried and sentenced by military or civil tribunals, as applicable.

It is well to remember this, for actions undertaken against the belligerents or enemy without proper authority, without due process, or without proper cause are termed murder, and both the individual who performs the act and the one who orders or sanctions it are guilty. One may shoot or stab an enemy soldier or officer in the process of an escape attempt, one may act in self-defense in cases where the enemy is acting against the civilian or guerrilla populations, and one may utilize any and all forces necessary to defend others. One may also engage in overt military actions against the enemy: all these are allowable. Acting as judge, jury and executioner for a summary killing is murder. The only practical recourses would be to charge the persons involved as agents of the court, and order them to comply with the sentencing. No other orders are permissable, and the agent performing the act must be convinced that his superior has

ordered the job as a duly-approved and sentenced order handed down by a court or tribunal.

Presuming that the actions are properly approved of by the friendly courts and the agent is detailed to perform as the executor of the sentence, the satisfaction of the sentence must be quick, clean, and as painless as possible. Torturing the enemy to death is not a totally sanctioned action. Using "drag racing" (handcuffing or binding the enemy's hands to the rear bumper of a vehicle and towing him belly-first down a gravel or macadam road), staking him or her out over an animal's burrow, after which fires are lit to panic the animal out, tearing through the enemy's body, use of slow poisons or acids or causing death by shock through torture are not advisable. For one thing, it creates an image that the friendly forces are savages and may stir up retaliatory acts which are comparable. It also degrades the image of the resistance or guerrilla forces, putting them below the levels of degradation achieved by the enemy. Further, this may turn away many squeamish friendly-leaning civilians, and defeat the purpose of all the good propaganda.

There are other reasons. If the enemy is on the ground in strength, he may be able to interfere with the longer-acting killings or the victim may be rescued and revived before it is too late. This means that a very much enraged survivor will be left to raise unholy hell among the civilians, and he will be even harder to get to the next time out. Also, the friendly personnel who deal with the enemy who has been sentenced will not be as apt to become revolted at the process. Poisons which take a longer time to work are feasible only if they are

delayed as to effect, and not as an agony-prolonging effort; it is easier to pump out a victim and get him back on his feet.

The best way to discuss practical avenues to carry out sentences would be to separate the catagories into overt and covert methods. Overt, which will be dealt with first, includes projectile-weapon modes, blunt instruments, edged weapons, and chemical modes. These are typified by the fact that they have very little clandestine motivations behind them, and are performed rather bluntly in public, or in the open.

PROJECTILE-WEAPON MODES

First, there is the long-ranged approach, with a powerful rifle having good sights or a scope: a sniping attack, in other words.

The sniper must have a faultlessly accurate rifle, or at the least a rifle that will shoot to within two inches at 100 yards. A telescopic sight will be useful, although a rifle with blade front and peep rear sights will have enough potential to deal with most situations. The ammo utilized to zero the rifle to 100 yards should be the same type and lot number as the ammunition used in the actual assignment. Normally, a good long-range marksman should be issued ammunition in case lots, so that he can be assured that a shot at different ranges will be reliably accurate. Variations between lots will change the accuracy very slightly, and at a more extreme range this could easily cause a missed shot. Plenty of practice should be assured, and allocations of ammunition should not be stinted. Practice can be had in the guerrilla apparat, between sentencing assign-

ments, in the role of sniper.

The sniping unit may consist of one man, although the better structure would be composed of three personnel: a spotter and close-range support weapon-bearer, an intermediate-range support and security specialist, and the sniper, whose only role is to engage the target. The spotter may carry a spotting telescope or field glasses and a machine pistol for close-up volume-of-fire support in case enemy personnel manage to surprise the team. A two-man team would have just the spotter and the sniper.

The intermediate-range security agent--also termed the security or support man--is armed with an assault rifle for engaging enemy personnel at longer ranges or for laying down a barrage at the area, if the sniper misses or enemy security personnel attempt to pin down the sniper. The sniper is concerned only with hitting the target, although he may also spot the target in two-man units or rare one-man efforts. The sniper will usually be armed only with his semi-automatic rifle or--as is preferable--a manual repeater, although provision of a pistol or a light machine-pistol may be made in some cases.

Work may be undertaken outdoors in the rural areas, or the sniper may infiltrate a city and fire from windows. In the latter case, a support should be created from furniture and other materials to allow a stable firing platform. The window should be opened, as breaking glass will spoil the aim and disrupt the the path of the bullet; do this at night, and attach a sheet of clear plastic about four mm thick so that the curtains do not flutter. Removing the window may be necessary, or taping it over, then breaking the glass out in the case of fold out types--but

the plastic should not obscure the view or be too overt. Security or spotter may have to pull it down immediately before the shot; using tape to put it up will assist in this. This is necessary since the enemy will be alert to blowing curtains or the lack of a glasslike glare from a window, and it will always help to keep the element of surprise as long as possible.

Dealing with the weapon coming and going to the site will be difficult, although it could be inserted in a big piece of furniture and hauled out later, or abandoned for the time being in a vent-duct or other passage. Take-down rifles such as the Japanese para. models are not especially good, and few modern counterparts exist. The Browning.22 Rimfire semi-auto is effective, and comes apart into two handy sections, so it may be used for close-range sniping. The Charter Arms (American) AR-7 .22 "survival" rifle is handy and comes with average accuracy, but cannot handle a telescopic sight and still compact into the stock. Incidental types of Mauser M98 rifles may be dismounted from the stocks, or may have folding stocks (such as the GEW 33-40 Mountain Carbine) as issue or added-on features. These, if fitted with good sights and tested for accuracy, may work well. Alternately, the screws which retain the action to the stock may be removed and the barreled action with sights laid into a carrier in a package that would not be too long.

Rifles used for sniping may be especially modified if any apparat gunsmiths are available. A fairly thick barrel may be used, and the length may be reduced slightly. A rifle with a barrel eighteen inches long will still be accurate to within combat ranges, and may even be applicable to sniping. The

rifle must be very reliable in the beginning, though, and have good accuracy. The action may be tuned, and a sporting-type adjustable-pull trigger installed; this is a simple operation. If the gunsmith is good, he or she may install a fine peep sight on the rear receiver bridge to aid in getting off good shots; a peep sight is less likely to come to grief and is still reliable, while a telescopic sight is fragile and will not take too much banging around--it will have to be checked and re-zeroed every time the rifle is taken down or hauled about roughly. A peep may be set for accuracy and not bothered too much, unless the stock has been soaked, or the sight hit roughly.

If a scope is installed, it should be backed up with a set of other sights so that damage to the scope or fogging inside will not leave the rifle useless. See-through mounts may be used on the scope, which set it up higher from the barrel and allow one to sight under the scope, using the open or iron sights. Good civilian scopes are made by Mauser-werke, Redfield and Weaver, and may be found in virtually every nation where hunting is allowed; they are durable and relatively water-tight. The peak of quality is the Auto-Ranging Telescope (ARTScope) as sold by Leatherwood in America. This has a cam built in to assist in getting a perfect hit by adjusting the scope to range, during which the coincidence of the crosshairs is adjusted to equal the point of impact for the bullet. ARTScopes are usually available in any American caliber, such as .30-06 (.30 M2), .308 Winchester (7.62mm NATO) and .223 (5.56mm), although some cams for 7mm Mauser and .270 are available. Leatherwood makes special mounts for these scopes which have a longer axis of

contact than regular types.

Makes of the rifles should be selected to have a general character and to prevent tracing back to the nation of origin; the M98 Mauser is ideal, since it was used worldwide. M93 Mausers are also good, the Krag-Jorgensens used by the Germans (taken from the nation of Norway) are also splendid, a good Japanese Arisaka with fresh ammunition will perform well, and some S. M. L. E. and Enfield rifles from the Commonwealth will perform well.

Semi-automatic rifles are not quite as reliable, although a good American Garand M-1, the Italian counterparts, and the M-14 are reasonably sound for ranges up to 250m or so. The FAL, SAFN and other FN productions are good and reliable, as are versions or copies. The Communist Bloc, Chinese Communist and related rifles are adequate if they are copies of the Moslin Nagant and use the 7.62 by 54mm round (Long 7.62mm) in fresh, quality ammunition. The weapons must be of good quality and fine condition. The SKS, AK-47, AKM and RPD weapons do not have much accuracy, and cannot be used in sniping unless a barrage of automatic fire can be given out; the 7.62 by 39mm round (7.62mm short) lacks accuracy and is indifferently loaded--shooting Chinese, Czech and Russian ammunition through a well-built testing Mauser, they evidenced a spread of three to nine inches at 200m, when specially-loaded 7.62 by 39mm ammunition kept to within one inch. Powder loadings are erratic in some lots of ammunition.

The SVD or Dragunov rifle may resemble the AK-series, but it uses the rimmed 7.62mm long round and usually comes with a

four-power PSO-1 telescope.

As a rule of thumb, never use a selective-fire rifle as semi-automatic in sniping beyond 200 meters, with the possible exception of the American M16A1, the M-14 and some FAL models. The M16A1 has the accuracy, but the author is not in favour of the light projectile at high velocity, which shows a distressing habit of wandering in the wayward breeze. The M-14 is all right if it has been looked to and is in good condition, and the FALs are good enough for some accurate shooting out to perhaps 600 meters. Other selectives do not have the accuracy. A bolt-action rifle well cared for will out-perform the selectives, and most semi-automatic rifles; a special sniping bolt-action will be good up to 1,500 meters, and can be counted on to do good service up to 1,000 meters with little trouble.

From 50 to 100 meters, a .22 rim-fire rifle that is well-built will be ideal, since it has the accuracy and can be deployed and used without much fuss. A good screw-on (not claw-type clamp) mount will assist in getting good hits with a scope sight. Good models are the Mauser, Wetherby, Mossberg and some Remington and Winchester bolt-actions; the Ruger 10-22, Remington N-66 and Mohawk, and other high-grade repeaters are also adequate. Forget about inexpensive rifles, or those which do not have positive trigger pulls with no slack, let-off creep or which have grinding surfaces. Ignore also the more crude blow-back repeaters.

Closer than that, a reliable shotgun or machine pistol will suffice, with buckshot or .25"/6mm steel ball-bearings used in the shotgun. A bore larger than 28-gauge may be used, and any-

thing is suitable--up to 10-gauge Magnum. A shotgun is more likely to achieve hits than a submachine gun, and the single report may be harder to spot and summon enemy personnel than the rattle of automatic fire. From a 12-gauge riot-gun, the blast of buckshot will spread to thirty inches at 30 meters, and from a hunting gun the spread may be even smaller. Using something like number four buckshot, which is small enough to produce a dense pattern but massive enough to achieve good effect, the shot will be effective to forty meters and possibly even further, if repeat shots are made. If shotguns are used in the area for hunting birds and small animals, it will be an easy matter to reload one lot of ammunition with six millimeter ball-bearings.

At almost point-blank range, a pistol may be used. While is is not practical to engage any target at a range over fifteen meters unless one is an expert pistol shot and has a special pistol, it is easier to get up close and engage the enemy with a handgun. Most weapons will have a silencing device--a sound moderator, if one wishes--and will be in either a very large caliber, or a very small one. Fast and furious loads like the 7.62mm Tokarev/7.63mm Mauser, 9mm Parabellum, 9mm Largo/Bergmann-Baynard, the .357 and .44 Magnums, and comparable loads will not be quieted down by any but the most massive silencing devices. Since turning a pistol into a carbine-sized weapon is not practical, smaller and lighter arms must be utilized, and quieted down appropriately. Pistols (and rifles too) which use or can be adapted to use the following are sub-sonic and rather mild: .22 Rim-Fire BB Cap, CB Cap, Short and Gallery or reduced-load rounds; Automatic pistol rounds .25 ACP, .32 ACP, .380 ACP/9mm

short, 9mm Makarov, .45 ACP, .455 Webley (Eley) Automatics, and lightly loaded 9mm Parabellum.

Revolver cartridges, aside from those already listed which will interchange, are .32 S&W, .32 S&W Long, .32 Short Colt, .32 Long Colt, .32-30 Winchester, .38 S&W, .380 British, .38 (S&W) Special, .38 Short Colt, .38 Long Colt, .38-40 Winchester, .41 Short Colt, .41 Long Colt, .44 Special and .44 Russian, .44-40 Winchester, .45 ACP and Auto-Rim, .45 Long Colt, and .455 Webley (Eley) Revolver. Rifle Loads, aside from those preceding which will fit and fire directly or via adapters, include special rounds for the lighter rifles; a heavy (220-grain) bullet may be inserted in a case for a .30 US Carbine round ahead of just a pinch of powder, and still generate enough power to expell the bullet and work the action. Other straight-cased rounds may be similarly adapted, after an effort has been made to find a charge that will get the bullet out without blowing the primers out or melting the cases; forget about distance, but do count on intermediate or short-range accuracy.

The purpose of silencing the sound of the shot is that the enemy will not tolerate plinking or killing in the streets; also, the civilians will be alarmed. Pinpoint the area of the action, in case the enemy is out but is not sure where the shot came from. With frightened civilians running in all directions like scared pheasants, it will be easy to spot the scene of the action and the shooter; he will be left alone in a circle of widening size, an easy target. If a quieter weapon is used, it is practical to assume that only a few people would hear the noise, and not

associate a mild report to a weapon-shot; to a vehicle-engine backfire, or something innocent, but never to a shot. Enough chance exists for the passersby to simply assume that the victim had a heart attack or stroke, and not pay much attention to it until they look closer and see blood.

Display of a pistol may alarm some passersby, and it is often the case that the weapon is deployed under cover of a coat or paper draped over the arm, with the muzzle of the quieting device just inside the material. It is carried pointing at the ground until the target is approached, then swung up, discharged at almost point-blank range into the head or throat (body armour will stop slow silencable rounde) once or twice, and the lowered again immediately. Use of a long trench-coat with slits so that the wearer can get into the trousers pockets is also known, and may see use. The judgmental squad operative will hold the weapon down along one leg, and pull it up when the target approaches.

Disposable improvised weapons may be constructed with a silencing device, and the roles of these will be in one-off jobs, in which the weapon is discharged and then dropped so that the operative will not be found with it on his person. It may be disposed of in a drain, area-way, dropped into a trash can, or other place, or dropped at the scene.

Rural Situations

It is practical to utilize any and all projectile weapons mentioned in the senses referred to in urban circumstances in

loosely-populated areas, and in addition utilize normally-silent weapons such as longbows and crossbows in intermediate-range situations.

A compound or other longbow is capable of putting an arrow into a vital spot out to at least fifty meters, although it is easier to obtain good shots at closer ranges.

A crossbow is usually far more powerful, since it can be equipped with metal or compound bows that have draw-weights in excess of eighty pounds, or about forty kilogrammes. These also have rifle-type peep and blade sights, and can deliver an accurate "bolt" (crossbow arrow) out to 100 meters or thereabouts.

Arrows from either will defeat woven-nylon armour-vests--but not plate-type metal, ceramic or compound inserts--including some laminated-fibreglass or laminated-nylon vests, if the arrows are constructed with heavier, tougher razor-sharp blades. The ones which seem to work better are those with a wider blade with a very abrupt taper from point to full width. Heads with this taper in one and one half inches tended to penetrate samples of armour more readily, although these were made with a thicker cross-section than the others tested. Very hard metal heads tended to break up on the laminated armour, and softer metal of knife-blade stock worked better. All arrows were alloy shafts, solid, with threaded head inserts and feather vanes. The bow was a standard eighty-pound-pull model. Mass of the arrows coupled with velocity from the heavy bow penetrated better than lighter arrows from the same bow.

The reason for the penetration was determined to be the

fact that the armour was intended to be protection from impact, and so would accomodate blunt-nosed weapons or projectiles. When given an edged head at good velocity, the material was simply cut and eased aside as the arrow went in. The more abrupt taper of the edge allowed the blade to cut in while velocity and power were still high, in the first moments of impact, and not be spent over a longer curve. In cases of full penetration, the bolts went through the material and stopped when projecting from the back of the two hay bales used as a target backstop.

Sniping is a convenient rural operation. Figure One shows the two-man team of sniper and spotter/security man, and it can be seen that the spotter is equipped with a submachine gun for security roles. The sniper is using a rifle with open sights, which is allowable at the range depicted.

There are two slight misconceptions which might be drawn from this drawing, and attention must be drawn to them: First, the sniping team is rather too close to the edge of the woods for the common applications. They do have the advantage of high ground, and are presumably on the edge of a steep hill, but unless some covered and secure trail would lead away from the site, they would be prone to return fire. One or two shots would be safe, although it would not be practical to sit atop a ridge and plink away at an enemy centre all day. Always expect and allow for an alert soldier with an assault rifle who saw the flash, and plan locations accordingly.

The second point is that shots from higher points tend to

drop more than others, and the sniper must be aware of this and allow a little extra for the differences because the powder has been shaken into the nose of the case. This shaking-forward will result in different ignition times, and more bullet drop than a level shot at the same range. A shot uphill for the same range would rise a bit more than otherwise. This has nothing to do with the relative rise and drop between targets and the shooter, so don't be confused by this. If a rifle is held muzzle-up and then lowered to level for a shot, the velocity will be higher and the point of impact will be different than when the muzzle was held down and then raised slowly for a level-terrain shot. To get good performance, at extreme ranges especially, one must get into the habit of raising the rifle the same way for each shot.

Snipers should be well back in the bushes for most shooting, and should have the firing platform well back in rooms for urban cases, so that the ball of flame from the shot will not leave the room and betray the location. In brush, the shooter will be more easily camouflaged when well within the cover, and the smoke from the shot (there will be some) will not be as apparent. As long as the shooter is well back, he cannot be spotted as readily, and is better able to retire carefully without being spotted and fired upon.

Firing should be from the prone stance if at all possible, since this is the most reliably steady posture; both elbows on the ground, the rifle supported against the shoulder which is nearer to the ground because of the chest being on the ground. Depending upon the school of thought, the legs may be straight

behind the shoulder, or the marksman may aim out at a forty-five degree angle from the body and legs. Any stance that works for the shooter, and which is allowable because of ground configuration and circumstances, will be fine.

Sitting with the elbows braced on the knees and the feet firmly on the ground will work when grass and brush prevents prone shooting. It is not as secure as prone, but will be secure enough for most shooting. Leaning one shoulder against a tree or pole will assist the shooter, as will sitting back into a wall or rock, tree or stump and partly leaning against it, drawing the feet up to brace the elbows firmly.

Kneeling will not be as secure as the former, and one must lean the shoulders or other areas well into a tree or object to provide a steadying influence. Resting the elbow against the raised knee will help, as will sitting on the other foot. Anything will work as long as the shooter feels comfortable and can be accurate in that stance, even if it means being elbows-down and stern-high with just the knees and toes on the ground. This example will not be comfortable or accurate!

Standing is the least secure stance, and the marksman must take every chance to rest the elbows, trunk or other parts against a level surface, or lean into a wall or tree to allow more accurate shooting through the use of a steadier hold. Standing must also utilize the hasty-sling measure, in which the arm is thrown through a loop in the sling and the hand slid down the forearm until a very secure lock is achieved between the sling and the left-arm bicep and the forearm-stock wrist. This can

be effected with the slings on either the bottoms or sides of the rifle stocks, although the two-piece M16 shown would be better held just in front of the magazine well, where the parts do not move; using a sling on the M16 rifle will bend the barrel and throw the shots wide!

When shooting into shadows, which would apply to urban as well as rural situations, the sniper using telescopic or peep sights will find it easier to see within the areas by shutting out side light through the use of a shooting cloth. It is harder to see into shadows when the intervening ground or area is well illuminated by natural or artificial means, since the eyes will respond to the lighter areas by contraction of the pupils; this in turn will render the shaded areas even dimmer, and one may not be able to see past the opening even though there is adequate interior light for shooting. Seeing under trees is even more difficult, since the foreground will be well illuminated and this will be a complex situation; the dim areas under the trees may have plenty of illumination, but the ground just beneath the first trees in the grove will be brighter from sun reflecting off grass, and the foliage above will be a darker but still bright colour. This will demand seeing in through a "hole" with the edges helping to mask out the extra light that contracts the pupils.

The "shooting cloth" may simply be a bit of light-tight fabric such as a scrap of poncho or canvas, sewn three-quarters of the way around an elastic band--or with a band having been passed through a fold in the cloth--so that it can be worn as

a kepi when not in use, covering the back of the neck. It could be used as a camouflage aid, since it will mask the face of the shooter very well. Worn on a cap with a long bill in front, it is handy since the marksman can reverse the cap, settle down on the rifle, and be very nearly set. The shooting hand then tucks the cloth around the scope so that the side light is shut out, and makes sure that no light from the sides will impinge upon the eyes. The hand is moved to the grip, and the rifle readied for firing. If a rifle with a peep sight is used, a length of tubing from some handy source--a bit of cardboard bent properly, etc.--may be affixed to the front of the rifle's sight with tape so that the cloth will not obscure the sighting path.

The size of the cloth may vary depending on how tall the individuals using it are, although it must be long enough to be able to fall below the chin, tapering back to behind the ears, and on either side of the face to a point just beyond the end of the telescopic sight or tube. It is better to have a bit extra than not enough. A number of try-pieces using paper or lighter cloth could be made up and then the pattern transferred to the desired material. The cloth could also be attached to the material of the cap, with a tie or snap-strip attached to the end, so that it could be rolled up and secured to the hat in a compact package when not in use.

Ammunition

The type and style of ammunition utilized is generally

accepted to include the uses of ball-type (full jacketed or solid lead), armour-penetrating, tracer, incendiary and perhaps explosive, and combinations thereof. It is prohibited by the Geneva Accords, "To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Circumstances and usage have established the illegality of lances with barbed heads, irregular-shaped bullets, projectiles filled with glass, using a substance on bullets which would tend to inflame the wounds thereof, and the scoring of the surface or filing off of the ends of ball ammunition. No remarks have been made about the use of sporting ammunition--soft-nosed or hollow-pointed bullets--which is unmodified and used as it is produced. This concerns only warfare, and it could be argued that the fulfillment of a sentence is not comparable, and does not fall within the provisions.

In any event, the ammunition best suited for the task would be the most accurate match-grade target ammunition readily available. These may or may not be solid-nosed or other types, and as long as the ammunition is not modified or tampered with as it comes from the factory or carton, it may be argued that the ammunition is not modified along forbidden lines. When target or match ammunition is not available, the individual must use ammunition from only one lot or can, and hope that the fillings of propellant have been reliable. The use of one lot alone will assist in achieving uniform accuracy. Ammunition for such individuals and all sniping operations must be issued or provided in large lots of several hundred rounds at a time so that

reaiming is not required.

PREPARATION OF THE WEAPON UTILIZED

Sniping rifles may be prepared with great care going to wood-to-metal contact along the barrel, since pressures from uneven attachment or other matters can throw accuracy off in one direction or the other. It is usually best to remove all excess wood from the stock, including bayonet bridges, attachment points, bands and the like and possibly even cutting the wood back a bit if the rifle is a military model. Taking the upper hand-guard off is permitted if there are no action parts that would tangle up in the fingers upon firing. If the rifle is to be used in a military role, or circumstances have dictated that it be left alone, other steps will be needed, to wit:

Careful and total sealing of the wood in the stock, so that none of it can absorb moisture. This will make any inaccuracies permanent, but they can be allowed for more readily. One step would be to obtain several litres of tung oil, strip the wood from the action and all metal parts from the wood, and apply a degreasing technique. The stock was probably finished with oils, so to remove this it is necessary to hold the stock near a gas flame, moving it about slowly so as to prevent burns, until the oil bubbles up. It is wiped off with a rag soaked in solvent as it forms (this is best done in the open or outdoors, to prevent fires or flame-ups). The stock should be so treated until it is very pale; WW2 German, British and American arms are well-known for heavy stains or oilings.

It is possible that the wood was finished with a laquer or

penetrant material other than oil. If it does not respond to this method, apply sandpaper and use it to strip off the finish. A knife held as a plane after the stock has been painted with solvent will usually work, too. Once the wood is bare, see if the oil-boiling-out technique will work on any subsurface finishes.

Once the stock is completely bare, apply some stain (plug tobacco soaked in ammonia liquid will penetrate well and not damage tung oil) to darken the wood if it is blond, and apply one very thorough coat of tung oil after the stain has dried, covering all surfaces of the rifle. Get into the action recesses in the stock, and any holes. Once this coat is dry, lightly sand or polish with coarse steel wool, and apply another complete coating. Two coats will make a semi-gloss finish, which can be dulled with coarse sanding if desired. Apply another three coats to the inside surfaces of the inletting, the barrel channel, the places where the cleaning rod passes (if any are present), where metal contacts the wood inside or out, and so forth. This will seal the stock tightly against water penetration by any means.

Permanent screws such as those in the butt-plate may be put in after dipping in tung oil, so that they will not work out again. Slings which use an inletted swivel may be prepared with the base and screws being soaked in tung oil before installation.

Another preparation, which may be a little difficult to find in some areas, is laboratory bench finish. This is an extremely tough, penetrating finish that is resistant to acids,

bases and most solvents, and is somewhat dent-resistant. It will provide a matte or semi-gloss black finish. There are two types of preparation, one which is painted on the bare wood, and another system which entails using a boiling acid bath to penetrate and seal the wood. The latter is referred to as "acid-stained."

Sporting rifles may be prepared for this role by carefully rasping out the wood along the barrel channel and filling it, after a space all round the barrel is created, with a plastic or fibreglass preparation which fills the wood and assures uniform contact. Simply stripping out all wood that would contact the barrel will suffice, with no channel filling afterward, with this step being taken so that there is no way that uneven pressures on the barrel could cause inaccuracy, simply because there is no contact with the barrel at all. With the latter, it will not matter how much the stock swells or warps because it will not contact the barrel to cause inaccuracy.

The use of thin-layer laminations in creating the stocks (as found on some later wartime-production Mausers, many Soviet or ChiCom rifles, and many commercial types) will be easier to handle, since the plies go in different directions and resist warping in any particular direction, even if water manages to penetrate the heavy glues used to seal the laminations. The stocks do not look very pretty, but they do work well.

Other than a good stock, an excellent barrel is required. There are custom barrels which are of assured accuracy, and if these are available they may be provided for each highly-accurate rifle by the simple act of shipping the rifles with

bolts and all parts to the makers. If they are not available, evaluation of the rifles present will indicate which ones have better barrels, and which may be considered to have a little better accuracy. The barrels must be absolutely clean inside, with no pits or chips (worn areas) on the rifling, and should be as good at the muzzle as at the breech. The rifling must be sharp and clean, and the inside of the barrel must gleam after a dry patch has been run through to remove excess oil.

The bolt must be very snug when foreward, and not wobble or rattle in the recesses. The trigger should be smooth and clean, with very little jerk after it lets off (after the firing pin is loosed), and it should have a very uniform amount of pull--the weight required to let the firing pin go. A special hunting or target trigger may be had for most rifles, the Mausers sepecially, and could be installed in the rifles used for this role if it is possible to obtain the parts.

If the rifles are older military models with longer barrels, and it is possible to remove several inches without hampering the action parts, better accuracy and an easier to handle package can be made. This requires some sort of shop, but not an extensive array of tools. The cutting and levelling block could be a length of wood beam or railway tie with a hole drilled perfectly perpendicular into it, or a billet of metal could be used. The hole should be very close to the diameter of the barrel, or if possible a friction-fit. Tape may be wrapped around the barrel to assure a tight parallel fit. The length of the barrel to be removed is measured off, and the barrel

inserted in the block to the point where this much leaves the end. A plain hacksaw is presented to the barrel, and the part is carefully cut off so that it is flush with the end of the block. If it is practical, the saw blades may have the teeth on the side that would be next to the block cut off or ground down, although it is practical to use one face of the block for cutting and the other for dressing. The cut end is rough, and must be dressed down so that it is absolutely smooth and perpendicular.

To handle this, the barrel is taped a bit more, if necessary, so that it is absolutely snug in the block. It is practical, too, to use a metal vise just behind the block, so that the barrel is held by the vise and the block rests against it and prevents travel. It will work better if the barrel is muzzle-up, and the face of the block is more than six inches wide. A very wide flat mill bastard file--over a foot long is better--is worked slowly back and forth across the muzzle so that the metal is filed very smooth and flat. It is better to have just a fraction of the barrel tip exposed. The barrel is filed until all nicks, burrs and other gouges from the saw are worked out, and the muzzle is smooth. A fine file may be used, but this will not usually be required.

For recrowning, which is vital to assure accuracy, a quantity of round-headed brass or bronze screws or, preferable, carriage bolts are obtained, along with emery grit such as is used for grinding vehicle valves and the like. Fine or very fine grit will give a smoother finish. Along with this, a manually-driven brace or drill, also called an auger, is used. Powered drills will work well, too. Recrowning must be done, so that

the rifling is cut to the same length all around; if it is a little off in one area, not even enough to see, it will harm accuracy by providing more friction than the other rifling ridges.

The brass bolt is secured to the jaws of the drill or auger, the tip is dipped in a light oil and then into the grinding grit powder, and the bolt is presented to the muzzle of the rifle barrel. As the bit is turned the grit will wear away the metal evenly, and start the process. As often as the grit is rubbed off the surfaces, redip and regrit. Wobbling the head of the bolt around will tend to keep the surfaces even, and not allow a bit of the grit-loaded bolt to protrude into the barrel where it would wear off rifling that does not need this; this action happens naturally when the tool is hand-driven. It will take a long time and possibly a few bolts to wear down the muzzle to a point comparable to the original crowning, but that can not be helped.

Once the tips of the barrels are recrowned, they may be touched with a metal-blueing agent or left as-is, cleaned again most thoroughly from the breech, oiled, and the front sight silver-soldered onto the new muzzle.

Rifles usually work better with a barrel length between twenty and twenty-six inches, although they are still accurate and reliable--albeit having a huge flash and louder report--when cut off to just sixteen inches. The stocks may be cut off so thay they will be in sporter configuration, or they may be used with the original fittings reinstalled after shortening by the same amount as the barrel.

Rifles used for highly accurate shooting must be kept absolutely clean, and when the marksman is sighting them in he must remember to fire off a "fouling" shot before doing any target work, since the rounds will not fly true when put through a cleanly oiled barrel. If the rifles are to be used on a mission that requires just one shot, the marksman must let this off before packing the rifle up for transport to the site, and be prepared for an accurate single shot when the time comes. Otherwise, he will fire and miss, then reload and fire again, and he might miss twice or three times before effecting a proper hit. This sort of blazing away will not be practical if the target has a bodyguard equipped with heavy weapons, or if it may go to ground. This is partly why soldiers getting ready to leave a fire-base would "function fire" weapons before leaving; it will also verify that the weapons will fire when called upon to do so.

The telescopic sight should be set up for firing the same type and lot of ammunition over what would be the same or similar range before a mission is undertaken, with the sight not removed, subjected to blows or abuse, and protected from excessive vibration or shock until the shot is fired. Removing the sight, playing around with it, abusing it and so forth will change the points of impact with many types of scope or base, and it is better to presume that banging around will drift off any and all telescopic sights and bases, and not meddle with the barrel, the sight's attachment to the bases on the rifle, or anything else. Firing should be with the same equipment and garments as test-firing; a different thickness of jacket, or a sling

being used one time and not the other, or the use of a silencing device one time and not later, will all alter the place where the round will hit to a very slight degree. Slight, yes, but if the range is long, and the slight changes pile up, it will be compounding the chances of a miss or a nonlethal hit.

Other weapons, such as submachine guns, shotguns or pistols, must all be cleaned and lubricated lightly immediately before starting out, and tested for functioning with a cartridge having a primer but no bullet or powder. This will assure that the weapon will fire reliably when the time comes to use it. In transport, it must not be packed in straw, grain, chaff, or in any material that would possibly sift into the internals and jam. The safety catch should be locked off, and if necessary the weapon should have a full magazine but an empty chamber--if it is not totally safe the way a ready submachine gun tends to be. If the weapon rattles or makes noise, use a slick close-woven material to cover it--folded over so that it could be shaken off at once--so that the weave will not jam in something. When the British-backed Czech agents attempted to deal with Reinhard Heydrich, the Sten Mk. two carried by one of the assassins jammed with straw he had put in his pocket to quiet the rattling, and they had to fall back on throwing a grenade at him, which blew a bit of the horsehide--covered automobile upholstery into his back, killing him from infection. The grenade was a Gammon impact-type, useful for killing a light tank, let alone the Protector, but it too almost failed.

Repeat: The weapons must not be packed in any material that could cause or promote jams, and the covering should be

something with a smooth, slick finish that will not bind up in the mechanism. The weapon must be clean, inspected, proven to fire, and only left uncocked with the safety device off. The magazine or shells must be in place, and ready to fire upon cocking or pulling the trigger double-action. Shotguns without hammers may be provided with the safety on, if in the case of double-barreled or hinged-breech models, or auto-loading types. Pump-action guns may be used with the pump drawn back, ready to close and fire in one motion.

BACK-UP PERSONNEL

Vital missions, such as the termination of Reichprotector Heydrich, are provided with back-up personnel, and most roles should have an armed security screen or at least one individual detailed to security, who will take over the assignment if necessary.

The attempt on Heydrich was formulated around the use of a Sten; a very close-range attempt. Security could have been provided with another Sten, or--as they decided--with a grenade. Other roles could be to have a light automatic weapon set up at an intermediate distance to spray the zone if the primary attempt failed. A light anti-tank weapon may also be used, although this would be using excessive force.

The prime consideration would be to prevent endangering innocent passersby, so no fragmentation grenades or other shrapnel or fragmentation munitions should be used. The British agents used the Gammon, essentially an anti-tank grenade, because it utilized a large mass of plastic explosive and relied on

concussion and blast to hole armour, with an affective radius against personnel of about six meters. The only metal in a Gammon would be the compressed ball in the fuse, and the detonator; all the rest was plastic or cloth, with a hairspring around an alloy firing pin. Concussion grenades would also work, as would large masses of plastic explosive inside loaves, baskets, toy balls or the like, with a short-term fuse installed.

The security man would be so armed, and ready to act as backup and protection for the primary agent if he needed it, but would not have to expose his position or reveal his weapon if the attempt was successful. Had the agent with the Sten--Josef Gabcik--managed to fire the weapon into the Protector and his driver--Klein--the covering agent with the bomb--Jan Kubris--would have been able to leave, or add the grenade if he thought that thirty rounds from the 9mm Sten at fifty feet had not done the job. The two spotters--Valcik at 100 meters distant and Jemelik at 200 meters had nothing to do with the job but toot four blasts on whistles (the Morse letter "H") when Heydrich's car appeared.

Spotters are vital in some jobs, although it is practical to run an entire operation with only one or two men. Spotters when utilized, are men who know the appearance, vehicle and route taken by the target, and act as intermediate warnings to the sniper and backup that they should prepare for the job, that the target is coming. Spotters will be detailed to pass a sign to the rest when the target is sighted, such as removing the cap and wiping the head or combing the hair, or the like. The sniper need only watch the spotter, or listen for a whistle

or hail, and then prepare for action. In rural areas the spotter has a field glass or powerful telescope, and is next to the sniper, so that he can advise the former when the target is approaching, and call the shot if it happened to be a miss so that corrections could be made.

DEALING WITH VEHICLES

A vehicle takes more than a rifle, in most cases, as many cars driven by high enemy officials will be armoured well and capable of withstanding standard small-arms fire. For these, an anti-tank weapon would be called for, or a massive mine or grenade having command-detonation or a magnetic clam to affix it to the vehicle. Many vehicles have the vent-wing on the foreward doors made from unarmoured glass, so thay they could be opened a bit, although others are rebuilt with gas-proof air-conditioning and the vents are just for show.

Even if the vehicle is unarmoured, hitting a moving target with a single shot at extreme distance would be difficult, and a recourse would be to use a section of the road that drives straight at an ambush site--or from an ambush site, going away--so that a straight, sure, shot could be made. Otherwise, an emulation of Gabcik and Kubris would be in order; a close-up attack with an automatic weapon and a grenade, at no more than 100 feet.

The latter is a typical roadside ambush, with the team hiding in a ditch or slightly up a hillside where the careering vehicle will not squash them and where it is practical to escape from any covering or convoy bodyguard. Terrain and local cover

must be taken into consideration in all situations, and the team must be able to escape without undue risk. Kamakaze raids are undoubtedly effective, but expensive in terms of skilled and trained operatives. Seneca said there is nothing so easy as killing a man; the risk and difficulty results when one attempts to escape the consequences.

In order to avoid the consequences, an escape route must be laid out, and changes of clothing allowed so that the Secret Police are not looking for an individual two metres tall, weighing 100 kilogrammes, and dressed in faded green peasant trousers, a greenish mackinaw and a ragged green cap. Once the flag goes up, every man weighing 100 kilos or being two meters tall will be looked up, and special consideration will be given to any who dress in greenish outfits.

Getting the team out of sight, under cover, or clear of the area will be better. This must be done at once. In the shooting of Heydrich, the word did not get to the Nazies at Hradcany Castle for about an hour, and the full alert took a bit longer to be implemented. It would have been practical to get the team to the rail station, aboard a goods or other train as coal heavers, and safely out of the area. Employees are seldom checked; passengers are. If the team had simply dispersed and one had gone to the rail station for work as a hauler, another to the yard as a coal stoker, and the rest out as bargemen and hands, all may have escaped.

A police state still runs faster than an open society in some areas, but the bureaucratic mess will be enough to allow some leeway while orders run up and down the ladders like mice,

and the troops and Secret Police are marshalled for the tasks of sealing off the area. As long as plans are arranged to promote a good and thorough escape immediately after the job is done, it will be much better than attempting to hide out in a secret room until after the hounds have stopped the search. Security will not be as tight for finding the executioners of a minor traitor or collaborationist official as for the men who presumed to slay the Reichprotector, the military governor, or a comparable official.

Plans should be laid out to allow for every occasion--lateness of the target, a missed chance, a too-early arrival of the target, or other factors which would influence the conduct of the escape. For this, the "Ben Franklin" approach should be emulated: Expect and allow for the worst, and be pleasantly surprised when things turn out as well as they do. In other words, sort of positive pessimism should be cultivated.

In most major attempts which had failed because of the inaction of the assassins, the failure occurred because: (1) The team was broken up and a weak man was allowed out on his own; (2) The team stayed too long in one place; (3) the team was at the mercy of too many indigenous personnel, one or more of whom talked, or (4) The escape was based on too much delay between the act and the escape.

(1) may be covered by having the men acting on the buddy system, with each giving and taking strength from the other. Staying together, drawing morale from another, and giving morale to another will all help this.

(2) is quite obvious; in moving around, the team would not

present a permanent target or allow the enemy to catch up to them as readily. In the case of combinations of 2 and 3, staying in one location will enhance the chances of being betrayed or discovered.

(3) relates back to the old saying, "three may keep a secret if two are dead" as well as "When three men discuss secrets, two are police agents and the other is a fool". These are not properly quoted, but the impact comes through. The fewer indigenous personnel who know just what is going on, the fewer who can compromise the operation. In the case of a commanded job, the men in that area may be sent in from another location where they would not have friends and relations living in the target's area. Liaison with resistance and underground personnel should be kept to a minimun, for the sakes of the resistance and underground as well as the sakes of the agents involved. What no one knows, no one can force out of anyone. Some betrayals have been because of civilian pressure on the agents, or because of pressures placed upon them by relatives in the area. No contact with people in the area is best, but in cases of importance, it is practical to use only orphans or people whose family is safely out of the danger zone.

Too, people talk, and there is no way of knowing if an enemy infiltrator is in the ranks at some point, where he can pass on word about the attempt of the location of the agents involved.

(4) is also obvious; the faster the agents get out of the area, the better. If they are moving ahead of the enemy cordons and checkpoints, they will not be stopped. If they seem to have

been in a particular place while things were going on, they will be excluded. If they are part of an essential effort, such as coal heavers on a steam train, and the crew agrees that they have been there during the excitement, they will be allowed out. If they are leaving via the lesser-known routes, they will avoid major enemy checkpoints, since the big corks will be required at the bigger points of entry. In sealing off a city, it is practical to find that ninety-eight percent of the traffic by vehicle is totally stopped in a few hours, but it would take several days to completely isolate a major city.

As long as escape is planned from a point near the border of the city, so that movement can be by storm drains and other clandestine means which will not attract a great deal of attention, it is possible to exfiltrate on foot with little equipment and few weapons from that point. To seal off any large area, the enemy will require one spotlight per 200 meters, picket-mines and other mines at a density of five meters by the perimeter's measurement, a soldier per every forty meters per two or three shifts, aeroplane resources at a percentage of one fixed or rotor-wing craft per sector so that one pass can be made every fifteen minutes, light machine guns in towers or atop tall vehicles to cover dead ground, dogs or sensors to detect any movement, and more resources. The figures needed to militarily hold a city are about one-eighth as much as would be required to secure the borders of any city, which would allow some slip-throughs even then. This does not include the manpower needed to secure corners, conduct complete block searches, support secret police teams, guard prisoners taken during the sweep,

prevent filtration into already cleared areas, and so on. In the end, it is possible to isolate a city, but only with large resources of infantry. Even holding a border requires immense amounts of men and material, and this is an ideal situation. Securing a city or even a large town would require many more times as many as a comparable perimeter-length of border.

Even if the outskirts are prepared like a frontier, with ploughed ground, mines and roving guards, it would require huge amounts of material to do this quickly enough to plausibly cork up the community. All the farming ploughs used in the Ukraine and a third more Communist troops than are presently on Czech territority would be required to sector off Prague if the present military governor was eliminated there, and this would require another third to do it within two hours, which is the really critical period.

If the personnel involved can get on bicycles or in a car and travel for a destination very close to the outskirts in half an hour, or even get out of the immediate area within that time period, they are safer. Even afoot, it is more convenient to leave the area before the alarm sounds, and then exfiltrate along a selected route after dark or at dusk.

If the enemy pours the city or area full of troops, it is easier to pass as enemy personnel conducting a search or doing a patrol, since the foe will be likely to combine elements of several units or divisions in the sweep, and the chances of two or three new faces being noticed among the hundreds of strangers will be rather remote. Listening to enemy challenges at a

checkpoint will allow one to learn what the message and countersign are, and provide time to slip through as a straggler or small patrol that was detailed to check out something. Sudden maneuvers or emergency conditions always create temporary confusion in each sector, which may be utilized by exfiltrating teams. A small bank of soldiers with a nonuniformed member of the secret police along will virtually be a ticket to travel anywhere, as long as a flurry of official-seeming confusion attends the passage of the team.

So, as has been shown here, it is easy to exfiltrate unharmed if the enemy uses too few soldiers and police; and too, it is easy to exfiltrate if the enemy uses a great many soldiers. This is not like a walk in the park. It has its risk and the agents may have to creep and crawl along the route while listening and looking for soldiers as well as mines. However, exfiltrating offers more advantages than sitting tight while the enemy roots through the city like so many swine, looking for hideouts or weapon caches.

If the enemy happens upon a hideout or is tipped off, he will pour the area full of uniforms once the target is localized, and smother the squad of agents in scores of soldiers. When the assassins of Heydrich were discovered in a Greek Orthodox church, the Germans sent in the Second SS Panzerdivision "Das Reich" to ferret them out. "Das Reich" got more than it expected, but sheer volume of bodies managed to crush the Czechs. In police states, it is expected that enemy policy will be to sweep areas lightly but thoroughly until resistance or something solid is found, and then mass up and roll over the trouble spot

like a steamroller over crabs on a pavement. Expecting to go undiscovered will call for either a very secure hideout that cannot be found or such a flexible pattern that it is possible to evade the enemy searchers and patrols. Once they localize and concentrate efforts, it is only a matter of time before they stamp the resistance into the ground. They have better facilities and more men to use in the search, and any site large enough to hide more than one man and food for a month will be likely to be discovered. Oh, there are tales of soldiers who had been cut off in a retreat hiding out in homes or even in buffets and furniture while the enemy was billeted on the premises; but the enemy never turned the place upside down looking for the escapee at the time. A man in hiding must have food, water, sanitary provisions, air, bedding, and a weapon for defense or suicide. Lying up in the rafters or under floors may work under ordinary circumstances, but not otherwise. It is practical to assume that the enemy will have house-to-house searchers and general uproar if the target was important or if several minor targets were dealt with in the same period of time.

It is imperative for the team to escape, since the capture of the parties involved will be a propaganda victory for the enemy. Inversely, their continued freedom will be a propaganda plus for the friendly side. There may be witnesses to the action or the enemy may have identification of other types which will allow them to pick out the team members. After fulfilling the sentence, the most vital consideration must be escaping the enemy's anger.

WEAPON SUMMARY

The weapons which appear most often in the area of operations will be the best ones to utilize, providing these are reliable and adequate. If some must be imported, make sure that they are innocent types; a Mauser M98 with post-war modifications will suffice in any European, Asian, African, and Latin-American area of operations. A Moslin-Nagant may be utilized in enemy territory, since the enemy will not know exactly what to make of it. Within the Curtain, a job with a Nagant might be laid at the door of the KGB for a bit. In Asia, a Japanese Arasaka will work effectively if the bore and ammunition are good, and the action is a pre-conflict model that did not see much use or abuse.

Parts added onto the rifles of centre-fire persuasion should represent a mixed nationality; a German sporting trigger, perhaps an American or German telescope, FN ammunition, custom work by a Swiss artisan, and so on. If the rifle happens to be an American Model 70 Winchester with all American parts, it will doubtless be laid at the door of the American Central Intelligence Agency, and they have had enough trouble as it is. With an assortment, the job may be credited to everyone or no one on the list.

Centre-fire rifles are acceptable with a barrel length of between eighteen and twenty-four inches, twenty inches being satisfactory for purposes of concealment and mobility. The barrel may be anything from a tapered slim-line tube to something which is as big around as the action ring. This has

very little to do with accuracy in actual applications. The massive tubes lend weight and stability to the rifle, and the lighter sporting barrels are easier to carry about and deploy rapidly. A thick sixteen inch barrel was used to good effect by a sniper in Asia, and he accounted for six Communist officials in one band in a bit less than nine seconds at 275 meters. The only consideration with short barrels is the size of the muzzle-flash and a slightly louder report, with some extra recoil.

Rim-fire .22 rifles are acceptable as intermediate-range sniping rifles, with a maximum range of perhaps 120 meters. They are more useful with a silencer and used for precision shots at about seventy-five meters, though, and only good recognized sporting or target arms need to considered for the longer distances. At shorter ranges, from twenty-five out to seventy-five meters, a good scoped .22 with a sound-muffling device will allow shots to be placed with great precision with very little fuss or chance that the sniper would be sighted before he decamps.

The standard .22 Long Rifle cartridge achieves maximum velocity and optimum accuracy with a barrel length of between fourteen and sixteen inches; the only value of longer barrels would be that they would tend to consume the powder and slow the round down so that it will be sub-sonic, providing the round is a "gallery" or "indoor range" type such as BB-Cap, CB-Cap, or the special long-case "Indoor Target" ammunition. Long barrels are of use on tube-magazine rifles and so designed

that they will have a large capacity. It is variable; a tight barrel will tend to reduce velocity sooner, and a loose bore will allow the bullet to fly further before it begins to be slowed down by friction, but in most cases optimum velocity will be had with a barrel length of fifteen inches. NOTE: This short a barrel is illegal in America, and the minimum length allowed is sixteen inches. Few American gunsmiths will modify a barrel as short as fifteen inches without reporting the change, and many will refuse to undertake it. Weapons purchased for shipment to overseas areas must be modified to sixteen inches only.

The shorter .22 rifles will be very handy to carry and shoot, since the lack of barrel will give them a decided lightness that can be exploited well. A quieting device on the muzzle will not increase the weight too much, and will be compensated for by the removal of some barrel length.

Telescopic sights for the .22's should be of the same type and grade as the 'scopes used on the larger-caliber rifles, with mounts which screw into the side of the action face, not the claw-type units which grip the rails cut atop the receiver. Having one model of telescopic sight on all rifles will enhance the ability of the marksmen, since all will be of the same style and afford ease in operation. The 'scopes with a wide objective (front) lense will provide more light-gathering capability, which will mean that accurate shots can be made with less outside light. "Widefield" (oval) objectives will work with less light than others, since the area of the front lense is much greater. The "power" or magnification of the 'scopes will also

have something to do with the light-gathering power, as well.

In dim light, a lower-power 'scope will produce readable images for shooting more reliably than a very high-power unit. The answer, of course, is the variable telescope. Most are from three to nine-power, although some unique models will allow for two to six-power. A nine-power telescope on a .22 rifle is rather odd, and will allow great resolution of the hairs in the target's nose, but is otherwise not too useful. The maximum for the .22 is about six-power; this is plenty powerful for longer shots, and will allow some close shots without filling the lense with the target.

The long-range centre-fire rifles will work will with the nine-power, since at 500 meters and beyond it is necessary to see exactly what one is shooting at and be able to resolve the target area.

The lower powers allow rapid targeting at closer ranges because it is possible to see more of the area, and then move the cross hairs on to the proper point.

The design of the cross hairs utilized for this sort of shooting is critical, since it may be the case that shots are necessary at very dimly-lit targets, or the only time available for the shooting is when it is rather dark out. The standard spider-web cross hair is very good when the target is brightly illuminated, but in dim light the black of the thin lines merges with the greys of the background until it is almost impossible to see where the 'scope's cross hairs are. At times. it may be totally impossible.

The "posted" cross hairs design is rather useful and well

thought of in Europe, but it suffers because the tip of the post may fade into a dark target, making for erratic shots that may go a hair too high or low. Also, the big post may obscure the target at times, making a good shot mostly guesswork and prayer.

The cross hairs with a big dot in the centre tend to show up in dim light more readily, and with a low-power scope this may be the only thing seen. However, the mass of the dot may obscure the target.

The cross hairs with an opening in the middle--the "peep"--are good at intermediate and short ranges, when the target aimed at is not too small. At longer ranges, though, it is not possible to center the sight very effectively, and this may result in a miss. In dim light, the peep-cross hair rig will be difficult to see.

The better rigs are "Four-Plex" types, or "Compound Four-Plex" with very heavy posts tapering to a more narrow post tapering in to plain cross hair wire. In dim light, the taper will indicate roughly where the round will go when the fine cross hairs are invisible, and in more precise circumstances the fine hairs will show just where the projectile will go. This design of reticle is what is used on most modern military sniping rifle telescopes, and may be obtained from most telescopic sight makers on either standard or special-order versions, without too much trouble.

Forget "illuminated aiming dots," as these will produce enough light to wipe the dimmer image of the target from the eye unless the batteries are almost exhausted. Deliberately exhausting the batteries so that the glow is very dim is asking for trouble, since

there is no way to tell if the illumination will fail prematurely or surge right when the shot is being planned, which will require shutting the light off and waiting for the eyes to readjust to the dimness. During this time, the target may pass by or otherwise become inaccessable.

Forget about the sights which have quaint little devices that are assured to improve accuracy, unless the telescope is made by a very reliable company and the device has been around for a few years so that all the problems have been worked out.

Always have a reliable ranging device along, if the telescope does not have ranging parallel lines built in or does not come with this feature with heavy wires that can be seen in dim light. A split-image optical rangefinder is feasible or the team may take up residence while it is still light and adjust for the range by comparing another object aside from the target with the desired aiming point. DO NOT alter the telescope setting to achieve the correct point of impact, since fiddling with the scope will be inconvenient and may backfire unless a very long shot is planned and the cross hairs are precisely on. Knowing the correct number of clicks required to move the point of impact about will not be possible without having shot a great many rounds at all available ranges, with the telescope being returned to zero for 100 meters each time.

Instead, use a bullet-drop table for the ammunition used, detailing how far off zero the bullet will be for each shot out to maximum range, and hold higher or lower to accommodate for this. This will be easier to gauge with fewer rounds, and the table may be written or typed up and affixed to the right side of the shoulder

stock.

Changing the location of the normal zero to accommodate the newer range is asking for trouble, in as much as the shooter may forget the number of clicks he has made, or miscount under the pressure, and even with a painted-on white mark showing the zero point, the time consumed in changing the point of impact will be difficult to gauge adequately.

Another possibility is to pre-select the firing point and the place where the target will be engaged, determine the range and rise or drop of terrain, and shoot at a target that distance away, further up or down a hill, until the shots are right on and the telescope properly set. Then, it is a simple matter to run over to the site and put the cross hairs right on the point which is desired to be hit, if time and the target conform. This is impossible in most circumstances unless it can be deduced that the target will be at a certain point at a specific time either via habit or special occasion. Even then, the occasion may be different.

One such allowance-case which did work was the shooting of President John F. Kennedy: The assassin had adjusted-in an "up and to the right" deflection in his telescope, which precisely coincided to the point at which the bullet would catch up with the car containing the president. The assassin had the route-plan, and the speed of the motorcade was very conveniently published, so all he had to do was compute matters. This is, at first sight, a highly complex matter, although with the proper formula it becomes less difficult. It is being released here only because the Secret Service has allowed for such matters.

The distance to the target-site is determined, and then the time in which the bullet will travel from the muzzle to the site is computed from the velocity figures for the projectile. Then the speed of the vehicle is equated, and the distance of travel accounted for by the time from the firing of the bullet to the arrival at the target site is entered into the matter. Say, for example, it will take one second for the bullet to arrive at the target, and the vehicle will travel 3.25 feet in that time. This gives a "lead" of 3.25 feet. The angle of the road, route or pathway is added, and this is entered into the computations. Say it is forty-three degrees; the point of impact is then determined to be 3.25 feet from the centre of the target, at a precise angle of forty-three degrees. Now, there are two alternatives: go off and shoot at a range at the precise distance (flat trajectory path) with a bit of rise or drop to compensate for the deviation from horizontal; or condense/expand on the ballistic deviation (simple math will work with this) and shoot at a measured distance, so that the point of impact is equal to 3.25 feet from the centre, at forty-three degrees from horizontal, including the ballistic deviation from horizontal. The sights are aligned so that they produce a hit at this deviation from centre; in other cases, the shooting may have a deviation of forty-three degrees to the left and below horizontal, or squarely on horizontal and 3.25 feet to the left or right.

With this computing, the assassin simply has to centre the cross hairs on the target and be certain the "lead" will be taken up and the bullet will arrive squarely on target when the target passes into the zone at the given speed, after the elapse of time

has been achieved. If the speed is constant and may be predicted, one shot will suffice; otherwise, three or four may have to be fired into the area with a precise aim on the target to be assured that one or more will hit.

In the case of the assassin who shot President Kennedy, everything had been provided for him; he had sought several jobs at sites commanding the alternative parade routes, and could have been provided with the ranges/deviations/speed-lead times/etc. involving these areas. It is not within the recorded ballistic and mathematic experience of L. H. Oswald, however, to have known enough about diverse fields to be able to discover this procedure for himself. Then, of course, there is the difference in heights. L. H. Oswald, upon Marine Corps discharge, was five feet eleven inches tall and the assassin was five feet nine inches. With no evidence of a spinal disease to account for the loss of two inches, it must be assumed that the assassin was not the man who left the United States Marine Corps. The FBI fingerprint files, which would contain L. H. Oswald's true prints, are easily available. If personnel from organized crime can get information out of the FBI, the other side could get information into the files effectively trading the cards with the prints of L. H. Oswald for those of the assassin. Finally, an informant with a foreign intelligence service reported that this sort of ballistic dwell-allowance is known to KGB personnel.

This manner of allowing for time-in-flight and target-movement is now out of circulation, for the benefit of those who might find a need for dealing with a totalitarian, or perhaps the minions of

of The People's Peaceful, Progressive Proletarian Paradise.

Interestingly, the man who shot the assassin, J. Ruby, utilized another favourite assassins' trick: He held the revolver with his index finger along the side of the frame, his middle finger around the trigger, and with the ring and little fingers holding onto the butt of the revolver. This is an unexcelled point-shooting method, for the pistol points at whatever the index finger points to, and the projectiles will reliably seek out the target. It is best for sudden, immediate, shootings where there is no time for the careful adjustment of the grip on the pistol, but rather where it is a matter of producing the weapon and squeezing the trigger as soon as it is reliably pointed.

This curious knowledge held by the late J. Ruby may be easily explained by his proximity to criminal elements. Certainly.

Interestingly, this matter is not taught to, known by, or recorded with the American Central Intelligence Agency; discussions with retired agents have touched upon this matter, but to no avail. If P. Agee has not mentioned it, it must not be taught, so that is added verification.

Allowing also for wind-drift is mandatory, since an errant breeze on the range may require aiming at a point a few degrees left, and if the wind at the site comes in another direction, the shot will be entirely off. Shooting to range is not possible, so the best thing would be to hold off until that certain time of dusk or dawn when the winds calm for a moment. This situation may or may not be present at the site; evaluation is in order. Wind-drift can be determined by watching smoke, leaves and other signs,

and experiences with that lot of ammunition under comparable circumstances relied on for evaluation of the amount of drift. As a rule, the same weight and design of bullet will perform in the same manner in wind providing the velocity is roughly the same; this is one reason for using ammunition from one lot as long as possible. Drift will not usually be a serious problem for heavy bullets at moderate to low velocities or at closer ranges--60 meters or so--but it will be a problem for small rounds like the 5.56 millimeters or .223 at high velocities, and especially at longer ranges. Breeze at 100 meters or more may swing one of these off-target by a distance equal to the width of the target's vital parts.

As a rule of thumb, use the Beaufort Scale to estimate the amount of wind all the way from the shooter to the target. Study the whole foreground! It is entirely possible that winds going in different directions will be encountered between the firing platform and the target, and this will call for evaluation so that the bullet does not drift to the left before meeting the wind in front of the target, which goes to the right. This phenomenon is especially possible in cities.

Winds from zero to one mile per hour do not bother smoke, which rises straight up. One to three miles per hour is called a "light air," which will cause smoke to drift ever so slightly. Four to seven miles per hour is a "slight breeze" which rustles the leaves in the trees and moves grasses slightly. Eight to twelve is a "gentle breeze" and moves leaves and twigs, with pronounced grasses-motion. Thirteen to eighteen miles per hour is a "moderate breeze" which stirs up dust and scraps of paper and moves small branches.

Nineteen to twenty four is a "fresh breeze" which moves small trees and creates wavelets on water. Twenty five to thirty one miles per hour is a "strong breeze" which moves large branches around and bends small trees. Thirty two to thirty eight miles per hour is a "high wind" causing whole trees to move and which makes walking about difficult. Thirty nine to forty six miles per hour is a "gale," which breaks off twigs and mashes down plants of comparable size. There are higher ratings, up to seventy five miles per hour plus which is a full hurricane, but shooting at any range but point-blank or with an automatic weapon will be difficult at anything above a "strong breeze." With the .223/5.56 millimeters, a shot at any long range will wind up in the next quadrant, and even a full magazine of thirty rounds may not come close to the target. In application, a moderate breeze may drift shots well clear of the mark with no trouble.

Never count on volume-of-fire or the hypothetical number of projectiles pumped into the area of the target to do the job of poor aim or bad area conditions! An incident the author recalls dealt with a group of foreign nationals being trained in the special base in Arizona, and revolves around how five teams with a loader and shooter in each engaged a lone coyote with five German MG 42/59 light machine guns at just about 300 meters. The weapons were set up to fire their 300-round belts of tracer-loaded 7.62 millimeters NATO ammunition at a rate of 800 rounds per minute. This is 1,500 rounds, spaced with a spotting tracer every four ball cartridges. Just when the teams had reloaded the coyote wandered onto the range, and the team-leader urged his men to shoot

at the animal. Before the training officer could countermand this order, all five weapons turned their muzzles toward the desert dog and began to fire. The first crash raised dust from the sites in front of the bipods and out around the coyote, obscuring him. He ran free, and the five weapons blazed again, obscuring him again. There were three more "engagements" before the belts were totally exhausted. Another weapon, set up on the anti-aircraft tripod and with the lighter bolt arrangement which allows a 1,100 round-per-minute rate of fire, was standing there with 100 rounds loaded up, and the team-leader ignored the training officer long enough to chase the coyote with a 100-round burst. After 1,600 rounds at 300 to 350 meters in less than a minute, five ground teams and one enraged student-instructor failed to hit a perfect target on cleared ground. The five teams were all shooting at a height comparable to coyote's, so all they should have had to do was pour the area full of bullets and count on at least one hit. The higher AA mount was shooting down, so all he would have had to do, in theory, was lay down a barrage and wait for the coyote to run into it. The coyote was still in the area six months later, but he never went down the ranges after that day. Back of the firing line, yes; in front of it, no.

If it may be argued that these men were firing precision-aim weapons and missed, consider the following account.

One day during the 1950's, a group of USAF trap-and-skeet shooters decided to help out a farmer who was losing crops to crows. A full dozen of these marksmen went afield with pump shotguns provided with five rounds of 12-gauge field loads holding about one

and one-eighth ounces (three and one-quarter drams equivalent) of number six. Arranging themselves in a "firing squad" line they awaited the crows' flight from roost to the field. There were about two crows per man, and when the birds got into range the leader of the firing squad ordered his men to rise up from their sackcloth blinds and blast the birds out of the air. All twelve men arose and let fly, continuing the barrage as the crows went into evasive action and passed by the line on either side. Sixty rounds were expended, at a count of about sixty-seven and one-half ounces of shot, with three birds being downed. This barrage should have dropped many more crows than just three, since the shooters were professionals familiar with flying targets. An Army officer with a light rifle having a telescopic sight later went out and cleaned up the crows, using .22 BB-Caps, at a cost of one round per bird. Reports have it that the USAF gunners were invited to a banquet where the Army officer served each man a baked and stuffed crow, with crow gravy for mashed potatoes as a side course. One thing the Air Force gunners did manage to hit was the farmer's wash, blowing his shorts full of holes as they hung on the line.

Anyone who thinks that a good hit can be effected by simply filling the area with jacketed lead should reconsider and very carefully evaluate the circumstances. An astonishing number of shots may be fired and still not hit anything vital, so shotguns and machine pistols must be used only at point-blank ranges or when there is no place for the target to go once one gets the range and can pump the area full of metal.

ACCURACY: Don't accept any of the fictional pap about accuracy. A .22 Long Rifle round from a good rifle will average about 1.25 inches at 100 yards with "Standard Velocity" or about 1.63 inches at 100 yards in "High Velocity." Two inches at 100 yards would be average, for combining user and rifle inaccuracy.

Civilian rifles and custom-loaded ammunition will produce 0.50 inch groups at 100 yards, with the commercial ammunition running around 1 inch at 100 yards. Military ammunition would run around 1.50-2.00 inches at 100 yards if the lot is reliable and the rifle is tuned to it. These are averages for center-fire ammunition; the East-European and Chinese ammo is variable, and some of the Western Europe lots are questionable. War-time productions may vary and should be carefully checked. The .223/5.56 millimeters rounds tend to be more accurate, as a rule...except when shot from bolt-action rifles in tests.

Sub machine guns are not aimed as much as pointed, and the assault rifles are generally longer-ranged SMGs. With these, put the front sight on the target and fire until one is sure that the job is done. Follow the techniques described in the unit on weapons, in the section on armed and unarmed combat.

Shotguns produce a dense pattern providing they have some sort of barrel length. The sawn-off models with a barrel length between six and twelve inches and just an abbreviated buttstock are not reliable in any roles but close-range assassinations, where the blast is fired at a few feet or a meter or two. The spread of the shot is fine for close-cover ambushes--the author utilized a sawn-off double in Asia, for ambushing VC/NLF units--but very little

else beyond five meters or so. The only value of such weapons is their concealability. If possible, a shotgun with the barrel intact, but with a trimmed-off butt, should be used, so that the weapon can have the stock put back on for standard roles. A barrel of eighteen inches or more, with a stock trimmed so that it can be concealed, will hardly be longer than two feet to twenty eight inches.

From a riot gun, the spread of the shot is thirty inches at thirty yards, so blowing the target's head apart would be less trouble.

Handguns are accurate in the hands of experts, but unless the team is composed of experts it will not be convenient to presume to effect hits at more than three meters, under conditions of stress and combat. Usually the ranges chosen will be much less--two meters or so. The advantage of a handgun is that it can be concealed and deployed easily. Accurate two-handed shooting is practical at 25 meters, and the author hunts with a Luger, effecting hits at 75 meters on small game. Groups at both ranges--average two-handed shooting and the hunting ranges--run around one inch. Better shooting is possible with better and more accurate pistols, but this tends to reduce the surprise factor required with a pistol. If sharpshooting is called for over a greater range, it is better to back off some and use a rifle. If the target is too well guarded to allow this sort of shooting and an in-and-out raid with pistols is not possible, a mortar or rocket launcher is practical.

Bows, either longbow or crossbow, are as accurate as the user makes them, and as accurate as they are constructed. As this is so variable, it will not be possible to give a hard-and-fast

answer. A quality crossbow is certainly capable of firing an arrow 100 meters with acceptable accuracy, if the shooter does his part. A longbow is reliant on the skill and handling afforded it by the user, and this may range from not being able to hit an elephant at 40 meters to striking a target like a groundhog or deer in a vital area at 85 meters. Never expect a homemade longbow to perform as well or be as accurate as a professionally made bow.

Accuracy at longer ranges is reliant on the average for the weapon. It forms a cone, starting at "zero" at the muzzle and ranging out from there to 100 meters, where it may be two minutes of angle (2 inches at 100 yards) or so--one minute to either side of the zero-point. Double the distance, and the spread may double, or it may be even bigger. In theory, the spread at 200 yards may be 4 inches, but in fact it will be about 5 inches. 400 yards? It may be around 10 inches to 12 inches. As distance increases, the potential spread increases. While this is all right for a military weapon when a wounding is as effective as a killing if not more useful, as a body may be left lying, while a wounded man requires two to evacuate him, it is not feasible for assassinations. The goal is, after all, to kill the enemy who has been sentenced to death. The deed must be humane, quick, and permanent; none of which requirements is fulfilled in woundings unless he is blasted to shreds. All of this must be considered by the agents involved, and the officials who pass down the orders.

BLUNT INSTRUMENTS

This entails something heavy and massive which is used to dispense with the enemy who has been sentenced, with or without

overt signs. The use of blunt instruments will take a great deal of courage and dedication on behalf of the agents carrying out the sentence, because laying hands on the enemy and extinguishing his or her life manually will be a task which is disgusting. It is not as sloppy or as messy as the use of edged weapons or the quaint forms of capital punishment calling for separation of the head from the body, however, and the agents can carry this out with less revulsion than a stabbing or other, more ritual, form of execution.

This role is useful in cases where the agent is detailed to the assignment in proximity to the enemy, but where the enemy has attempted to reduce the chances of such assaults by searchings and removal from the area of any weapons or devices which could serve as weapons. Here, a chair, fireplace poker, shovel, coat-rack, walking stick, cane, crutch, or other implement in the immediate area may be used.

Weapons which may be utilized in this role only include the venerable twenty-four inches of lead or steel pipe; a baseball bat; police or military nightstick or baton; blackjacks or coshes, whether beavertail, spring-shank or the reborn OSS-pattern "Snake;" hammers or hatchets; a comfortable length of hardwood; a cane, crutch or walking stick; the haft of a knife or butt of a handgun; and the garrote. Bare hands are also included.

All of the clubbing weapons would be utilized against the head, neck, centre of the shoulder blades or small of the back as well as to the floating ribs, front of the throat, and tip of the breastbone.

With simply the bare hands, one may strike the nose in an

upward blow, driving the septum back into the brain or breaking the neck in the backwards jerk, or both. Chops or jabs to the front or back of the neck, as well as to either side, will serve to snap the neck or crush the voicebox, possibly dislocating the neck and crushing the spinal column at the same time. A "Japanese Strangle" may be used to snap the neck, as will be noted under "Unarmed Combat." It is also possible to grasp the enemy's chin in one hand and the top of his head in the other, and lift and twist sharply. This will do the job rather smartly.

With the hands or feet, the tip of the breastbone may be broken off and hurled into the heart with a concerted blow upward and inward. It is also possible to break the enemy over one's knee like a rotten twig. One simply grasps the opponent from the front, on his left side, with one's left forearm behind his knees and one's right arm around behind his waist. The enemy is lifted clear of the floor by straightening the legs--like lifting weights, it is not a good idea to wrench one's back in this role--a half-step forward by the right leg is effected, and the enemy is smashed down over the thigh. By dropping to the left knee and leaning forward, some extra force is put in the drop. If the enemy grasps one and stiffens up to protect himself, he will die sooner and more cleanly, since the spine is not meant to bend backwards, and his weight coupled with one's weight will shear it cleanly through. Twist him to make sure he is gone, and stomp on the throat to make double-sure.

If one grapples with the enemy and manages an arm-throw, a stomping in the side where the floating ribs are will promote work

for the burial party. If he is down and unheld, and will stay that way for a moment (say, he has been given a hard knee in the groin), one may take a flying leap at the enemy, drawing the feet up and keeping the heels together. Just before contact, shoot the legs out straight but with the knees not quite locked, landing on his ribs or chest with both heels. The weight of the attacker plus the force of his jump will be immense--300-500 pounds--and this force will snap ribs off and crush him.

Stomping on the throat will also be effective if applied in this manner.

There are supposed to be forty nine ways of killing an opponent with one's hands or feet. Unfortunately, the author knows only thirty one ways and cannot fully instruct others in the techniques.

Should the target be wearing a helmet and presenting his back, this may be used to kill him: if his helmet lacks a safety strap-disconnect feature that will pop off at a certain amount of pull, simply grasping his collar with one hand and the forward edge of the helmet with the other, then hauling his head with helmet attached smartly backward with all one's strength will snap his neck. If the safety strap pops or the strap was not attached, one will have a handful of helmet; this will still kill the owner. One simply heaves it up, and then reverses and smashes the top of the helmet into the top of the enemy's skull, caving it in nicely. At the least this will concuss him, and allow one to use other techniques to deal with him once he is down and uninterested in the proceedings. The "clunk" of the helmet hitting and breaking bone may be noticed by other enemy personnel, but as it is not a

a dangerous sound they may take a bit wondering if the victim simply dropped his helmet, and allow the agent to escape.

A chair may be utilized to brain an enemy, simply by snatching it up and slamming it down atop his head; or by arising, making a move to leave, and then pivoting around with the chair grasped by one hand like a sabre. A chair is not precisely a fully lethal implement, but it is worth recalling that one can be used in such a manner if it is light enough to be lifted and swung with one hand. Swiping an enemy officer across the head with the legs or side of a chair will surely do some damage, and at least rattle him enough for one to use other measures.

Walking sticks, tool handles, lengths of wood, fireplace tools and the like may be utilized in the manner of canes, or in the simple overhand smash at a moment of opportunity. Strike at the head, shoulders (collarbone), back or other points cited. A full coal scuttle could be used to send the enemy to his just reward, too.

Rather than rattle on and cite implements and devices, and weapons of the moment, one must be aware and alert to chances to snatch up something handy and hefty, and fulfill the sentence there and then, keeping in mind the need for maintaining an escape route from the area after the deed is done. If the weapon is not massive, it must be delivered to the mark with accuracy; if it is massive, it must be delivered rapidly and smoothly so that the enemy has no chance to defend himself or move out of the way.

The backjack, cosh or "snake" may be used with great effect in braining an enemy officer who has been put on the list for

sentence-fulfillment. These are delivered to the vital parts of the skull or throat, since mass and velocity are not the best. These are swung at the temples, jawpoints, front or back of the neck to break the bones, dislocate them, or to crush the throat. A blow to the back of the head above the ears and slightly behind will serve to knock the enemy out for other attentions. A blow to the point where the spine joins the head will kill if delivered hard, as this point is not heavily reinforced and communicates directly to the medulla, which is one opening for instant death. The "snake" is a cosh with a telescoping spring-coil arm connected to the head, so that it is a striking implement of some length when in the act of swinging, but retracts itself into a short concealable package when at rest. It can reach around the enemy's neck or face in a swing, to do frontal damage even when one is behind the target, and with the small metal tip it is quite dangerous. The commercial version is made with less precision than the OSS version, and the claims as to its devastation are exaggerated, but it will do the job rather well if one is careful and accurate with it. Spring-column "snapper" coshes are somewhat better-constructed, and with the large metal ball under leather they will break bones and confound the enemy if they are used with precision. The larger "beavertail" blackjacks, with the whole filled with lead or steel shot, are not as flexible as the spring-snapper models, but the greater weight will still do the job if they are used with any dispatch and precision. Look toward the section on weapons for details on better types, and techniques.

Revolting developments describes a few rather foul ways to do

in an enemy, and the author would prefer to go to any lengths before utilizing these methods. Still, in the interests of completeness...

One may do in an enemy by jabbing one or both thumbs in his eye(s), smashing downwards and inwards with all one's strength, driving the thumbs back through the back of the sockets and into the brain. This is not wholly trustworthy, and the assassin may vomit at the sight of the eyes being crushed and the brains spilling out. Alternately, one may emulate the Afrikan, who thought biting into the enemy's throat and tearing the tissues out was a fair and effective method. Either of these may be mentioned to the agent(s) as a gauge of the mental stability. If they agree that they are worthwhile, and even think these to be viable, the man may be shifted to a new job.

Killing an enemy is necessary, but the lengths to which one wishes to go--or is willing to go--is under consideration. Anyone who thinks either are acceptable and even meritorious is beginning to like the job or is getting mentally numb; either of which would be grounds for changing the line of work before it is necessary to send a team after the assassin, should he decide to have some extra-curricular activities along these lines.

EDGED WEAPONS

This also includes the pointed but not "edged" tools, since they are stabbing/slashing devices with a sharp part which cuts or rends flesh. Stabbing Weapons are utilized in comparable manners, so no matter what the device is created from, the roles will be similar. Starting at the top and working down, it is

practical to stab for the ears, eyes, the base of the skull, the side of the neck anywhere from the bony area just beneath the skull to the collarbone, upward through the underside of the chin or throat/chin junction, up the nose, back through the mouth into the spinal column or vessels, or through the skull at the temples or base of the skull.

The trunk or torso may be attacked downward in the hollows of the collarbone, inward through the side(s) between the fourth and fifth ribs or the fifth and sixth ribs, jabbed upward toward the heart just beneath the breastbone or sternum, into the stomach, or even try to break the spine with a sharp stab between the spinal processes. Paralyse the diaphram and the target will die, and lower stabs into the intestines, kidneys or liver may be effected in the hopes that infection will set in and the victim die some time later. Obergruppenfuhrer/SS GEN. Heydrich died as a result of infection resulting from fragment penetration of his kidneys, spleen and liver which spread infection; but only because there was no antibiotic.

Stabbing could be very clandestine, such as in the case of the curved-point assassin's tool on the discarding T-handle that is shoved into the heart, or very overt as in the case of the spy in Asia who broke out of a Communist prison by driving the two bamboo chopsticks into the hearts of the guards who came in to see why he was groaning.

Techniques which could work for stabbing spikes as well as knives may include the knife-in-the-coat-pocket gimmick. This uses a weapon hidden in the inside of the pocket, with the blade

projecting through a slit or tear inside the pocket, with the coat-pocket handkerchief covering the handle. One reaches for the handkerchief as one approaches the enemy (from in front or behind), draws the knife in a smooth movement, and drives the weapon into the enemy's heart or kidney as he passes. The knife is let go, and the assassin walks on innocently as people begin to gather around the man on the ground.

The weapon may also be built into the trousers pocket, so that the assassin has only to withdraw his hands from his pockets and thrust the point into the enemy's vitals. If it is in a sheath that is built into the right or left trouser pocket, the pocket materials may be shifted over to the other side, but this may not always be the case. This is an OSS trick, and it was said that if one saw a man with all his pocket junk in the left (or right) side-pocket, one could be sure that he had his knife strapped to his right (or left) thigh or in a pocket-sheath. Pointed implements like ice-picks may be used in the pocket with just a cork over the point, and the cork packed in pocket junk so that the withdrawing pull will bare the point. Other devices may not need a point-protector.

Some items may be hollow, like hypodermic needles, which will allow blood to spurt out in great force. Others may be solid, which will let the enemy take a few glassy-eyed steps before realizing that he is dead. Plain hypos may be used as stabbing weapons, injecting a bubble of air into the victim's veins or arteries, which will air-lock the heart and kill him in a matter of moments. There will be a few spasmic heaves, and he will be

dead. If the air hits the lungs, he will die, as well as if the air lodges in the brain vessels. A bubble as large as a B-B--.177 caliber--will suffice, although one could pump in half a cc if one is the careful type. Loading him with several cc's of air will surely do the job, but would look a little odd if the coroner or the local equivalent found it.

One useful implement would be the carbon dioxide-powered wine bottle cork-popper, as it has a sturdy needle and many have an actuator plunger which will inflate the subject like a blimp when it is pressed. Liquified carbon dioxide will surely do the chore.

The needle holes will be apparent, and placement will have to be very precise in order to hit a vein, although the subject under sentence-fulfillment may be held still, drugged or made drunk for a more humane execution. The puncture mark may be camouflaged with scratches on the skin, if a clandestine job is required. This can be found by post-mortem examination, although the exams are not usually this comprehensive unless someone has thought of something or is naturally doubting.

Other, local, implements may be readily determined after a temporary stay there and an open questioning of the environment. Weapons which are used in the stabbing role are usually hand-sized and easy to hold as well as conceal, although some situations may very well call for the use of a lance, pointed fencing foil, hand-spike or other implement. For dealing with armour, there is nothing for it but to use a very heavy spiked weapon delivered with the utmost power. A standard Gerber "Boot Knife" will be able to penetrate typical light layered woven-nylon body armour, and in

tests with an American mine-detector probe and a British Commonwealth number four rifle bayonet, both managed to ram through the vest materials when delivered with a short thrust one-handed. Two-handed also worked, and with less resistance.

A standard man's brolly may have the shaft filled with a steel rod ground to a point, and is capable of being used as a stabbing weapon which will pass by casual inspection and street use. Armour with layers laminated together with resin were harder to penetrate.

CHEMICAL MODES

The use of chemicals usually implies poison, or perhaps drug, subjection which will cause death to the sentenced. In a military sense, the use of poisons, lethal gasses and the like is illegal under the Geneva Accords; although it is not practical to presume that satisfaction of properly-derived sentences for criminal or military excesses are on the same level with military anti-personnel uses of these agents. The use of poisons or lethal vapors is illegal when the goal is not satisfaction of appropriate sentences, so do not become peculiar and begin to doctor springs, water fountains or other products which will presumably kill enemy personnel. Leave the atrocities to the enemy; the officers involved and the individuals who carry this out may be given personal attention.

Poisons will exhibit different characteristics dependent upon their speed of application, their chemical makeups or other features, and the method of action. It is necessary to select a particular poison for each job based on the several criteria: Is it to work quickly, for any reason? What manner of delay is required, for

any reason? Is it to be cumulative or one-dose? How is it to be delivered? All of these questions are reasonable and must be answered before the selection is made.

Quick Working: This does not imply symptoms and death soon after administration of the dose. Rather, it means a poison which, once the symptoms start, will result in a quick death. This is imperative on the grounds of not causing undue suffering. If that does not impress anyone, consider that a slower material will be more easily counteracted, and a recovered and very angry erst-while victim will be possible unless the medical aid present is of low quality and skill.

Delay Requirements: Some poisons begin to work at once, like the cyanides, while others produce a limited delay of up to an hour or more. Arsenical substances will usually have a delay between administration to the body and symptoms of about half an hour.

Cumulative Versus Single-Dose: This is important, since it is very convenient to administer doses over a period of time which will ultimately be lethal, but which will not show up at once or make their presence felt. Others require a small single-dose amount to work. One which suggests itself for cumulative effect is Warfarin, a rat-poison compound.

Delivery Mode: How the preparation is to be delivered has everything to do with the result; one which is injectable or ingestable will be possible only if food or drink is open to access. A vapor, on the other hand, may be passed through the air-conditioning ducts if the target is not available for other attention.

It goes without saying that the doses must be of high potency and assured of doing the job. Doubling the rated normally-lethal dose is expedient, although this is not necessary with blood-bonding or nerve-type agents. Powdered arsenic may be used as a complexion aid by some, and if one does not drink alcohol a few hours after, a dose which is normally lethal may be passed off with no trouble. One man who had built up a resistance handled a full gramme of arsenic with only a mild upset. The usual dose for any arsenic compound varies between 0.1 and 0.5 grammes. If the individual is in any occupation which associates with any poison but cyanides, or has sleek hair and the peculiar dappled skin pigmentation that indicates arsenic use, or if known to fear being poisoned, double the dose or use an agent which is not likely to be counter-acted.

NOTE: Amyl nitrate may be used as a medicine, and as a heart-attack inhalant capsule, and this will effectively alter cyanide attacks so that they will probably not be lethal. Dangerous, yes, since the cyanides will bond to the blood, but with the amyl nitrate, the effect will probably not be terminal.

Amyl nitrate is also used as a "fun" drug by some, and may be abused by the victim if he is of that stripe. Some excessively wary Soviet agents are also known to have a cluster of crushable ampoules in a pocket sewn into their coat-pocket handkerchiefs, in preparation for an attempt by someone with a cyanide weapon. Mono-injection units comparable to the US military's atropine injectors are also known, and apparently in private circulation; these fire a dose into the body when the safety clip or cap is removed and the

end struck against the leg. Choosing another mode of attack is practical in such cases.

Rather than spend a great deal of time on this distasteful subject, the poisons will be reduced into commonly-found forms, such as solid, liquid, and gas. The first group will be the inorganics, and the second the organics.

Inorganic Solids: There are actually thousands of these, so the primary agents will be discussed, and the readers urged to explore further if the tactical need exists. These include arsenic and compounds; thallium; the cyanides; and sodium flouride.

Arsenic is the term used in this case for various compounds and blends. It is virtually tasteless, albeit rather hard to dissolve in water at times, and somewhat effective after it takes the customary twenty to sixty minutes to go to work. It makes one ill, produces projective vomiting and elimination, and is painful. If administered in the liquid forms it will be more effective and more immediate than when used as crystalline matter, and these may be dosed with alcohol to make sure that it will get into the kidneys and create the toxic effect. Usual lethal dose is, as said, between 0.1 and 0.5 grammes, so allowing for a full grain to cover any errors (of the pure agent of course) a pound would be 448 doses.

Thallium is a rare and exotic metal, which produces horrible physical injuries and kills over a longer period of time. As is predictable, the KGB loves it, especially irradiated thallium--material which has been put in the centre of a reactor and broken down to atomic dust by the bombardments. When this is administered, there is very little hope for the victim unless a doctor can

recognize falling hair, gastritis, blood oozing from the pores, dark liver-like striations and blotches on the skin, bruised-looking swellings, and other symptoms. The Moscow metal is not only lethal as thallium, it is lethal as radioactive metal dust in the body. Thallium is rare and restricted in most nations, but if available it may be administered as dust or fine bits. It is one of the worst poisons around, due to the fact that it is more likely than not irradiated thallium.

Cyanides covers potassium cyanide, potassium ferrocyanide, sodium cyanide, and prussic acid (hydrocyanic acid), among others. As a rule, these are instant-action, and it requires only a few grains to do the job if the material is pure. As a grain is one-sixteenth of a gramme, the amount of agent necessary is very small. Effects of the agents vary, but they may be presumed to be immediate, and require no more than four to six grains of preparation to be terminal. They may be improvised, also, with few tools. The techniques require only a few simple chemicals, a torch or other heat-source which will boil the agents (a gas welder or sweating torch will do), and materials like a glazed nonporous dish that will stand the heat--a pottery unit will work. Potassium hydroxide and potassium carbonate will be used in producing the sodium cyanides. Productions are identical.

To produce these materials, the dish is heated to a red glow and the chemicals put into it, after which a blue-flame torch blast is played over the container and contents to melt and bring them to a liquid state. A military gas mask in good condition, or a pad soaked with bicarbonate of soda, is utilized for breathing so

that the makers will not be killed off.

The production of a ferrocyanide begins by blending one part hydroxide, one part pulverized charcoal and one-half part iron filings as a mechanical-mixed powder, then adding this to the red-hot dish. The material is heated up and stirred with a nail or spike until uniformly red-hot and no more purple flashes appear. The dish is then grasped with tongs or pliers and the contents is poured into approximately five parts of water. The mix is stirred and allowed to set until the agent is dissolved. The material is filtered, allowed to evaporate, and crystals of ferrocyanide are left.

To turn a ferrocyanide into a straight cyanide, it is necessary to add a carbonate (potassium if the hydroxide was potassium; sodium if the hydroxide was sodium) and reheat as before.

Eight units of ferrocyanide are mixed with three of a carbonate, put into the pre-heated dish, and fired with the torch to melt. It will bubble and separate into a clear liquid and a solid material; when the bubbling has finished, the clear part is poured off on a flat enameled or neutral surface. While it cools it will harden; once it is firm but still warm, the cyanide is broken up and stored in tightly sealed phials or glass rod-sections which are then heated to seal, making death-capsules.

Sodium flouride is the preparation for rat poisons. It is a waste-product from manufacturing, and was once used extensively as a rat and insect poison until more effective preparations came along, whereupon it was prompted as a water-adulterant and tooth-protector which is supposed to toughen the enamel of the teeth and

prevent decay to a degree.

When sodium flouride is administered in a dose of approximately one grain, the inevitable and prompt result is painful death. Lower doses, not immediately lethal, will often result in a stupified state which evidences a decreased creativity and a lowered ability to perform simple tasks of mental effort.

Medications and drugs may be used as poisons or lethal agents. Materials such as anti-clotting agents (based on Warfarin and other substances but not asprins), pain-relief drugs such as the additives and Darvon, and others may be obtained in raids or clandestine passes from chemists or doctors and prepared in a capsule which resembles a usual type used by the target individual. It is more practical to assume that the effects would be more immediate when pure agents are used, such as would be found in custom-blending dispensaries or the old-fashioned chemist's shop, since the actual uncut amount of agent utilized in a large capsule might amount to a grain half the size of a small rice grain. Thus, one capsule might contain thirty full-strength doses. The bulk of the capsules or tablets is there for a reason; to make taking too much difficult, and to make the patient think that the pill will be very effective because of its large size.

Very small tablets might be pulverized and loaded into a larger capsule, as well, so that the effect is amplified for a particular role. This may be required if the individual is a pilot, driver, or the like and it is desired to make him crash or behave rashly. In this case, the dose is not lethal, but rather intoxicating. While the actual target may not be available for dosing, it may be the

case that his driver, pilot or guard will be, so this is a form of left-handed work. However, there must be proof and evidence that the pilot, driver or guard is also guilty, and may be sentenced as well, since the crash would kill everyone involved. Legalities must be observed at all times!

The "fun" or abused drugs such as LSD-25, "STP," and the rest might be available on the black market, and in this case it is appropriate to raid the illegal distributor and appropriate his stocks of the pure chemical. Dosings of this type of preparation may be much higher than for abuse, to achieve a permanent or other effect. Processing the agent into foods or drinks which will be served to the target is possible if tests have proven that the agent will not be harmed by cooking, contact with alcohol, or the like.

Capsules may be treated with an enteric coating so as to make them more resistant to dissolving, which will entirely alter the method of application of various drugs. Rapid-acting agents may be delivered in a capsule so treated and not dissolve in three to five hours, or a slower-acting agent might be present and not achieve any effect for eight or ten hours. Applications such as this are achieved so that the individual who placed the dose will not be in the area when the poison or drug strikes the individual down, and also so that the efforts of the enemy to affix blame will be altered appreciably.

Capsules are graded in size as well as by dissolving rates. As the number of the capsule goes up, the size decreases, as in cases of bird-shot. A 00 capsule is larger than a 0 capsule, and

a number four is smaller than a number two, and so on. Rates of dissolving are created to alter the speed of action and release. Some capsules will dissolve in three minutes, others at four, five, six, eight, ten and twelve, and so on. The longest used for regular commerce is rated at fifteen minutes, and the shortest is rated at two and one-half to three minutes. Capsules may be tested by weighting them with a small B-B or birdshot and filling with bicarbonate of soda, then dropping in a five percent solution of hydrochloric acid with a bit of pepsin added so that a good simulation of gastric juice is created. By checking to see how long it will take the bicarbonate to begin to foam, one will have a good idea of how long the regular capsule will last in gastric juices. Products usually leave the stomach in a matter of about ninety minutes or so, so if it takes three hours to dissolve an enteric-coated capsule in the simulated juice it will require about five in the intestines. Five hours will equate to approximately eight to nine hours in the intestines.

To create an enteric coating, the empty capsules are immersed for precisely thirty seconds in a one percent solution of formaldehyde, then allowed to dry and cure for two weeks. Longer immersion will result in a tougher capsule casing, and a higher concentration of formaldehyde will also make a somewhat tougher capsule. Vegetable lacquer and the like may also be used to coat capsules, although without such a precise effect or timetable.

A smaller capsule might be secreted within a larger one, with the colour of the original agent showing through the clear shell of the original. In the case of belted or sealed capsules, these

may be cut apart and then recemented with tinted gelatin or a chemical adhesive.

Liquid Poisons: This includes the liquid-state versions of the former agents, hydrocyanic acid, and organics. Liquids are applied in drinks, as injections, put on the edges of sharp objects the sentenced target will cut himself with, and also prepared as contact-agents, sprays, and the like.

Contact poisons are very dangerous, since a small amount on the skin will be "inhaled" through the pores and will be likely to kill the victim in a matter of minutes. Pure nitrobenzine will act as such an agent, and a small amount poured or spilled on a target will result in death in a few minutes or less. Applications might be in the form of a cup or shallow container of the agent in a likely place, covered with water or an oily substance so that it will not be smelled or evaporate. Nitrobenzine will bond with the blood, inhibiting oxygenation, and resulting in a death by suffocation. Even a small amount, indirectly picked up by touching an assaulted victim, will probably put the man who touched the nitrobenzine victim in the clinic or hospital. Sometimes the agent may be administered by a sprayer, although it is highly incendiary and will tend to explode if used in a pressure-flask; soft squeeze-containers will work best, but it will tend to dissolve these. As a fuel additive, it produces extreme power, but will burn the engine parts in short order. Used as an additive to gas or oil lamps, it will cause the lamps to explode when lit up.

Prussic/Hydrocyanic Acid is a rapid agent, and is used for the most part in gas guns and the infamous KGB single- and double-barreled assassination pistol, which resembles a pen-gun. This

acid is terminal within five minutes, and creates an almost instant collapse. The user will have taken amyl nitrate in tablet form, and soon inhale a capsule of amyl nitrate, to assure himself that he will not die in glory after having fulfilled the sentence.

This agent is distilled using potassium ferrocyanide, concentrated sulphuric acid, distilled (not rain) water, and calcium chloride along with simple precautions. Production is best conducted outdoors, in a secure area with military all-agents gas masks for all personnel. The ingredients required are in the ratio of 15/9/9/5; any form of measure-by-weight is acceptable.

Initially, the equipment required is simple, since a crude still is all that is necessary, with the outlet from the holding flask run well away from the area of production, and exiting downwind of the site. This is to reduce chances of vapour poisoning. The fifteen parts of ferrocyanide, either potassium or sodium, are put in the cooking flask and mixed with the nine parts of pure distilled water to dissolve. Then, the nine parts of concentrated sulphuric acid are introduced with due care. Mixing concentrated acid with water generates heat, and will boil if poured in all at once. The result is stirred with a glass implement to completely mix all three ingredients, then attached to the distilling coil and cooler.

The receiving bottle is given five parts of calcium chloride, in coarse chips, and is then attached to the coil from the cooler with the exhaust tube leading out of the area.

It is distilled slowly, so that the mixture in the cooking flask does not foam up and enter the cooler tubing, until the

surface of the calcium chloride in the receiving bottle is covered with the hydrocyanic acid, and the heating lamp is turned off, the bottle is removed from the distillation assembly, and the poison is transferred to a dark glass bottle with a tight seal. A few drops of hydrochloric acid are claimed to make the agent more durable. This poison rapidly deteriorates if allowed to come in contact with air or light, so as it is used, small glass beads or balls are dropped into the holding bottle to keep the level up and to reduce the surface area contacted by air. The container may be painted on the outside to reduce light and associated deterioration. Deterioration and handling caution may be reduced if the bottle is wrapped with corrugated cardboard, set atop corrugated cardboard discs, and kept in a plastic, fibre or other sort of transportation container. Covering the bottle with such discs will insulate it from damage in most types of transportation. When needed, the transportation container is opened up and the bottle removed only long enough to pour from and fill with beads.

Cooking the acid out will leave a distinctive blue dye, which may be dumped out, used as an ink, or treated in a comparable manner. It is usually more sensible to dispose of it in a clandestine manner, so that the production will not be as apparent.

Delivery of this poison is as in the case of any low-caustic agent; a syringe, squeeze-bottle, basting bulb, irrigation bulb, squirt-gun or the like is charged with the agent, smoothly wrapped in a plastic bag, and shot by an agent wearing a rubber glove. Many devices leak badly, and the use of a bag is imperative to avoid contacting a contact-poisoning. The glove is insurance, and also

secures the weapon in the event that it is found and processed for fingerprints.

Ethylene glycol is the basis for some explosive agents, such as ethylene glycol dinitrate, and is commonly found as an anti-freezing additive for vehicle radiators in more primitive countries. If available in the pure form from a chemist or other source of supply, it is a rather unique poison, since it is a clear, syrupy, sweetish preparation. As an anti-freezing preparation, it is often combined with other agents, tinted, and even flavoured so that it is not easy to take by accident. Alone or diluted, in various compounds, etc. it will require from .5 to 4.0 ounces to be lethal, so it is best to assume that 4.5 ounces is the standard dose.

Owing to the fact that it will mix into alcohol and water equally well, the usual mode of delivery is to adulterate beverages which have a sweet taste, and to use only "softer" drinks which will be consumed in quantity so that the requisite 4.5 ounce dose is consumed in one sitting. It may be possible to adulterate the preparation in some manner to camouflage the sweetish taste, such as in the disgusting red-pepper-flavoured vodka; a concentrate of red pepper is mixed into the ethylene glycol; and enough water to dilute a bit to water-viscosity so that it will not be noticed. Sweet wines are also used as the medium for delivery.

As a victim is killed, he will appear to be drunk, and this is usually used as a cover for the poisoning. Few people will be anything but disgusted that "old Ivanovskiy" or whomever is drunk again, and his passing out will be presumed to be the result of too much to drink. If delivery to the enemy who has been sentenced

is effected under the considerable confusion of a party, it may take hours for the body to be discovered, and a few more hours to sober the rest up adequately to get a decent description of the individual who passed the victim his drink, or poured it. The bottle may also be donated as a gesture of ersatz goodwill and will be equally effective, providing the individual does not have an Aide-de-camp who sneaks drinks of his supply, and that he will not share the bottle with someone else. The way it will be drunk has a great deal to do with the application of the dose; if sipped, the enemy will only get sick. If shared, he may not get the full effects. A litre may have to be half ethylene glycol to be effective, and this runs the risk of a premature discovery unless the agent is predominantly e.g. or the target is known to be a drunkard.

The most probable method of delivery would be to adulterate a punch or other soft drink with it, to make sure that the enemy will get the full effects without stopping too soon. Knowing the drinking habits of the target may modify this, since if the subject takes a ten ounce tumbler of pepper vodka for his afternoon or evening drink, a precise dose may be administered. Otherwise, it may be necessary to dilute it heavily and trust to chance that he will consume enough, soon enough, to be dispensed with.

Poison Gasses: A gas, in this instance, is not a vapor or mist of a liquid, but rather the evolution of another preparation which is lethal in itself. Otherwise, a "gas" might be any liquid poison sprayed out in a mist, in a concentration that is dense enough to be lethal.

CARBON TETRACHLORIDE, a degreasing preparation and a filler for some earlier fire extinguishers, will evolve into phosgene gas when applied to a very hot surface, or when boiled. The extinguishers have been outlawed in many nations because they will tend to kill the users if sprayed on a fire in a closed area. As a degreasing preparation, it comes in screw-top cans, wide-top tins, flasks, and compressed-air bottles or cans, and is usually marked so that the users will not spray it on hot surfaces. The author knew a fine chap who had the consummate folly to spray it on the heating ridges in a Volkswagon manifold-heater pipe, after some oil had been spilled on it and it was smoking up in the car. He used quite a bit, and then drove off in the car immediately after. The car was found nosed into a ditch, with the friend quite deceased after having breathed an unusually high concentration of the phosgene gas in a closed car. Any vehicle heater, it seems, will boil off carbon tetrachloride into phosgene if well saturated beforehand.

The agent smells like musty hay and would take about an hour to become lethal at a detectable concentration. Mixing with a material or preparation which would give off a scent would tend to cover this, providing the presumed victim knew what it was he was smelling in the first place. The odour would not be too objectionable, and may be presumed to be the way the quarters smell, or the way the heating unit smells after repairing. As it requires heat to generate it, the probable course of action would be to charge a unit with it in cold weather, so that the windows will not be opened and the place exhausted. Any number of likely avenues for attack present themselves: Inside furnace duct-work close to the hot exchanger panels; in the evaporative devices put on or in hot-

water radiators; on a small electric hot-plate in an obscure corner, or in the duct-work. An electric turn-on timer might be used, or a coffee pot which has a timer attached, so that the unit will not come on and evolve gas until the victim is presumably asleep and not likely to notice the gassy smell.

Cigarets, cigars or pipe tobacco may be treated to some chips and slivers of "Teflon," the non-stick coating used on modern frying or cooking pans. As "Teflon" comes in brown, it is possible to mix it into tobacco with little attention coming to it, even if examined. When the flame from the smoking touches it, the plastic chips will evolve a gas--variously called "methane" or "nerve gas"--which will kill in a very short while, and is not treatable with anything but atropine. A few slivers will suffice, so the treatment may be confined to just one cigaret or cigar (products which are inhaled are mandatory, since it works when breathed in) or one pinch of pipe tobacco. It is presumed that one twelve inch skillet would produce enough Teflon chips to do in a hundred or more people. Trading one cigaret for another would be feasible, the borrowed cigaret returned with a lethal filling.

Further, there are various fabrics utilized, especially for surfacing aircraft and modern train seats, which are plastics which evolve cyanide compounds when burned. Strips and cuttings packed around an incendiary would create a gas-bomb, according to the IRA. Owing to the Provos' interest in terrorism, some rather remarkable ideas have come from their quarter, some of which would work.

Other gasses could be evolved in various circumstances, and these would be lethal. Rather than dwell on the more obscure and

revolting, the readers will be left to their own devices for formulating agents; with the provision that all field uses be restricted to those products which are humane and rapidly-acting--blister-gasses are excluded--and which are used in conjunction to a proper sentencing by duly-recognized officials.

ORGANIC POISONS

Solids would include any leaf, bark, stem or root which is lethal when consumed, and the list is rather extensive. With regional differences and localized plants, it is possible to create an effective listing from botanical studies in the area of operations. While a full listing would be another book--there being a supposed 2,000 toxic plants known, not counting different types of the same basic growth, this will be a brief listing of the more probable ones.

Utilization of these would not be on a par with inorganics, since a much larger dose would be required and the measurements would not be very useful. The amounts applied would not be clandestine, at first glance, but leaves and the like are more acceptable as food-adulterants, and a massive dose might be included in a sandwich or other dish. Pulverized berries or beans are also applicable to insertion in foods, since most have a faint flavour which is camouflaged by spices or hot sauces.

An advantage of all this is the fact that the toxic plants cannot be excluded, removed, or restricted unless the enemy goes out and covers all the ground very carefully, sterilizing and removing every bed found. There is always a chance that some would

escape the search, and this will continue to perplex and trouble the enemy.

He may also be dosed with aconite in any form, which is found in the plant "Wolfsbane." Pure aconite will kill in doses as small as .004 gramme and a certain measure is .007 gramme. That small a dose would have to be cut with some other preparation in order to be able to see it, and even at high strength, mixing a bit with a wax and filling bullet noses with it would be an interesting occupation.

Wolfsbane is not precisely a common plant, but it may be found in most parts of the world, in some form or other, and reference to a handy botanical handbook of the dangerous plants will assist in picking out one of the local indigenous relatives.

For a bit, there was a helpful mail-order botanical house which would sell assured-growth Wolfsbane to anyone, with an attached brochure which clearly indicated the lethal qualities and doses as a warning, but this concern has since disappeared. In reviewing the lists, all two hundred-odd offerings were lethal in some respect or other, and were clearly marked as such. Wolfsbane, monk's hood, nightshade, yew, foxglove, and others were discussed, along with Irish potatoes grown in direct sunlight, poinsettia, rhubarb, the holly that is hyper-concentrated with caffein, and others. Curious.

Among the toxic seeds would be found castor bean, rosary pea, and the like. These are often used on Catholic rosaries, as the beads, and may be found on some types of "natural" trinkets. Two or three, positively four large ones, will do the task with dispatch.

Into flowers, the oleander, nightshade, poinsettia and comparable types will be lethal if leaves are used. A generous helping of these will help the sentenced over the River Styx in short order. Foxglove is another plant which might be utilized, as well as uncooked rhubarb leaves, and plenty of uncooked potato sprouts.

Liquids: Tobacco is an acceptable agent, since it contains nicotine, which is a toxic alkaloid. Flake or dust tobacco has been processed by soaking in water or alcohol for a few days, and then the nicotine solution was allowed to dry to a syrupy consistency. The agent was then loaded into a dropper or capped pipette, and administered in the form of five or six drops per occasion. This is very old, having seen use during 1941 in occupied Poland, and later in Czech territory. More recently, an antiCommunist group in Eastern Europe has been experimenting with "perking" alcohol through a strainer filled with shredded tobacco. They distill the alcohol out of the highly inferior vodka--pepper-flavoured vodka was cited--and use it. A very detailed system in which the alcohol was captured in a cooling coil and returned to the coffee pot has been mentioned.

Nicotine sulfate, the insecticide, is reliable if it is cooked down between sixty and eighty percent (for forty percent or twenty percent of active nicotine sulfate). It is both an ingestible and a contact-poison, and is rapidly toxic--ten minutes for the maximum time.

Tobaccos have been treated with these agents, so that the smoker gets a hyper-dose of nicotine and collapses at once. Cigars

have also been injected with nicotine agents, which will have roughly the same effect. Pipes have had a healthy dose injected into the stems, so that the juice flows back into the mouth when the user draws on it. Sharpened edges of furniture have also been painted with nicotine poisons, in response to a fictional story concerning this sort of poisoning, so that the victim died when the poison entered the cuts when the victim tried to lift himself up from the furniture.

Gasses: While not appropriate for use as gasses except in cases of fine vapor-mists, it is possible to utilize dusts such as insecticides in the manner of gasses; such as the case where some Israeli crop-dusters spotted a group of Arab terrorists in the cucumbers, and flew an inverted wedge-formation over the site, with sprayers going full blast. The Arabs needed immediate medical attention, as the insecticide was evaluated as being highly effective for use against mites.

Live Vectors: Under this heading come the biological agents, such as various germs and bacteria, fungi and the like.

Back in the very early 1940's, the Poles pioneered biological warfare in a grand way, albeit unofficial and low-profile. Take for example the man who would carefully pick the lice and vermin (excepting fleas) from the bodies of people who had suffered or died from typhoid and other diseases certain to lay the Germans low. Body or pubic lice were easy to catch and package up when one wore rubber gloves, it is said, because they are so slow. This man would also use body fluids from typhoid and other sufferers as a liquid germ-bearing preparation, and drip it into drinks, or

onto foods. The chap spoke perfect German, and enjoyed playing the collaborationist, entering German-approved bars and associating closely with the soldiers and officials there.

The "Human Germ" would manage to doctor drinks, slip a louse down the collar of a man as the Pole patted his back, and when he accepted a job as sweeper of German officers' quarters, he took great pride in putting a few of his little allies into the bedding where they would be certain to bite the sleepers.

Another "Germ Man" managed to package up cigarettes rolled by the sufferers of serious diseases and sell them to the Germans, and have candy, drugs and other preparations made up containing the germ-bearing body fluids of seriously ill people. Somehow, he even managed to pass on VD in the form of candies. How he managed to accomplish this is best not thought about.

Needless to say, all of the infecters and germ-bearers managed to find time to introduce everyone they could--other ranks through Captains--to prostitutes who had venereal diseases, TB, and other professional ailments with the hope that the enemy would run out of prophylactic drugs or this rash of disease would lower morale. They also managed to forge health cards so that women and men with such diseases would be allowed to work in the officers' mess and other likely places.

Another vector which has been used off and on, and which has finally seen print, is the pregnant female tick. While she has no specific disease, her bites have a toxic saliva which is picked up by the victim and passed into his system. The result is so much like polio that it is impossible to detect the difference, except that polio drugs will do nothing to the symptoms. If the tick is

inserted in a hat or helmet, as was done in Cuba by anti-Castroites, the creature will bite the scalp and be hidden by the hair. If the tick cannot be found, the victim will ultimately die. When the tick is discovered and removed, the symptoms fade away very soon and the sufferer returns to good health after a lengthy period of rest.

Larger creatures, such as rabid animals, netted bats, and the like may see use as animal-borne disease vectors, and it is possible to introduce infected lice to rats, and let the rats loose where they will contaminate foodstocks and possibly bite people--this was another Polish trick. The Germans spent quite a bit of time and effort in vermin control that could have been spent fighting Poles because of this.

Used as assassins' weapons, such animals would have a smaller field of activity but would be just as effective. Diseases are not immediate or totally terminal, but they do lend themselves to a clandestine attack and to repeated assaults in manners which would not be readily apparent.

CLANDESTINE WEAPONS OR ATTACKS

These may be in the form mentioned thus far, as secret assaults or clandestine infections, or they may be in a form which is overt to the victim but covert as far as the enemy medical examiners are concerned. Or, they may be secretive overt assaults.

Overt assaults which are not readily apparent as coming from the assassin would include the "Boxed Pistol," which is simply a handgun or improvised counterpart with a silencing or moderating

device affixed, well concealed within a box. The assassin dresses to resemble a deliveryman, and slips his hand within the box to fire the weapon when the target is within range...or the weapon-box might be delivered in such a manner as to be used overtly at the scene but act as a camouflage when the user is entering and leaving the area.

Of course, explosive devices, like grenades, which will do the job in a dramatic manner might be secreted within various things, such as cakes or breadloaves, or taped and dropped into vehicle fuel tanks.

Another clandestine method would be to have a supposed "enemy soldier" in the area of the Commander's car, who would get excited and shoot his superior by accident. Taking advantage of an air-raid or bombing to apply some "debris" to the top of the assassination target's head may work well, too. A battle or some other uproar would provide perfect cover.

Stabbing weapons may be introduced up the nose, back through the mouth, or in through the ears to effect a terminal wound which the victim is well aware is an overt assault, but which medical examination would presume is only the bursting of an important vein or artery in the brain as a result of stress. Other avenues might be investigated from earlier parts of this work.

Of course, drugs might be substituted and a user/abuser given a "hotshot" or a packet of pure "coke" or heroin to sniff up the nose; this will simply seem to be an accident on his part, for not cutting it down well enough. Even if foul play is suspected, the enemy will not admit that the victim was an abuser, since such

decadent capitalistic things are not supposed to exist in the Peoples' Peaceful Progressive Proletarian Paradise, and certainly not within the Party Of The Proletariat.

Other techniques lend themselves to such roles, with the wiring of the urinal or toilet-seat into the line current. A "Deodorant" can may be wired into the line voltage, or the doors to the stalls may be wired into the line via a "bare spot" on the cord for some other appliance. An "accidental dropping" of any electronic device into the bath will serve to light up the victim like a neon sign, and it will appear to be a simple accident on his part. A radio, light, or other appliance might "fall" into the bath while it is occupied, as well.

Alternately, an "Inverted Assassination" may be arranged, with the home of a minor enemy official having some materials for making bombs, printing underground papers, and the like installed where he will not find them immediately, and having another individual report him for this business. Loading the home with discreet bundles of counterfeit money may be practical, too, as well as a number of blank enemy forms or ID cards. All of these features, as well as extra weapons, ammunition and the rest, will afford the compromised enemy official a trip to gaol, and take him off the hands of the underground. The enemy will likely execute him after their own "trial," and this will occupy them for a bit, and put all the deceased's friends and associates under severe suspicion. If a number of them can be implicated in such a way, it will serve to clean the muck out of the stables.

Alternately, there is the ruse relished by the French

undergrounders: forging a letter to the people by a traitor, with signature and the rest, and helping him to "commit suicide" with the aid of a rope, a tree, and several men to hoist him up after capture. An enemy ally who decides that he has been a traitor to his nation and his people, and then writes a long note of apology to the wronged parties before killing himself will make the enemy seem to be no end a fool, and embarrass them nicely.

Suicidal enemy-aligned traitors may be prompted into such acts by one such real or apparent suicide, so several may follow the example of one and the reason will still seem to be authentic. It is also a propaganda tool that may be employed with great vigour, since it gives heart to the friends and puts despair in the hearts of the traitors.

Suicides may be in any form, just as long as they do not form a curious pattern. Ropes, wires and cords may be employed in some cases, a pistol in the ear or mouth might be profitable if the traitor has a handgun, and "leaps" out of windows will serve nicely. Only be sure that the victim does not get a heave out of the window, but rather a light push, real suicides do not land more than their own length from the front of the window or wall where they started, and often closer. A very robust toss will be suspected straight away. Avoid, also, shots where the real suicide would not be likely to put them. If a long-arm is used, take off a shoe so that it seems that the enemy fired the weapon with his toe. Make sure that no extra fingerprints or traces are in the area or on the weapon!

If the job is to be done as a formal execution but is not to be identified as such, a sack of sand may be dropped on the back of the sentenced individual's neck when he is kneeling with his

head bowed. This was used quite often by the Chinese Communists when eliminating soldiers who would not join in the revolt at the well-known prison-camp that gave the Americans such a problem during the Korean Conflict. This drop will break the neck as surely as a hanging, be ceremonial in aspect, and not be an overt indication that the victim was subjected to a sentence-fulfillment.

A very overt sentencing might be conducted from an improvised or fabricated gallows, a firing squad--any wall will suffice--or perhaps the application of a machete or axe in a formal Asian beheading.

Authentic Germ Warfare: While this is indeed a touchy subject, and very dangerous to all concerned, it is practical to create germ cultures or incubators which will promote the production of lethal toxins, which will be applied to the food, drink or effects of enemy personnel.

Toxins are the safer, as actual consumption of the material will be required, and not simple proximity to a batch of faulty culture. It is simple enough to create a breeder-culture for anything from anthrax to pneumonic plague by simply introducing a sample-drop from a victim of the disease to a batch of sterile potato, meat-broth or other soup, and then keeping it at an optimum temperature until the disease organisms have totally taken over the situation.

Assuming the disease carrier has been located, identified and can infect the broth, the materials needed would simply be the broth in a sterile capped syringe-type bottle, a heater, and security precautions to prevent accidental infection.

The "laboratory rig" for this might range from an electric

light bulb on a length of flex to a heater for a fish tank, the bottles for the cultures, syringes for transfer of the agent to other breeder-flasks, and the like. Anyone who finished one term of higher biology--a college or university biology student in the last year, or anyone above--could cook up a hell-broth that could depopulate Moscow, Peking or Havana.

Toxins are more specific, since the individual making up the toxin-rich broth would not suffer as great a risk, and the enemy who has been sentenced will be the only one involved. Germ-cultures would be very non-specific, and could finish up eliminating more civilians then enemy personnel, for the simple reason that the enemy would reserve the full use of hospitals for his own personnel, and take over all the medicines.

This toxin-treatment process is well-known. The most likely toxin would be botulism, and the agent used as the medium would be green beans which have not been canned properly. In deliberate cases, the beans are not heated fully; or if cooked, are allowed to cool down and are exposed to the air for specific periods of time so that the spores are introduced to the mixture. With no preservatives, the toxins would begin to show up in a matter of weeks.

Taking the page from a Minuteman handbook, the beans are "tested" on different enemy personnel until one batch is shown to be infected; this is utilized as the "seed" batch for infecting any further productions.

When the production lab is in full operation, one may assume that several hundred pounds of toxin-rich broth and bean-soup

may be processed monthly.

Use, according to the Minuteman papers, would be in the order of dosing other uncooked foods with the broth so that the victim would consume a large dose. From a different paper, it is said that the toxin may be separated by freezing the broth and exhausting the air from the container so as to make the water vaporize away. That paper said that the vacuum-chambers in animal shelters, used for killing the occupants by exhausting the air, would suffice. If this is the case, the toxin would remain in powder form, and this would be more likely to do the job without being noticed.

As this is simply food poisoning, albeit removed from the area of chance, there is little that would indicate that the attack was formal.

Other vectors known to work as germ-bearing avenues are the tipping of edged weapons with the blood of animals suffering from anthrax. This disease is very durable, and individuals have been infected from a cut as long as a week after the implement was used on the diseased cattle. Blood will remain liquid after shaking around with marbles inside a heavy glass jar, and this agent may be utilized as a breeding vehicle as well as the actual dosing-mode.

Indigenous personnel in the hills of South America utilize a rotted meat "slush" to cure the heads of their arrows, and it is thought that the toxins resulting from this technique are on a par with other organic agents.

Raw milk from cattle suffering from "Undulant Fever" is another reliable vehicle for the disease, and this is the reason

why milk and milk-products must be given the Pasteur treatment. Used as a deliberate germ-warfare technique, the disease is not terminal, although it will make the victim less effective at work--twenty-three to eighty-five percent less so.

Other disease vectors are possible, and indeed practical, from a most-desperate-situation standpoint. The difficulty resides in the nonspecific aspects of these, for it is not legal or moral to destroy others who have not been sentenced by due process. Diseases which are cooked up in a tool-shed laboratory are this way. Toxins are more specific, and infected implements which will only touch the individuals involved are even more specific. In all cases, it must be assured that no one is harmed but the party sentenced. Diseases remove the overt human intervention from the scene, and reduce the likelihood of reprisals against the civilian population as a result of the attack. To this extent, at least, they are advisable.

TECHNIQUES FOR SQUAD PERSONNEL

The personnel who engage in assignments of this nature will have to be selected by calling for offers, in most cases, because it will be rather different from what a regular line soldier will experience, and it is not as reliable to dragoon people into this role.

The personnel must believe in the cause for which they are fighting; they must believe in the authority of the underground courts or tribunals to sentence a traitor or enemy officer to death and must believe that the fulfillment of the sentence is

a right and just thing to undertake. Without all this, it will be difficult to obtain steady, reliable personnel who can be counted on to perform the fulfillment within the best of their ability.

It is not usually wise to accept personnel who have lost families or loved ones to the orders of the subject, since their participation will usually be a result of a personal vendetta, and the individual(s) may walk into a suicidal situation which will only result in two deaths instead of one.

The Men/Women Must Be Able To Take It: Fulfillment of a sentence can be a messy thing, and the people involved must be able to take it without becoming shocked, or warped to the point where they will actually like the work. Assume the role is to shoot a traitor in the head from behind, on the street: any but the lightest-calibre pistols or revolvers will cause a horrible wound; with a nine millimeter Parabellum, a shot into the head at close range will reliably spray the shooter with the blood, brains and tissues of the victim, back out the entrance hole. This spray will be on the weapon, the hands and arms, and it may even soil the face, clothing, coat, and arms of the assassin. Only when the round is very light and small will this hydraulic spurting be avoided, and then it may come in the form of a jet of blood from the wound.

A shot from a rifle, either a light .22 up close or a heavy target grade model further away, will allow the shooter to see what happens to the head when the bullet hits. With a .22 there will be less fuss, but a spurt of blood will still result; with a heavy-calibre rifle, the head will likely come apart from the force of the slug, sending blood and brains and bone splinters in all

directions. With a telescopic sight, the shooter will have the chance to see all this happening at the ranges mentioned, and this might unsettle him. With open or peep sights, the result will not be as obvious, and the shooter will be spared this somewhat.

The shooters must be able to take this sort of thing and not be revolted and have their nerves broken. Poisons and other methods will not be quite this bloody, but they will still manage to revolt some people. The reactions of a person who has been poisoned may be very mild, or they may be comparable to those caused by arsenic or thallium with horrible side effects and a painful death. Stabbing weapons will be variable; some may not create much mess, while others will be horrible. Any ritual or other beheading will resemble turning on a shower of bright red paint. The sentence-fulfillers must be able to take this sort of thing and still have presence of mind enough to escape.

Escape: This is altogether a different matter. Once the job is done, the man must be able to get away. When approaching the subject, one must have either. Experience enough to be able to come up from the front without looking chalky or flushed, with wild eyes and erratic breathing; or come up from behind. With any sort of weapon which will create a mess, the user must be dressed in dark clothing so that the blood and gore will not be as obvious on the garments. A dark-coloured overcoat or raincoat should be worn, if available, so that the majority of the stains will be easily washed off or removed with the coat. The shooter must wear dark glasses if possible, to keep blood and gore out of the eyes and lessen the area of the face to be wiped. A wet cloth and a dry one must be provided, to allow for wipe-downs so that the face and

hands will be cleansed of the blood, and, like Pilate, the shooter may wipe off and become thoroughly respectable once again. Gloves are mandatory if the shooter has ever been fingerprinted by the enemy or the former friendly government, and none of the clothing--if plastic--must be touched without the gloves to assure that there will be no fingerprints. All of the soiled articles, the two cloths, the topcoat, and the sunglasses, must be dumped as soon as one is out of the area. They may be put where someone else can pick them up and wash off the traces, if they are in very short supply, but no one should touch them until after the initial excitement and questing-about is over.

Techniques For The Job: The shooter or shooting team must be totally calm; this excludes smoking and drinking coffee while waiting for the target, and it excludes sitting in a car--say--and playing the radio or tapes. No distractions should be present to hinder full alertness for any sounds or sights which might (assume will) have a bearing on the mission.

Sitting around the area for very long is out of the question; use spotters who will alert the team that the target is on the move or has entered the killing zone. Door-stop fulfillments are out of the question unless it is imperative that the citizenry be informed of the fate of all traitors, and the marksmen must not be seen loitering around the area as though waiting for the target, who may have friends who will see and report this. Cruising around or walking the area are also excluded from the choices possible unless there is a great deal of tram or bus activity which will camouflage the team's presence.

The better procedure would be to watch for a pattern of sorts to develop; most people who do not suspect something will leave for work at about the same time, follow the same route to work, leave there at a predictable time, and follow another route home or to a cafe. A week's observation will establish this pattern, and allow the team to place itself between the target and one of his objectives in time to send him to his just reward.

Make sure that the enemy does not spot the team. The individual members should be cautioned to never look the target in his eyes, follow him with sight, or otherwise appear to observe him. Some of these people have been tried for before, and are very clever in their protective measures. If no pattern is obvious, they have been practicing evasive procedures, and are not likely to allow a quiet walk-up with a revolver. These paranoid secret police types have been practicing defensive living, and must be hauled over by a supposed roadblock or hit with a rifle. If the team does not look the enemy in the eye, and closes in a casual manner which does not seem to be governed by the target's speed, it will work more smoothly.

In fact, it is better to never look directly at the target until one is close enough, and then act like lightning when the moment comes. If it is convenient to let the target come to the team, let this be at a bus stop or tram pick-up point; anywhere that is habitually utilized by people for standing for a longer period than normal. Never bunch up, sit in a car for any period of time, walk in formation or in step, or seem to be tight. Nervy behaviour will be spotted as well, if the target is afoot and alert to signs of a party willing to ferry him across the river

Styx.

Pedestrian ambushes of a vehicle are somewhat easier in a city, since the traffic is slower and the enemy more likely to be killed by the first burst, but the effects of any explosive devices will be amplified and the falling glass and masonry will be apt to kill or wound the team members. Should a vehicle-to-vehicle ambush be called for, try to arrange for a parallel shooting, between vehicles side by side, or endeavour to get a truck or wheeled mover out in front, so that the fire can be directed back from the tail-gate or rear hatchway. Attempts with the vehicles heading towards each other will stand an excellent chance of wrecking both, or making the friendly driver deaf from the sounds of the shots let off beside his ear. Firing into an oncoming car from within a stopped car facing the other direction (towards the direction from which the car will come) will give a much better chance, however, as the weapons can be shielded within the car and fired through the side windows. When the other vehicle crashes, the car may be started up and the team evacuated.

RATIO OF EASE OF ACCESS

Sentences are much easier to fill when they involve traitors and lower ranking turncoats who are working for the enemy. A military governor on the other hand, will be almost impossible to reach, as the fantastic behaviour of Heydrich is the exception, not the rule. As a rule-of-thumb, consider that the higher the rank of the sentenced individual, the more difficult he will be to reach. However, no one under the rank of general will normally

be provided with an armoured automobile to drive around in, so it is much easier to interdict the routes with heavier weapons fired from a distance. The bodyguard forces will be likely to be armed with assault rifles and the like, and not able to engage a weapon like an anti-tank RCL or a hidden sniper.

The lower ranking personnel may be used as training assignments for new personnel assigned to fulfilling sentences for the appropriate courts. These vermin will not be in any great lather to conceal their movements or act defensively, and the lowest-ranking will not be provided with any body-guard forces. They may be armed, but probably not. They will not be mourned by too many civilians, so the problems of escaping from the enemy patrols will be reduced somewhat.

The new men may be instructed by those who have had experience, and coached in how to behave. Then, once their behaviour is satisfactory, they may be detailed out in actual assignments, and these critiqued by their instructors. As expertise is gained, along with confidence, they may be detailed off to more difficult assignments.

This is a distasteful subject, but necessary, and the personnel engaged in this work must realize that the occupation forces and their puppet-traitors will not be evicted by any other method or manner. The personnel must be grounded quite thoroughly in the legal aspects of this work, and how they are acting as agents of the courts. They are permitted to question their orders, if necessary, to make sure and to satisfy themselves that the assignments are lawful fulfillments of valid sentences. This is vital, to make sure that no officers use the service as an illegal tool of personal ambition or vengeance. This element is vital, for it

separates the friendly forces from their totalitarian counterparts.

Making the lesser traitors, profiteers, turncoats, fifth-columnists and individuals of that stripe as initial training targets will serve two purposes: give valuable experience to the team members and alienate this segment of society from the enemy cadres, lessening enemy control over the captive peoples. The occupation will resemble a plant; it will have to develop and utilize roots of party members, traitors and the rest in the general population to unify and expand his control. If these degenerates are forced to withdraw through fear, the foe will be deprived of control, and will have to foster other ruses to allege that he has the upper hand. One of these measures will be random arrests, to give the impression that his intelligence net is well-cast and close-meshed. If he is deprived of most, if not all, of his domestic support, he will be forced into other actions, which will be better dealt with by guerrilla methods.

During the lull before implementation of full overt activities, it is wise to compile lists and run the courts so that the enemy will be clearly identified. In considerations of the most profitable methods for dealing with traitors, it has been determined that the greatest effect might be drawn by directing attentions to these individuals in a sudden series of strikes. The sheer shock value of a few score sentence-fulfillments in one evening would surpass that of the same number spread over a fortnight or two. Also, if the jobs were done quietly and in series by several teams, it would be more difficult for the enemy soldiers and secret police to adequately protect the survivors. Should the foe learn of the

massive strikes, he will be unable to tighten road patrols, guard all the parties legally slated for execution, and carry on with his other duties, and the sheer strain on manpower will be telling.

Fulfillments against enemy cadre, on the other hand, are a horse of a different colour. These individuals should be favoured with the squads' attentions randomly, so that they will be forced to either hide out all the time, or be covered by extensive body-guards. Even the strengthening of bodyguard forces is useful, as it deprives the enemy of that many men who might otherwise be out oppressing the people. If the enemy seems to be letting up on the patrols or oppressing the people rather more, see about distracting him with a few brisk strikes at his cadre, so that the soldiers will be brought back to road patrols and security measures.

TOP ENEMEY PERSONNEL AT HOME

These chaps must be dealt with in the manner which is most likely to result in the team's survival; the struggle will produce too many martyrs as it is, and it does no good to field a team which does the deed and then is finished off before they escape from the building. However, the enemy officer or agent may be living alone or with a small family or bodyguard, which makes it practical to strike at the home and escape before a reinforcement party arrives.

The easiest method is not always the best or most politic; the easiest method of neutralizing the menace is to deploy a long-range projector of high explosive, such as bazooka, panzer-faust, RPG-2, any recoil-less rifle from 5.7 centimeters to 10.6 centi-meters, or even the 4.0 centimeter M79 weapon. One of these

projected into the room(s) known or presumed to be occupied by the enemy will certainly do the job. The Czech 8.2 centimeter RCL is ideal, as the communists and others have discovered. However, such target practice is akin to using a hammer to swat a cockroach, and may provoke an enraged outburst by the enemy. It is also an overt type of military operation, and against the Geneva Accords in some respects.

Otherwise, it is an operation for a covert team which is armed and supplied in accordance with a clandestine operation. For this reason, it is necessary to itemize the possible static counter-measures, so that they can be looked for, allowed for, and the operation arranged to neutralize or bypass them.

First, there is the possibility that the enemy has a surveillance outpost which observes the target's residence. This will be within sight, and may be provided with infra-red or image-intensification viewers so that the outpost may be in constant visual observation of the location. At the best, the observers can watch only one direct face and obliquely down two walls, with dead-spots or unobserved zones toward the front of the sites. More usually, the observers will be set up in an oblique site so that two faces may be observed in full detail. Wire, bushes, structures and the like may be used to channel would-be assassins into the observed areas, so if there is a very definite security screen or wall on two sides and less defense on two others, this is an indication that the enemy is remotely observing the area. Two outposts may be used to completely cover a site, each watching two sides, so they may support walls or wire.

The solution, then, is to investigate any property within view that might be such an outpost. Forget about ranges, since radar or other measures might be used to make a protective, viewed, area around the property at a much greater distance. Anything which looks odd must be investigated by clandestine means, and determined to be secure before moving on the enemy target.

With, or without, a defensive covering screen, it is still possible that the enemy is being observed. The solution is "BLID" or "Geophone" sensors. The former is "Buried Line Intrusion Detector," and is actually a wired string of sensors set approximately eighteen inches apart on a line 150 feet long, attached to a unit called a "processor." The area may be as large as needed, since the sensors can be buried in the ground so that they create sensory zones up to seventy two inches wide, per line. More lines, or rippled lines, will cover any area up to thirty miles deep. More lines and units may be added to the system. This is an excellent perimeter detector which will foil any attempt to trespass within the covered ground. The "Geophone" unit is a broader-ranged single-sensor unit, capable of detecting human travel up to two hundred feet from the sensor, and will detect any vehicular motion up to 1,500 feet away. These cannot be detected, and their whereabouts can only be estimated by the fact that the enemy did dig a trench (BLID) or a single hole (Geophone) and run a wire into the structure at some time. However, they will false-alarm if a powerful magnet is introduced into their spheres of sensitivity. Some sources claim that these systems will not work if there are guards or dogs about, but this is not so: Guards will be tracked by the sensors, in the better systems, and dogs may be too light or produce the

wrong type of signal in the ground to cause the sensors to signal an intrusion.

Fences may be wired, not only to electric currents but also to flares, trip-mines, and comparable ordnance. Vibration sensors are also capable of being installed on fences, usually as a cable with a sensor box every second or fourth fence post, or with sensors directly on the wire meshes. Other, more detailed, sensors will readily determine if an accidental vibration has been achieved, and if so, allow the guard(s) to listen to the type of signal picked up. All the better systems will have anti-tamper devices to alert the guards if the team attempts to disable the alarm.

Tampering, attempting to break in or the like will trigger any of a number of potential devices: mines or robot weapons-emplacements, flares, doors to dog pens, and other countermeasures.

Cameras within the emplacements also form a difficult device to bypass, since this creates a multi-system situation which will not allow any bypassing.

Above-the-ground sensing devices, such as microwave "radarlike" scanners will detect motion within the area if it is a size compatible with a potential intruder. These will usually be detuned so that waving grass will not set off an alarm, although bushes and trees within the area of scanning will be picked up if a fresh breeze is blowing them about, and so set off an alarm in many cases. Thus, these devices will be where three things are absent: trees, bushes, and patrols.

Photo-electric beams are also practical out in the perimeter; usually beamed to and from large monolithic devices set approximately

every twenty feet. Larger and more powerful lamps will work at longer distances, and the smaller units will require closer pylons. These consume a great deal of power, so will usually be run from a natural gas or fuel generator rigged in tandem with the conventional power lines, and heavier cables will be passed into the area than would be normal. In most cases, these will be infra-red light or laser beams, which will be invisible or nearly so, and will not have any bush or tree in the way of the beams.

Generators will be in use in cases of microwave scanning, cameras and perhaps the more extensive BLID or Geophone systems, but standard wet-cell power supplies will suffice for the smaller and lighter BLID and Geophone arrays, and the fence sensors. Generators can usually be heard or seen by the puffs of exhaust out of a longer pipe, although some may be ducted into flues and be impossible to hear or see, by the smoke and vapors put out.

Foundations, walls, and other structures will be defended by other types of seismic sensors, which are akin to spike-mike bugs and window-glass sensor-pads; responding to the vibration of the walls or structures in the presence of digging, blasting, chipping-away, and the like.

Now, in truth, the average enemy officer will not be protected by such an array of sensors, monitors and detectors. One might expect the dictator himself, and perhaps the most important military governors, to be defended by such measures, in addition to masses of guards and patrols. Providing, of course, the target is excessively worried and has the ability to ask Moscow, Peking or his advisors for such devices, plus the technical help to emplace them and keep them operating. However, mentioning these devices

and measures will allow the teams to be fully aware of the possible defensive measures, and give some ideas on countermeasures which may work. Nothing works absolutely; all of these devices will only alert the guards that something is afoot, and a platoon or company of tanks which happened to be stolen at an appropriate time may be used to roll in and deal with matters in a dramatic manner, or perhaps a hundred troops might storm the structure and deal with the enemy officer. The sole purpose of such devices is to make a small-scale overt attack difficult.

However, covert attacks are still possible. Under situations of this sort, it is possible to insert an agent or two into the household itself. If this sounds farfetched, consider that the Reichsprotector's deputy, Dr. Frank, had a British Secret Service agent as his gardener, and this state of affairs lasted throughout the war. De Gaulle had a communist agent as his chef...and that leads to nasty ideas about how The Grand Charles might have been terminally indisposed as a result of some bad food.

In most cases, the enemy will be content to put out dogs and some human patrols, with the dogs either in a special "demilitarized zone" of their own or working with handler-guards. Dogs are a definite threat, as they can hear a man at three times the distance their human counterparts can, and may reliably smell any intruder at several hundred feet if the wind is in their favour.

These will be war-dogs in the best and most classic sense of the term; not "Watch-dogs" or "Alarm-dogs," but full-scale attack- or patrol-dogs. Attack-dogs are worked with handlers, and may be ordered to guard, attack, hold, and the like, and be called off

by a command. Patrol-dogs are very savage brutes, indeed, and these animals will tend to be only marginally controllable--which is to say, they may not eat up their handlers for no reason at all, but the strangers will be invited to a doggy dinner as the main course.

These dogs may not eat anything they find out during the travel of their rounds; this depends upon how well trained they are. To train a dog in this manner, strangers to the dogs prepare small tidbits with any of a number of tasteless, odourless agents which will make the dogs ill, and lob these into pens or place them in training areas where the dogs will find them. These preparations may be scented by the hands of the strangers, or they may be prepared with gloves so that no particular human scent is present. The dogs learn to eat only the foods given them by their handlers, through cause-and-effect. They eat strange food and get ill, and make the connection.

If the dogs have not been trained this way, it is handy to toss in goodies treated with poisons or drugs. While killing these dogs may not be feasible, some preparation such as LSD-25 will have the beasts so distracted that they will not see the camouflaged assault team. Using drugs will also allow the animals to recover their poise later, and dine well on any secret police men who happen to roam through the grounds in search of clues and artifacts after the strike.

Otherwise, bows, crossbows, arrow-slings (slingshots which fire arrows), and any silenced pistol or long arm may be used to neutralize the anti-treat-trained dogs. The sniper or gunner may

move in down-wind of the beasts and cooly shoot them as they make their rounds, without having the shot or death heard. The weapon must be heavily silenced, the shooter must be firing from an area which will not be compromised if the dogs make a disturbance at the snap of the shot and the rather sharp "Smack!" of the projectile's striking home. A silenced weapon may be reduced to a report like a B-B gun, and the sound of the projectile's impact will still resemble an open-handed slap on the face or a heavy punch.

Veterinarian injector-guns may be used, although this requires getting up very close to the dogs and pumping the darts home while the animals are leaping and snapping at the fences, trying to create an opening so that they can consume the shooter. The infernal uproar may be heard, and draw guards to the site.

Vapor-spreader devices may be used to pump out a narcotic or other agent at the dogs; a plant-sprayer may be charged with a liquid containing LSD-25 in solution, and sprayed at the dogs as they attempt to get through the fence; or deployed in a remote-controlled manner, with a delay timer and actuator device. The latter method is better, as the dogs may be dosed at the same time as the sprayer-controller. If practical, the man detailed off to gas the dogs must wear a sealed suit like a diver's dry-suit, tight-fitting rubber gloves, a gas mask, and have all exposed parts of the skin taped over so that there is no chance of picking up a dose through the skin or a minute scratch. LSD-25 is very potent, and must be used with careful controls so that friendly personnel do not get a magnum dose. Drugs are preferable, again, because the animals will still be alive, and this fact might

confound the enemy if he does not check their blood-levels. Even if they are hopelessly hopped up, they will still be capable of "landing" and chewing up a secret policeman. LSD-25 also has a tendency of "spoiling" the dogs for further work, since the animals will lapse into irregular "trips" without any warning or symptoms, and this will be an undesirable trait for an enemy war-dog.

Poison gasses are not usually profitable for open-air use against dogs, although phosgene might be generated close to the fence where the dogs will come over and smell around and try to determine what that odd odour is, and so inhale enough to die.

THE BLACK BAG OWNER'S MANUAL

PART THREE: FALSE FACE

IDENTIFICATION

As everyone knows, some secret operations require false papers. To work extensively in Eastern Europe, for example, one must have several sets of papers: at least one major card or document for each nation, travel permits for being elsewhere than the alleged address, work cards or permits for each job claimed, frontier passes for infiltrating, incidental documents for the various areas, and funds. Each set must be under a different name so that the enemy can't put out an alert for Fedor Nens, or whomever, and pick up poor Fedor in Belgrade instead of Budapest. It can get confusing at times. It helps a little if the enemy has unified the documents required into a passport affair, but this hinders matters, as well--the entire item must then be created, and all the special steps required for a passport must be followed. Fortunately, the Peoples Peaceful Progressive Proletarian Paradise hasn't the economy or resources to create something comparable to the American or British passport, so the materials utilized are easier to reproduce.

Before getting too far afield, it is necessary to determine what the game is and how it is to be designated. Identification, or "ID," is vital for operations, but how is it obtained? What are the different terms for differently procured ID? Here, we will consider the latter question first. In general, there are four ways to procure ID in the field or from the Apparat HQ. These result in the following types of

ID: genuine improperly assumed, duplexed, forged, and counterfeited.

Genuine Improperly Assumed

This style of procurement might involve credentials slipped out of the enemy's office by a confederate or papers taken from a deceased person and assumed by another of the same general age, build, height, and so on. Terming the first "improper issue" and the second "improper assumption" will make the discussion easier to handle.

Improper issue is a very simple method, for a trusted clerk can fill out a phony list of specifics about an average individual, supply a nondescript picture, and approve the "verifications" filed. Most bureaus and offices run well with a minimum of paper-checking, so one ersatz application per week or month slipped in among the genuine ones will not be noticed. As long as all the answers are there and someone else has approved the forms, the documents will be processed in the usual manner. Any photograph submitted will moulder in the files and not harm anyone.

Photographs may be made up on order, with the clerk providing the photo of the user on demand, so that the papers will be "genuine" in all respects and the holder's photo will be on both the files and credential. The ID can be renewed in the usual manner without the slightest risk.

The clerk may also provide photos of genuine unknowns whose features won't precisely match anyone else's and sell

or issue these as new people require fresh papers. The descriptions and photograph will not precisely match, but there are many people going about with authentic ID which are a trifle off--too much or too little weight, a beard or none, or some difference in indicated and actual height. This isn't the least bit hazardous unless the differences are really blatant, for guards will look at the individual, then the papers, and try to get them to match without thinking about it. The papers may be old, or the photo may be outdated, or the individual more or less tired, or the photo a little fuzzy from lack of focus or wear. This type of ID can be renewed in a different area without any risk at all, for the bureaucrats and party bosses will not have the time or inclination to look up the photos and compare them under a glass when a customary ID renewal is made. The only difficulty is with fingerprints; they must match any on the ID, and if there happens to be a card of them with the application, the sets should match. Computerized fingerprint searches are the worst kind; but here, the agent simply stays away from situations which could get him printed by anyone skilled enough to study the cards and gets a new set of ID--avoiding official observation completely.

Improper assumption is a handy way to obtain new papers, either with the help of an indigenous resistance network or otherwise. In the first case, the resistance--physicians, hospital staff members, emergency medical aid personnel,

friendly police officiers, et al.--openly and knowingly conspire with the Apparat by pilfering the ID belonging to victims of accidents or illnesses. The victims are either listed as "John Does" or unknowns, for best effect--and the papers are issued to personnel who need to change their present identities. The ID might also be pilfered after the victims's name is given to the enemy authorities and the ID listed as "lost, strayed, or stolen" or allegedly turned over to someone else from the Secret Police. The durability of the "cover" afforded by this form of ID is shallower if the enemy knows the subject is dead.

In the second case, the agent obtains a job where he can obtain ID from critically ill persons or accident victims in order to procure one or more sets of ID. The Soviets are alleged to urge their agents to look up someone who has a superficial resemblance and kill him, hiding the body after removing the ID and effects--this crime will resemble the work of a mugger or robber who went too far. Another civilian handbook which discusses ID suggests much the same thing in a back-handed manner. The most secure system is to assume ID before the victim's death can be brought to anyone's attention so that the records will not show injury, death, etc. An easier method is to conspire with the indigenous resistance to procure such ID. Better choices would be single individuals, in moderate to good health, with no close friends or attachments. Conspiring with hospital staff would also allow phony

treatment records to be entered to the effect that the victim survived and was discharged.

Identification so assumed would have to be issued to persons who could pass as the original owner, a practice which would require keeping some sets for a longer period of time than is usually thought feasible. Consider such ID to be in the nature of donated blood--if needed, it will be available. If not, then certainly no harm is done.

Duplexed ID

This style of procurement of ID can be either a "short-term" or "long-term" approach. Each approach is useful to agents in certain situations, and both should be learned.

Short-term adoption of the identification of another person, with both parties being alive at the time, entails obtaining the papers belonging to another by theft, pilferage, or pocket-picking. The tactical uses of short-term ID are few--they are in crimes, in evasion (as supportive ID during the first day or two of the flight), or in brisk operations in general.

The original owner will note the loss of his papers, and if he is afraid of the government, he will report the fact at once as "loss" or the like--nothing that could connect him with any crime. The only advantage of this is that the enemy will tend to process strayed ID alerts in a different manner than stolen ID alerts. The usual patrol or sentry will not be

advised that Fedor Nens has lost his papers, but if a spy-hunt is on, he may be told that Fedor had his papers stolen. The moral is, never sandbag a citizen for his papers; get him drunk as a fiddler and abstract his credentials, but never "steal" them.

Long-term adoption is what the typical spy will do; these papers are duplicates of Fedor's own--possibly his lost or otherwise strayed papers. The agent lives in a different area while alleging to be Fedor and uses his papers in case of a street-check. If duplicates are requested, the agent must know the system for procuring copies. In some places, simply writing for basic ID (a birth certificate) will allow one to build up a folio of official ID. In other places, the agent may appear in person with all the vital statistics and be issued a basic birth certificate or other duplicates of existing papers. Of course, obtaining a full set of papers is a different situation--simply use them until they expire.

The reason agents can get away with using other ID is that they will not usually need to work at actual jobs in the area--the Apparat will pay them a salary. Thus, ID is only a "front"--it shows the name and address of a real person who has a genuine work record, and who is therefore properly accounted for by the Party of the Proletariat. Even if agents work at legitimate jobs and spy on their off hours, the second set of papers will serve to protect them. If questioned or apprehended while working at espionage, their true iden-

tities will be preserved if the state or the party has managed to find out a name or address. The state will not have the time or skill to seek out the doubles of the authentic workers.

The only difficulty with this technique might be that the assumed name appears on a pick-up list; being bagged for someone else's crime would be the height of irony. For this reason, it is best to seek out "respectable" groups of people before looking for a likely double: farm or other laborers aren't likely to do much but get involved in brawls and be picked up immediately. Library personnel are generally retiring people who maintain a low profile. Anyone who is quiet and set in a rut will suffice, actually. Avoid striving people and those who dress flashily or seem to be in the center of things. It would be better for a team of agents to look for each others' "doubles"; someone else can always pick a closer match than the party himself.

Duplexing from the basic ID is an easy matter. One need only select an individual of the same age and race, always looking for calm, quiet persons. With the basic ID, duplicates of the subject's other official ID with the agent's own picture on any cards or folders requiring this can be obtained.

Be certain, however, to do a thorough background check on the party. Some apparently shy and retiring people, those who are outwardly quite the dignified type, do an "animal farm" when out of their indigenous areas--go hog wild, go ape, and make

an ass of themselves. The author knows one very dignified educator who makes habitual use of the services of three prostitutes when at convention, and a staid librarian who gets a trifle jungle-jolly at "book fairs." It wouldn't do to emulate someone who corrupted someone's daughter or broke eighteen laws while on vacation or general holiday. Not at all.

Agents being sent abroad at their country's request would do well to duplex some individual and obtain full credentials rather than rely on officially issued credentials. There is always the chance of a leak or a corrupted, compromised, or double agent in the staff who'd find out that certain identification papers were being selected for operational use. Aside from the chance that the enemy would be informed of the assumed identity directly, other outlets pose problems for the agent. For example, Counterspy has published lists of agents' names. Journalists exist who'd never let patriotism or the Official Secrets Act stand in the way of a meaty story. Of course, the story would be meaty--the agent's own meat, blood, and viscera

Too, duplexing leads back to an innocent, genuine person and not a paper man who just popped into view for that particular operation if the enemy chooses to do some unofficial snooping. The extreme leakiness of the United States Department of Justice's "Alias Programme" should suffice to warn people in the desperate fields how very fine the thread is by which their lives hang. Doing the duplexing personally assures one

that the data is full and complete and represents a genuine person.

When obtaining the basic ID, finding out the date and place of birth plus the parents' names is necessary--order a copy of the birth certificate from a community not associated with the individual so that the mail does not go to the subject. If the investigation goes that deep, one will know of vehicle driving licenses and other credentials, and the possible presence of a passport. Obviously, an individual with neither will be better for all concerned. Take a test and obtain a driving license; expand on this and obtain an international driving license via the good offices of the Automobile Association.

With these two items of identification, apply (in the different area) for a voter's registration card and other credentials. If there are any medical problems and the individual is within the United States, obtaining a "Medic Alert" bracelet (Medic Alert Foundation, Turlock, California 95380) and ancillary ID of this nature is a fine idea. Get a copy of the subject's social security or social insurance card (the number should already be known). Assuming the individual carries one, request a copy of his draft card for military service, or see the Agency printing lab and get a duplicate made up.

Finally, go in with all this information and apply for a suitable passport from the Passport Office or designated application center. The clerks are told to watch for certain

signs of false use, but a spy who cannot fool the Passport Office had better go in for plucking chickens. If the drug smugglers can obtain false passports by the gross, a spy should be able to handle this matter with ease. The various credentials selected will be genuine and certifiably correct, so there is no reason why the agent should not get an authentic passport in a few weeks' time. In case of a snag, there is always the Agency behind one to rake the chestnuts out of the fire and put off the civil police.

Obtaining an immunization folder is also a good idea. If one has such a folder already, one should get a spare and take it in to a doctor, asking him to rewrite the information on the new folder, which is then devoid of name and address. The agent will add this later. "Spilling" some ink or the like on the cover will do to provide an excuse for refiling and rewriting the new booklet. Trading the front cover for a new one might also be possible. If no immunization folder is possessed, get all the shots required under the new name, and "revert" it later, after the assignment.

Finally, obtain some pocket trash to match the new name--engraved lighter, monograms on the billfold and luggage, laundry marks, etc. Get this to suit the economic image being created. Join a few innocent societies, take out a library loan card, get one's blood typed, and otherwise add items of identification that will verify the alleged identity.

After the mission is completed, hand in the passport so

that the Agency can advise the issuing agency that the passport was used for special missions. The individual whose name has been used can then apply for his passport later and get one with no difficulty.

If the other individual is in on the arrangement, it will be less difficult for all concerned; he can lend the other documents and stay pointedly out of sight for the time required. If this is not desired, it is always practical to duplex a dead individual. This is akin to tombstone-voting, except that one assumes the name, birthday, and other essentials of a person who died before any documents aside from the birth certificate could be processed. It is usually better to pick an individual who died in childhood but not in infancy. Arbitrary parameters are from two years of age up to perhaps sixteen years. This will avoid birth and death being listed in the same area and remarks on the certificate to the effect that the party had a terminal defect or illness. Make quite certain that the county, borough, or township of birth is different from that in which the child died. In most states in America, there is no connection between counties, and at the moment of writing there is no interchange of death records between states. Canada has the records tied into a central computer complex, and the British Isles tend to have such records collected at Somerset House in London. Still, Canadian and British agents can duplex the deceased with little difficulty.

With a valid birth certificate, one then goes forth and

obtains all the other articles of identification cited earlier and builds a packet for purposes of deception.

Forged ID

Forgery is a dangerous avenue to follow, for it makes it necessary to erase the original information on the cards and replace it with new data. If the document is to be subjected to careful inspection, or if the enemy has radio capability where a guard or patrol can call HQ and get verification of the alleged information, it would be wise to avoid this type of ID entirely.

Several forms of paper used for ID have slightly printed patterning which will be rubbed off during erasing or retouching. Removal of such patterning makes the entire document useless. Certain types of embossed cards have a painted-on covering that will craze when first impressioned and cannot be smoothed back or which wipes off with solvents used to remove the letter-highlighting inks. Those credentials with one-piece photodevelopment cannot have the photographs removed and replaced by another. Some of those IDs with photographs will have color-coding or patternings of the backgrounds which cannot be duplicated without reproducing the entire background. Other items of identification have "hidden" markings which are invisible to the naked eye but which can be spotted by ultra-violet or black light and which will be removed by the forging process.

Forged ID, in short, do not give the security commensurate

to the risks entailed in the forging. Avoid them except for desperate cases when they are the only form of ID available.

Counterfeited ID

This type of ID is much more reliable, although, like forged ID, it will not stand up to radio-verification. Its benefit lies with the ease and smoothness with which one can pass incidental street checks and other examinations. Counterfeiting is also suitable for replicating ID which are not usually issued or which wouldn't be issued to the subject.

Counterfeiting is an art form, actually, and a good counterfeiter can be an asset to any Apparat. Disposable items such as ration stamps, travel tickets, or passes are very easy to make in quantity so that displaced persons or those agents who must remain "invisible" can have the wherewithall for survival and operation without visiting the enemy issuers or offices.

The entire counterfeiting operation can be fitted into a cellar, preferably one next to a noisy shop or industry where the clatter of the press will be masked by the outside noise. Avoiding detection will be the first consideration.

The process itself requires a four-color press, so one must be obtained or sidetracked for friendly purposes. Purchased used in America, a standard 8½ X 14 offset press capable of this work will go for approximately 350 dollars. Any other tools necessary--page-perforating devices, rubber-stamp makers, cameras, metallic negative plates, etc.--should be laid in, of course.

A single-color press could be used in four runs with the same result. The press could be the same one used for propaganda, although it would be better to reserve one press for this work and have others detailed for propaganda, ration books, and travel tickets so as to spread the production about.

For creating anything, some matching-color basic stock in the proper thickness and texture is necessary. This may be white stock tinted and ironed, if nothing else; the color must match. Examine the color in all types of artificial and natural light to make certain it will pass properly.

If there is some sort of special patterning in the background--silk threads as in American money, or check-protector paper--the pattern and tint must be reproduced exactly. This calls for shooting pictures of the examples many times so that a complete series of patterns can be achieved. Create a negative of these so that a positive can be printed directly on the colored stock. The fine threads needn't be reproduced if they are not obvious on used examples: only blatant examples or special background need be considered. These backgrounds are printed first, in the same tint of ink used with the originals. This provides the basic stock for use as long as the enemy continues to issue items with that patterning on the background.

Ration books and other disposable items are unofficially made, but when copied they must have the proper look about them. Having several will make it easier to "lift" the serial-numbering letters and to create small lots of identically numbered tickets or stamps. The main difficulty with counterfeiters is

that they grow lazy and run off several thousand books with the same numbers, making it simple for the enemy to circulate a list of the bogus numbers. Actually, numbering is the most difficult job of all, for only a few dozen (if that many) replicas should be done with any one serial number. If the normal run is two ration books with the same number, count on six or eight, or even fewer, of the counterfeit books before changing the numbers. Following this rule will create less risk of discovery of the passers. The books will all be used up by the time the enemy finds out that a certain number has been counterfeited. Make the enemy smother in ersatz ration books or call for ton upon ton of red tape for even the most innocent stamp or ticket transaction, and the battle is won.

All obvious symbols must be removed from the item to be copied and blown up at least three times the their natural size. The numbers and background patterning are edited off so that just the symbol remains. This is touched up with a fine pen and india ink to make certain that the examples will reproduce properly. The master pattern is then reduced to the original size and duplicated at the proper spacing as many times as is necessary.

After looking closely at the original examples to see if there is any sort of deliberate indexing of the main pattern on the background print, print the master sheets for the ration or transpost-ticket sheets. Don't do any more than necessary for current needs, plus a few percent extra, in case the enemy

changes the format.

For serial numbers, carefully etch plates with several different numbers or use a loose-type press to create the duplicates. Some numbers may be pressed into the paper; in that case, use an adapted screw-press to reproduce the impressioned results.

For perforations or tear-strips, replicate the original with a wheel-knife with notches cut at the proper intervals. Cut apart to form sheets.

For covers, reproduce the basic designs and reserve them for use when the books are bound and stapled. If they are numbered like the tickets, run them through the press at the same time as the tickets so that each group has matching numbers.

Bind and staple, and the result is a convincing duplicate of the original enemy-issue book. Spread the duplicates out among the users so that no one has extra books, and supply them with a tearful story about how they bought the book, or found it, or were given it by a nice stranger, or were issued that book by HQ. There is little chance that small runs will be identified, but if they are, it is always handy to have a good excuse ready. The enemy can't punish all the black-marketeers, trusting types, fools, and dupes along with the spies.

Identity cards are more difficult, and for these, one needs to examine several copies of the cards--hopefully one or two that are freshly issued. Examine them under ultraviolet light

to see if the enemy has used any hidden printing to identify them--knowing how the enemy checks ID will help. There may be faint shadow-prints of a design in the background. Examine these with an illuminated magnification lens to determine whether they are just faintly printed, or if fine dots (quarter-tone printing) are used to achieve the result. Either way, designs must be reproduced in color and shading. If photographs are present, examine the backgrounds to determine if the enemy color-codes them or has a background material against which the people are photographed. Also look carefully to see if the enemy has used one pattern for original issue and another for duplicate issues of cards.

Is there an embossed seal? If so, this must be reproduced as nearly as possible either via etching or electroplating. Pay the most attention to the border and the ensign in the center, for the letters are standard type. It may be possible to steal one of the seals, camouflaging the job beneath a "fire of accidental origin" or war damage. If a related seal that is not as heavily classified and securely kept has the same design with different wording, steal this and remove the lettering. The latter can be replicated with metal letter-punches or etching and applied after the difficult design is affixed.

If necessary, make a drawing of the seal--in detail--showing the actual-size item beside it, and send the sketches to a custom seal-maker (who lives out of the area) for replication. This will cost between 200 and 300 dollars per seal.

Most domestic or foreign seal-makers wouldn't know, for example the Ruritanian Consular Seal or the Georgian Ministry of Information Seal if a Ruritanian or Georgian struck them over the head with it. Providing the money's paid, they will not bother excessively about it.

Otherwise, fudge it--drug-smugglers using stolen American passports lay a silver dollar on the replaced photograph and give a sharp blow with a hammer to create a passable replica of the Passport Office seal. If the document is to be carried in a pocket and will get bent and sweaty, with the seal catching the brunt of it, the impressioning or embossing will not remain readable for too many days. Anything, then, that creates a passable impression and that has the same outlines will suffice.

Is there a watermark in the paper? If so, and if it shows up on all the cards, it will have to be replicated. The easiest unofficial method of doing this is to create a stamp with the proper look with either rubber or a potato or turnip carved for the job and a solution of "water glass." Practice, and get the watermark down before printing bulk forms. The water glass will create a white, translucent cast to the paper that will pass for a watermark in the paper. With a good stamp and a proper solution of water glass, varnish, or shellac, it is almost impossible to detect the copy from the original. If there seems to be shading, do some press runs with the seal reproduced as an etching; more preparation is necessary for

lighter areas and less for the darker shadings. This will not pass if the card is perfectly fresh, but after some wear the "watermark" will look remarkably genuine.

Are there lines, letters, or numbers concealed within the paper? South Vietnamese money, for example, is usually prepared with concealed lines that are almost invisible when the notes are held in the hand but which show up well when the note is held up to the light. In the money, fine lines of material are compressed within the bills. In ID, these could be engraved or printed matter. To replicate, find out how thick the paper is, and find a half-thickness of the paper, glazed on one side. Use a very quick-drying ink to print on the paper before the image runs into the fibres. Once dry, laminate the top and bottom with an adhesive, and print as usual. This is touchy and very delicate work, but it can be done if the counterfeiters have the time and patience. In the case of letters or numbers, or fine lines that are rather straight, it may be practical to use rub-off transfer letters or perhaps scale-modelling stripping tape, which comes as fine as one sixty-fourth of an inch in some cases, instead of printing. These are especially good if the lines or letters are, as in Vietnamese or Cambodian currency, thick enough to raise a line on the bill. Laminate the two thinner sheets of paper atop this and index the lines, letters, or numbers against the printing on the card.

Are there phantom stamps or seals on the card that show up only under ultraviolet light? What color are they? Thanks

to the psychedelic counterculture, there are scores of clear ultraviolet-sensitive paints and dopes available, and more could be improvised afield from the usual chemist's stock of ultraviolet-sensitive elements. After choosing a tint and dilution that replicates the one used, see if it appears on the paper of the card itself or is "suspended" on one layer of a plastic lamination. Depending on where it is to be found, a positive or negative image will have to be made and etched, and the paper or plastic sheet appropriately printed. Do this under ultraviolet light to best position the invisible mark. Practice with rejects until the system is going perfectly. Printing on the bottom of a sticky plastic sheet will tend to hold better and not smear as much as on the slick top surface, although a paint or dope might alter retention of the print. Faster drying will also alter this; test to make certain that the counterfeit reproduces the look of the original in size and configuration as well as color.

Is the card made of plastic with raised lettering? Test the ink on the raised lettering and any design or color on the card with solvents such as acetone, naptha, etc. to see if the lettering will be easily wiped off along with the design. If this is the case--if all the surface printing wipes off with the solvent--the cards will have to be totally duplicated, and this is a very difficult job. If not, see if a "dead" or useless card can be ironed to remove the impressioning; use a plain clothing-iron, preferably one with a non-stick surface.

Remove all of the raised lettering, if possible. Reimpression cards with long metal letters or use captured or "borrowed" machine. If this last is practical, one may freely reproduce the printing or marking on the cards.

Is there any sort of color- or pattern-coded background color for the photograph? If so, find a paint (usually matte or semi-gloss) that is the same color and run a comparable background. If patterned, measure the pattern against some part of the subject (the ear is best) and reproduce it in that size via enlargement on photographic paper, or do free-hand art that will pass. There will be a portion of the design that will be concealed behind the head; if it is a national or party seal and seems to be typical, reproduce the rest of it as nearly as possible. Obtain a card for a small individual who has a narrow skull and little hair to get the "hidden" parts of the pattern, or examine several different cards to pick out the design usually hidden behind the heads of the subjects. Center the new subjects before the background so that the known parts are exposed to either side of the head. If there is a small silver-framed plate with white letters on a black background bearing name and number, obtain one of these bulletin plaques and go to work producing "authentic" enemy ID in that format.

Is the photo attached to the card or part of the basic format? In the former case, the format will have to be laid

out as part of a negative, the photo printed, and the cut-out picture attached to the card. In the latter case, the card's basic design will have to be made up, the lettering added for the personal details with the photograph's negative installed in the proper place. (This makes it easier to reproduce obscure enemy-controlled typewriter type, for the basic letters can be culled from other cards and arranged as layover or superimposed prints.) All of the card--two or three composite negatives--is printed on one sheet of photographic or photosensitive paper and then laminated in plastic. The one-layer cards (Polaroid or Dek/Electro) are forgery-proof, which usually makes them seem so secure that counterfeiting is never considered seriously.

Are fingerprints utilized on the card or ID? If so, the best route is to get a conventional fingerprinting outfit or at least a stamp-pad. Precision Dynamics Corporation (3031 Thronton Avenue, Burbank, California 91504) also produces the "Kleen-Print" fingerprinting device, which resembles a 35mm slide with a black face. The device is actually a thin rubber membrane coated with a black ink. The ink is slow-drying, and because it appears on only one side of the latex, it won't get on the subject's fingers. The membranes may be used only once before discarding, but they are a fine thing to have for preparing small lots of ID. The Apparat could obtain these in bulk; writing for further information on

the "Kleen-Print" system will result in two samples. They are more complicated than conventional ink-rolling, but are cleaner.

The individual's own fingerprints should be affixed to the card(s) in the proper places, in the proper order. The enemy may reverse the order if there is a great deal of counterfeiting going on; check to make sure. Get good clean prints on the paper, and allow them to dry thoroughly before laminating or packing the ID up for use, otherwise the prints might smear.

Is the document slightly tinted? Compare next to a dead-white card and experiment with scraps of card stock and vegetable dyes or commercial coloring agents until a tint is achieved which will match a new-condition original. A pint of solution will tint hundreds of ID cards. Iron and blot the test strips before comparing them to the original, and make certain they are perfectly dry (damp paper will seem to be darker). If engaged in printing a document that has a great deal of detail, it would be better to utilize waste examples from the printing run, as the comparative darkness of the overlaid design will make the credential seem darker than is actually the case.

How To Counterfeit

First, there needs to be an example of the credential for best work. Obtain this in any clandestine manner. Using a

press-camera, photograph the credential under strong direct light on high-resolution small-grain film.

Then, make a negative at least four times the original's size. This is necessary for retouching and editing-out the other information and for creating a blank for the cards or documents to follow. If writing goes straight through a line and it is impossible to edit this out, remove all but a few reference points of the line, and replace it with a fine line drawn over these points. This will be particularly necessary on fingerpring squares and signature lines. If needed, make a composite of three or more cards, with the details superimposed, and work with the references which match on all the cards. This last process is the most difficult.

Utilize india ink and china white to edit out the excess information, bearing in mind that the background (if present and extensive) will have to be reproduced on another negative, with the text and details edited out.

There will have to be as many edited negatives as there are colors on the original card, counting both front and back. With a four-color press the procedure will be easier; with a single-color press each stage will have to be done separately. Each negative will contain part of the original--the part exclusively devoted to that color. Each color will have to be indexed so that it will print on the cards in the proper lo-

cation when the press run is made. Even if parts of the detail will be masked by the data, they must be reproduced as nearly as possible; a sloppily done counterfeit will look like a counterfeit. Anyone who has seen several genuine cards or IDs will see something "odd" about the counterfeit example; this includes enemy patrols or checkpoint staff. Train or bus checkpoints are the worst, for the officer involved will have the chance to see several different genuine IDs within the space of a few minutes and will have the genuine image firmly in his mind when he sees the counterfeit. Such recognition means enlivening the lives of the other passengers as the spy or user of the counterfeit is hauled off the vehicle for further interrogation.

When corrected negatives are made, they should be photographed again to remove all signs of modification and reproduced as many times as the press will hold lifesize IDs. Each of these transparent film negatives should be indexed precisely where it will appear on the card and trimmed to the proper height (long axis). Some excess material should be left on the ends (short axis) for taping to the master holding sheet.

This master holding sheet is usually orange plastic; the process of taping up is called stripping. Each of the negatives must be carefully and properly oriented on the stripping sheet, and if more than one stripping sheet is used, holes cut out

for the ID must all be the same size. Sheets may be stacked to check proper orientation of all negatives.

Once properly stripped, the negatives are introduced to a lithographic plate so that the printing can commence. This plate is a sheet of light-sensitive aluminum. Make quite certain in laying the negatives on the plate that the stripped sheet will reproduce properly. For a positive printing, the negatives should be presented "right" side down.

A vacuum frame usually is used so that the plates will be given uniform pressure. If this is unavailable, careful work with a thick sheet of top-quality, clean, clear glass will serve to press the stripped sheet to the negative. Expose the lithographic plate to a high-intensity printer's arc light for 120 to 150 seconds. If arc lights are unavailable, some experimenting with a battery of powerful incandescent bulbs suspended over the developing plate will usually produce results.

The prepared plate is developed as per directions. This usually means that a desensitizing solution will be brushed, rolled, or rubbed on, after which the finished plate will be given a coat of lacquer. Gum arabic is then smoothed over the plate to prevent oxidation of the aluminum.

The prepared plate is then wrapped around the printing press cylinder and the "register," or alignment of the paper going through the machine and contacting the cylinder, is carefully checked. Checking the register frequently will pre-

vent overlapping or out-of-center printing.

While the plate is being prepared, the inks should be seen to. The precise color of the ink should be reproduced if the stock is pure white, although inks on any background tint or tinted paper will be just a little lighter because of the darker background. This will happen with every color except black, of course.

After printing any one color on the stock, the sheets must be allowed to dry for two to four hours, depending on how high the humidity is--the higher the humidity, the longer the drying. The sheets can be allowed to stay in the stack created as they are kicked out of the machine; transfer will not occur unless too much ink is being used or the stacks of partially counterfeited documents are disturbed.

When doing another tint or portion of the design, the stack of paper is presented to the machine in such a way that the feeding will be on the same register--check a sheet every so often to make certain. As the number of different operations on any one face increases, the chances of making an error or having one portion out of register increases. Fortunately, the enemy is usually too cheap and mean to provide such detailed ID to the Proletariat.

This process is repeated until the various stages have been printed on front and back and the blank credentials are ready for tinting. Test the tints on rejected examples to

make certain they match the original. There are two ways to do this: one is to tint each full sheet, blot and dry; another is to cut the sheets apart into indivdual units (weeding out the rejects) and test on the rejected examples before processing any one card. In the former case, the work is quicker; in the latter, errors are isolated to single cards or examples. When the original ID being used for a test and a comparison example are completed, fudge the data on some of the rejects before tinting so that the same color and shade are present; this makes it easier to compare the two and see if the tint is precisely like the original's.

If the enemy uses a special version of typewriter type which is impossible to get, the letters may be edited out of other negatives and combined on one-off printing negatives, or type may be made up replicating them. A screw-press is used to impression the type against the cards so that it rather closely resembles typewriter type. Running the card through a ribbonless typewriter for the assorted periods, commas, and so on will make it seem more genuine. Using a medium or dark grey ink or a lighter coating of black ink will more closely resemble typewriter type on an original card; bold black will look a bit odd, as though the ribbon were just changed.

Signatures are a genuine problem for many counterfeiters and must be studied closely. No two signatures, unless replicated by machine, are identical; the key points which

stand out as individual to signatures are the shape of the letters and the patterning of the name spelled out. To deal with this problem, the counterfeiter has two alternatives: replicate the signature as an electroplate etching and print or create a rubber stamp, or counterfeit the signature.

Replication is rather easy, as the signature is genuine--only once removed and re-created by hand-stamp or printing. This technique figured largely when Reinhard Heydrich was assigned the task of peddling the alleged Red Army plot to eliminate Stalin "for the good of Mother Russia." Heydrich first got the materials for replicating parts of innocent correspondence between Red Army officers and Wehrmacht officers pertaining to illegal military tests and trials within Soviet territory. For the basic materials, Heydrich had his men rifle the German High Command archives--without the permission of the German High Command, of course.

The result of the operation was to create a "Red Folio" (bound in genuine red leather) with Heydrich's text taking the form of letters to and from Red Army Command and German High Command to the effect that Stalin would ruin the Red Army and Russia and must be removed. In exchange for the Germans' promise to avoid any attack on the Russians while the purge was going on, the Germans were promised rather rich sections of the Ukraine. The only difficulty with the operation was in replicating the signatures of the Red Army officers; they weren't available for actual signing of the deadly documents, and a forgery would have been spotted.

In the end, the counterfeiters compromised: They created rubber stamps of the actual signatures, lifted from authentic documents. Where the inks were too thin to assure a good reproduction, this problem was solved by putting down a thin layer of glue on a glass plate, stamping the signature-stamp on this and then on an inked plate, taking the signature over to the documents. It was genuine because the signatures were actually removed from the genuine documents and reapplied to the ersatz plot papers.

This system makes perfect replicas, with one exception: If a ballpoint or nib pen is used in the original, there will be scratches on the paper fibres; these are missing on the stampings. Heydrich's crew of master counterfeiters and printers--many of them Jewish prisoners--had no cause to worry about this because the completed documents would be photographed and only the copies would be submitted. The quality of the reproduction would not have picked up things as small as rearranged fibres. This system will work with signatures created from fresh fibre-tipped pens or other non-scratching writing implements, or with credentials which are franked by rubberstamp or shielded within a plastic jacket. It will not work well with translucent or old fibre-tipped pens, where ink overlaps are obvious. These will have to be reproduced by hand.

Signing such efforts is more difficult, but not impossible. Where most would-be counterfeiters fall down on the job is in the attempt to produce a slow, labored copy of the

signature; this looks as though the signer had palsy--phony.

The secret for proper signature reproduction is to get the form of the genuine signature down pat and write as nearly as possible at the same speed as the genuine signer would, using the same or comparable pen-nib style and size or ball-point pen. The faster the forgery of the signature, the more likely it will be passable, providing the styles of the letters are the same.

Machine replication is more reliable than freehand, for it uses a scanner that follows the lines of the signature and which, via a moving arm, follows with a pen to reproduce the signature. This machine is utilized by government officials and executives who need to sign a great many documents of minor import and cannot delegate the authority. The machine will sign anything in any size from the very large down to the very small. With some signatures, a draftsman's pantographic frame will work, with the forger following the lines of the original very slowly and carefully, transferring the signature to the blank document. The pantographic reproduction is very slow and can easily suffer from the same jiggles and staggering lines as other slowly forged signatures.

All in all, the best system is to replicate the signature by plenty of careful practice on spare sheets until the lettering and size of signature are down pat; as long as the names seem nearly identical there will be little question, for most

guards are hard-pressed to notice the differences unless something has aroused their suspicions. Signatures are comparable to fingerprints in that they are unique to the original party who signed them but differ in that they can be replicated and are seldom, if ever, identical, one signing to another. These constant differences make it easier to slip in a duplicate without bringing on the attentions of the secret police of the Peoples Peaceful Progressive Proletarian Paradise.

For bulk reproductions, or the specific cases cited earlier, the use of rubber stamps is preferable. Creating rubber stamps calls for a more detailed printing array and greater assortment of skilled personnel.

Seals and stamps belonging to the PPPPP may be reproduced via rubber stamp, although the niggardly rate of issue of new stamps and the general wear and tear given them makes it rather simple to carve up a reasonable duplicate using a potato. Simply slice the potato across the grain, leaving a flat surface and a grasping portion, and carve out the meat in the manner of an etching or woodcarving. When the seal is in the proper configuration, ink and stamp on practice sheets until the results are as nearly perfect as possible. Replicate the amount of ink, the tint of the ink, and the design of the stamp, of course. This will call for patience and time; be prepared to utilize both freely. Eliminate all test sheets by burning and stirring the ashes, and grind up

the potato and eliminate the inked remains as soon as possible. This technique is usually acceptable with simple stamps such as frontier or directorate stamps that are affixed to documents to allow or show passage or access. Consular stamps or highly detailed items are more difficult; if possible, fudge by emulating a used stamp or one without much ink.

Unofficial documents must have names and seals in their proper locations. It just won't do to have a document "signed" by an officer or official who expired or was transferred prior to the date of alleged issue or to have the markings in the wrong places. Working from at least one original is preferable, as has been stressed repeatedly.

Aging the ID is best accomplished by the producers, unless the persons to whom the cards are issued have the time and security to age them themselves. The best system is to put the cards into a hip or side pocket and do a few days' work with them in place, getting them nice and sweaty. Alternately, they may be rubbed with ground coffee, sand, or dirt; or laid on the floor and walked over--if there is no threat of stamping them with recognizable ink or mud in a distinctive heel-print. Check the results with the available examples of smudged, worn ID of the same type.

Ancillary ID

The agent must have equipment and devices which will

stand as supportive ID. Also called "pocket junk," this material can be virtually anything that bears the same name as the other credentials. Identification may range from documents such as blood-donor cards, library cards, etc. to receipts, bank deposit cards or slips, store IDs, and even name tags sewn into clothing. Tags must be sewn in; a shirt or vest marked with ink will surely support the individual's present ID but would be a death-trap if the agent were to be passing under a different name and the clothing were to be examined. (An account of a student who verified his ID by way of a name tag sewn into his clothing has surfaced; allegedly, only a very trustworthy individual would admit that his mother sewed in ID tags.) Shoes, boots, and belts with the name stamped or marked on them are very secure ID for the party passing under that name--but are not suitable for evasion and other work. A cigarette tin or lighter with the alias engraved would be more useful; the items should be inexpensive enough to be disposed of with a minimum of psychic strain.

TACTICS FOR USERS OF COVER ID

Operatives or personnel whose tactical responsibilities require living under false ID must observe certain definite rules in order to remain operationally viable. Or, to put it another way, those who use false IDs must do certain things in order to remain alive.

The period of time spent changing from one ID to another can be long or short. The individual, if being hunted, may take time to transfer identities in a safehouse--to change outward configuration and learn a new life history. The individual may also "split-level" the credentials so that both histories are known concurrently and both sets of ID are present, if not carried. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages: the former takes a longer period of time to implement and ties down the individual while personal characteristics are modified. The latter offers more rapid changeover, but opens the way to serious errors if one forgets which ID set is present or switches details of presumed life history. The enemy is not above asking for another name, or asking (by accident or otherwise) if the prisoner or detainee is John Jones when he's bearing papers claiming to be Sam Smythe. Making a error in the telling could be rather nasty; asserting that one's father was Albert Llewis while the papers happen to say that he was Morris Leif could lead to the truth room.

Other tactical matters involve the disposal of real or entailed property; abandonment of property is always a psychological problem for the responsible individual. Hesitating in order to dispose of property could be a problem, to say the least. Too, persons who buy property are often tempted to

"secure" the investment by buying it in the genuine name or with a check drawn on the genuine account. Furthermore, if the property is purchased, the individual may well be tempted to use it while operating under an alternate ID, a practice which could spell trouble if the device, vehicle, or gear is serially numbered or otherwise identified as the property of another individual. This could lead to police confrontation or arrest by the secret police. The best route is to own used, secondhand effects that could be discarded or eliminated with less worry. Leasing or renting expensive articles is preferable to purchase, for then the property may be left behind with less trouble. All in all, property consists of personal articles, business articles, and home articles.

Personal articles include clothing, baggage, and the like. Garments and other apparel should be available from stores and shops organic to the area. They must not be from any chain store or shop that is identified as being from a different region, and if they bear distinctive tags, these should be removed. They should all reflect the same economic image--a 500 dollar suit and underwear from J. C. Penny's, a shirt of fine silk and a classic tie with Bostonian shoes would both seem a trifle out of place. Clothing must appear in various shades of wear, not as though it is all new or all used to the same degree. As a general rule, clothing suitable for a specific

economic image needs to be bought a bit at a time and stored away after being "broken in" and worn a trifle so that the newness is gone. In addition, anyone buying a complete outfit at a particular store would be considered to be a valued customer and remembered there.

Baggage should be a common sort that will not attract any attention. Marking stripes aren't a good idea, but if necessary they can be simulated with cloth tape. If the individual is known to have a set of plain colored luggage, add some distinctive stripes to alter this information. Bold colors and markings tend to distract attention from the person carrying the luggage. (Early helmets had cock's combs, horns, and bright colors to attract attention and hence avert the evil eye. The same principle will work with luggage right now; however, instead of redirecting a hexing evil eye, the evil eyes averted belong to secret police personnel.) It goes without saying that bright stripes should not be adopted by everyone, nor should any special type or model of bag be utilized for espionage; OSS agents in Europe got so that they could identify other operatives because of a distinctive type and model of suitcase. Remain completely invisible by using and wearing just what the people in the area use and wear.

Business articles are tools of a trade adopted by the operative to further his cover. It goes without saying that personnel who are undergoing evasion and escape from enemy

clutches need to ditch the tools associated with a "blown" cover. For an individual emulating or simulating any type of employment, tools are essential. These could range from a pocket notebook, calculator, and slide rule to a full kit of tools for a laboring job and a construction worker's helmet. All such tools must be "used" in outward appearance so as not to produce any curious questioning. While it's perfectly true that workers can get new items, and can even be forced to buy a whole new kit if someone steals the original, the majority of those so employed will not have collections of unworn, new tools.

Procuring tools may be done in several ways: the quickest and most dangerous is to steal a full set from some worker. Not only is the theft risky, but the party involved could easily recognize the tools later and start a to-do about it. A bit slower method would be procurement of a set from a worker who's moving, has retired, etc. Personal knowledge and watching the newspaper advertisements for such articles will constitute the most likely avenue for procurement. A more difficult approach would be to buy a full set and learn how to use them on a job, getting them worn and grimy in the process. This is preferable; a worker must know how to handle his tools.

Home articles include, first, the dwelling. It should be leased, rented, or bought in the name of the existing ID.

Lease or rental are the better avenues to adopt, actually. Furniture is likewise important; it will be more economical to buy secondhand or cheap new furniture and install it about the home. Keep the fittings within the economic profile that is desired.

Getting the dwelling in the proper economic range is vital, but that goes without saying. It should look like the residence of the genuine identity and not be a bit off the beaten track or in a rental area that is not usually utilized by the people the operative wishes to emulate. Working in a city is advised on the whole--all manner of odd individuals can exist in cities without attracting the attention that a village-based or rural-dwelling party would. The cover must be deeper and more secure for village or rural operations; in cities, all that is important is convincing the neighbors and the building supervisor of the authenticity of the "employment." It is also possible for operatives to maintain double identities in a metropolitan area-- one to live under after work and one to conduct operations under. This sort of thing is not practical in rural communities because of the small population.

While most any furniture will do, all the appointments must also be within the image desired, and it is useful to have a few alternate locations where the furniture might be altered to create hiding places or storage areas for tools of the trade. Personnel will be again advised to secure articles

which fit in with secret storage formats and the desired economic image.

Spies have been caught before now because they spent more money than their apparent incomes warranted. Communist spies tend to collect luxuries. The capitalistic nations are supposedly very primitive and crude, and Mother Where-ever is the peak of culture and freedom, but the spies like "roughing it" in capitalistic nations because of all the comforts afforded. They will collect large stocks of refrigerators, foodstuffs, and the like. This practice should be avoided.

Vehicles or transportation constitute a variable-importance item for operatives. In one sense, the use of a vehicle will allow extreme mobility without reliance on public transportation and will permit the agent to travel rather widely, thereby expanding his operational area. On the other hand, a vehicle is a physical object that can be identified by sight or serial numbers and could either be spotted by a secret policeman or connected to certain odd activities. If the individual uses the machine while under the alternate identity, there exists a very real chance of being stopped and arrested for vehicle theft; this would lead to arrest as a spy. Having vehicles for every identity would be expensive and risky, for there is the likelihood that several different garage or storage payments would need to be made, as well as several different insurance and other payments required. There is also the likelihood that the individual might inadvertantly deal

with the same service station under both IDs, which would let someone not connected with the operation see both vehicles.

Should the vehicle be registered, it would be better to consider it a "company car" or the like and have it registered solely under the firm's name. This way, employee ID cards could be made up for the agent and all his alternate IDs, and "everyone" could drive the vehicle with less risk. If there is a static check of the vehicle, it will be revealed to be a business car; just the name of the firm which is being used as a front will be given. Nothing terribly useful will come of this, for "company business" or "purchasing trips" cover plenty of country. A vehicle that is supposed to belong to "Smythe Oriental Imports, Ltd." could show up late at night, early in the morning, along the docks, deep in the country, and in other unusual locations where a private car would draw attention. A commerical traveller could be forced to sleep in the car, would be expected to prowl about for women, and might take "short cuts" that could easily get him hopelessly lost in interesting areas.

Leasing the vehicle or buying an older model is better than obtaining a brand-new machine and operating it with pride. For one thing, a leased or used vehicle could be expended or "lost" with less qualms because it would not represent as great an investment, financially or emotionally. If handled in the name of a business, and if the business

is not directly connected with the ID that is "dirty" or used in espionage, there is less of a chance that the enemy would be looking, for example, for a 1976 Fiat 800 because the owner of record was a spy. This offers a bit of a respite for personnel to escape by vehicle and avoid the center of the most intensive searching.

The type and model of vehicle is important, especially if listed as a company car or leased for that purpose. For commercial travellers with a large array of samples, a rather large sedan would be necessary--any large American four-door machine will suffice. A Checker Marathon would apply, as well as any "utility" vehicle, excepting luxury cars. For persons alleging to be buyers or executives without a large array of samples or papers to haul about, any smaller car would apply--compacts or sub-compacts, two-doors, and the like. James Bond and the other fictional spies who run about in Aston-Martins aside, sports-cars don't fit in with the low-profile image required for an operative's long life and retirement with the usual complement of limbs and organs. The only people who require sports-cars are couriers and related operators, who have to transport "dirty" cargoes and need the capability of evading or outrunning secret or civil police vehicles. With the advent of helicopter gunships, radio communications, etc. the need for hot motors to evade or avoid capture is lessening. Only bootleggers and drug-runners have a need for such vehicles.

The color chosen for the vehicle is also a factor. Choosing the most common colors for operational use in the areas involved is best; this means that a bright red vehicle could pass muster in, we will say, Rome, where red Fiats are the norm. As long as the tint is fairly common and can't be tied to one special car, everything will be fine. The slavish official conformity and interest in purchasing vehicles for police work in black, dark blue, or white is happily fading, and even the Drug Enforcement Administration arm of the United States government is now using nice little Honda Civics in popular colors. It is always pleasing to see the civil law enforcement units adopting professional tactics and procedures. This is not to imply that they are unprofessional, for they are quite good in their fields, but rather to note that they are adopting systems known to professional operatives in espionage with good effects.

The vehicle must be in good condition and not banged apart or severly rusted or damaged. Even if the car is very common, it is practical to call for alerts and have individuals or secret police units be on the lookout for, shall we say, a late model Fiat, model unknown, with red paint and a deep horizontal scrape down the left side and a rusted-out left rear fender. Even if the vehicle is perfectly ordinary, it is still possible for it to be identified by damage or certain abnormalities brought on by wear. Care in this regard

serves a two-fold purpose: first, the vehicle cannot be as readily identified if someone is searching for it; and second, the vehicle will be more reliable if all maintenance is performed on a schedule.

Cleanliness is almost next to godliness. The vehicle must be kept perfectly clean inside and out. Kept clean inside, there will be less chance that a search of the machine will turn up any discards that will identify the agent. Kept clean outside, there will be less chance that the vehicle will be identified as having done a great deal of travel. Removing signs that could indicate a great deal of travel should be done with all operational material--clothing, shoes or boots, and vehicles. If the car or scooter is garaged, it would be better to keep it washed down well so that the employees or attendants will not be able to remark that the car got a great deal of use from the look of the mud and dust.

Another advantage of having a vehicle in a common color, and one which can be left in really desperate situations, is the chance that the operative could pilfer licenses and other identification from similiar vehicles in another area. This is risky, illegal, and dangerous but should also be considered when choosing make and model.

Optional appointments or trinkets on the vehicle can go a long way towards identification of that particular machine, so the choices should be weighed carefully. Special hood dec-

orations must be avoided and custom parts applied only when they are common enough to be nondistinguishing. Ornamentation on the machine is somewhat childish and risky.

DITCHING OR ELIMINATING ID

Credentials which have outlived their usefulness must be disposed of in such a manner as to preclude discovery and resultant alerting of the secret police that the individual bearing those papers has ceased to "exist." Papers and credentials may be buried or burned with little difficulty--just be certain that they stay buried or are completely burned. This means making certain the hole utilized is well camouflaged afterwards or making certain the documents are totally consumed. Ashes should be stirred after the paper or plastic is consumed to make doubly certain.

Housing may be left as it is, or it may be seriously disturbed to suggest that it has been searched from top to bottom. The latter might confuse the issue by making it seem as though someone else had an interest in the affair. Stepping out without taking anything from the house or apartment is preferable, for the enemy will then be at a loss as to whether or not the individual has indeed fled. If the house or apartment looks ordinary, the foe may waste time awaiting return when he could be concentrating full energies on apprehension of the suspect.

Disposing of the vehicle is another vital matter, for it will be a link no matter what happens. The safest route is to leave it unlocked, door ajar, with the keys in the ignition in a rough part of town. Letting the indigenous population take care of it via theft and stripping will not be connected to anything covert. Certain precautions will need to be taken--in Northern Ireland, for example, a vehicle abandoned or even left for a bit along the road will arouse suspicion. Immediate police interest in the machine wouldn't be a good idea.

"Cute" methods of disposal such as simulating an accident by driving the machine off a hill or into a body of water are not recommended because of the damage and the likelihood that the car will not sink immediately or be completely destroyed. A vehicle may burn if run over a hill, and the fire will not be secret. These techniques aren't too practical in heavily populated areas, although they might work in specific cases, such as along mountain roads that aren't equipped with guardrails or which have thick growth along the bank. Some ponds or lakes are so little frequented that rolling a vehicle down the bank will not be noticed. Rolling the car down a landfill bank well away from the road may be useful in some areas--simply heave a brick or large stone through the rear window to simulate an accidental event, place the weight over the accelerator pedal, and start the car up. Let the machine

drive itself over the edge and down the bank.

NONINVOLVED ASSOCIATES

Finally, agents in an operational area must not become involved in any sort of emotional liaison. Not only will the presence of a companion be a handicap and a security breach, it will slow down the agent's response time to danger. In addition, anyone close to the agent is likely to have information that could compromise the operation or lead to capture. This topic might seem far afield from ID, but in fact it forms an integral part of the complete picture; an agent who is devoted to family or others is hindered greatly. A whole family might be equipped with false ID and all relocate together--this is possible, but not practical. Those not presently with a family would be better to avoid the matter entirely.